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What does it mean to read, and to engage with, a work of fiction? In this thesis, I 
develop an account that explores the relation between fiction reading and the reader’s 
narrative identity. Starting with an investigation of Paul Ricoeur’s account of narrative 
identity and of Kendall Walton’s account of the nature of representations, I set out and 
argue for my own model of fiction reading. My account is based on two starting 
assumptions: first, that human beings are entangled in stories throughout their lives, and 
second, that emotions are complex and have a narrative structure. I argue that during the 
reading process, the fiction reader creates her own narratives which contain not only the 
story provided by the work of fiction, but also event sequences from her own 
experiential memories. I investigate the creation and the influence of self-conscious 
emotions which are generated during the reading process, especially when a reader 
identifies with a fictional character from within. I consider how and why these fiction-
induced emotions can continue after the reading is finished, and how these emotions can 
motivate the reader to engage in self-reflection and to refigure her self-narrative. My 
account examines a new topic: the interactive influence of fiction reading and the fiction 
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What does it mean to read, and to engage with, a work of fiction? The reading 
experience often makes us readers feel absorbed in the fictional events, as if we were 
transported into a world apart from our daily lives. The deepest absorption occurs when 
we manage to empathize with fictional characters. Many readers value fiction reading in 
particular because it offers them the possibility of escaping from their usual troubles and 
imagining a different life, experienced through a fictional person in a story. In fiction, 
there are no constraints as to what can happen in the story, with the exception of those 
imposed by the work of fiction itself. We can slay a dragon to save a princess, gain 
intimate knowledge of the prostitutes of Montparnasse, or ride to the South Seas along 
an iron equator belt on a horse on roller-skates. We do not need to explain or justify 
what we imagine when we are engaged with a work of fiction. Compared to the risks we 
run in real life, the risks of reading fiction lie in different areas, and they appear to be 
less pressing. Whereas real life has to be continually negotiated with the world and 
society, imagining fiction needs only to be negotiated with our self, our hopes and fears 
and our moral values, and we can do that at our leisure. Reading can be uplifting and 
pleasant, or disturbing, or emotion-provoking. Reading can arouse strong feelings, 
especially when we feel for a fictional character from within. We rave against 
repression together with Jane Eyre, bursting with outrage against her cousin who plays 
her nasty tricks and gets away with it. We feel the dagger in our heart when Scarlett 
O’Hara finally realizes that she loves Rhett Butler, and is rejected by him. We feel the 
desperation of not being able to clear ourselves from unjust suspicion with Oliver Twist 
who realises that his benefactor must take him to be a thief. 
What exactly happens to us when are deeply engaged with a work of fiction, 
and how does our reading experience relate to our real life, in the real world? We would 
not be able to experience emotions in the fictional world unless there was some 
connection between the two worlds, between what we perceive and feel in the fictional 
world and what we have experienced in the real world in the past, what made us who we 
are. This connection can only be brought about by us, by the reader herself. Our lived 
self is engaged with a work of fiction – even if we leave our daily concerns outside, 
there is something of our self which we bring into the reading process. What is the 
relation between our own life story and the fictional story we enter? This question has 
not yet been fully explored, and in my account of fiction reading, I use a new approach 
to gain deeper insights into this issue. 
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My account is based on the assumption that, as Wilhelm Schapp puts it, we 
human beings are always entangled in stories.1 Stories put us into relationships with 
others, and these relationships can be the cause of emotions. This does not only happen 
during our daily lives, with real people, but also during fiction reading, with fictional 
people. The fiction reader tends to create different kinds of narrative which are more or 
less loosely based on the work of fiction. In these narratives, both the reader herself and 
the fictional character are somehow entangled in the story. I am particularly interested 
in the nature of these entanglements: how they emerge, who is in the lead, how they are 
driven, and what consequences they have for the reader. Hence, narratives play an 
important part in my inquiry. 
I argue that, typically, the fiction reader does not get entangled only in one 
narrative, but in several narratives. In each of these narratives, there is a different kind 
of relationship between the reader and the fictional character she is interested in. In my 
model of fiction reading, I categorize three different kinds of narrative that the reader 
develops during the reading process. For each of these kinds of narrative, I explore how 
emotions can be evoked, how these emotions can develop, and how they can influence 
the reader’s self and her self-narrative. 
There have already been endeavours to explore the connections between fiction 
reading and the reader’s self,2 but they have not used the concept of narrative to 
illuminate the degree and the possible development of the reader’s involvement with a 
work of fiction. My contribution to already existing accounts of fiction reading is built 
upon understanding the connection between the reader’s narrative identity and the 
narratives which emerge during the reading process. 
As a basis for my investigations, I bring together the works of two very 
different writers on narrative: Paul Ricoeur and Kendall Walton. I create my own model 
of fiction reading, drawing on, but also extending, both of these accounts. Paul 
Ricoeur’s account of personal identity differs from other accounts by introducing a 
hermeneutic approach to examining a person’s self. It is part of Ricoeur’s account of 
narrative identity that we engage with fiction to develop our identities, and it is part of 
Walton’s account that our engaging with fiction has an impact on our lives. As well as 
showing how each of these accounts can help to fill a significant gap in the other, I shall 
                                                 
1 ‘Wir Menschen sind immer in Geschichten verstrickt.’, Schapp 2012, 1. 
2 See especially Goldie 2012, Keen 2010, Stroud 2008, Coplan 2004, Walsh 2003, Ricoeur 1992, Ricoeur 
1991d, Ricoeur 1988, Iser 1972. 
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argue that important lacunae remain with respect to the influence of fiction reading on 
the reader’s self. I fill the lacunae in their accounts with my own model of fiction 
reading. 
Part I of this thesis provides an introduction to and a discussion of Ricoeur’s 
account of narrative identity. Contemporary philosophy provides theories that attempt to 
explain how personal identity is constituted, and how it persists over time. Among these 
models, accounts of narrative identity have been gaining importance in recent 
discussion.3 In his model of narrative identity, Ricoeur holds that a person represents 
her self by a narrative that she weaves, and continuously refigures, across the events of 
her life. In this process, a person has two roles: she is the author of her own life in as far 
as she integrates the contingencies of the past into her on-going story, and she is also the 
protagonist in her own narrative. Ricoeur says that fiction reading plays an important 
part in the refiguration process of our self-narrative. By identifying with characters in 
fictional stories, we test and evaluate various ways of interacting with the world in our 
imagination and apply some of them to our self-narrative. Thus, reading fiction helps to 
shape our narrative identity. 
Regarding the reading process as such, however, Ricoeur is content to describe 
the reader as engaging in thought experiments which can – after reflection – influence 
the reader’s self-narrative. He does not investigate how the reader can develop real-life 
emotions during the reading process, or how reading-induced emotions can be 
instrumental in leading the reader towards self-reflection. These are significant gaps in 
his model, and filling them will give a fuller insight into the process of self-reflection 
and the development of self-narrative. 
Part II gives an overview of Walton’s account of engaging with a work of 
fiction. In aesthetics, Walton cast a new light on the role of the reader and her emotions 
by developing a theory about the nature of representations. He interprets the reader’s 
engagement with a work of fiction as participating in a game of make-believe. Hence, 
Walton’s account has the potential to help to fill the gap that I have identified in 
Ricoeur’s account. 
However, Walton’s account is also incomplete in two respects. According to 
Walton, the reader accepts the rules of the fictional world prescribed by the author, and 
makes-believe that the characters in the novel exist, and that he feels for them ‘from the 
                                                 
3 See especially Schechtman 2014, Goldie 2012, Atkins 2008, Strawson 2007. 
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inside’. Walton himself lists among the things that are still left to do to complement his 
model ‘the specific ways in which such participatory experiences contribute to our 
lives’.4 Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity can contribute to fill this gap in Walton’s 
theory. 
The additional gap I see in Walton’s account is that when he is considering the 
affective impact of fictions, he focusses exclusively on episodic experiences rather than 
long-term changes. For Walton, the reader’s engagement with a fictional work leads to 
physiological-psychological states that can be identified as the affective part of an 
emotion. Walton does not go beyond the immediate emotional effects of fiction-reading. 
I argue that the reading experience, in connection with accompanying imaginings, often 
triggers a chain of self-conscious emotions in the reader, even if the starting point was 
only a fiction-induced affective state. In my view, this is an important link between the 
reading experience and the reader’s subsequent self-reflection. In order to account for 
this, I will develop a new account of fiction-reading. 
In Part III, the main body of my work, I lay out my own account and show how 
it fills the gaps in both Ricoeur’s and Walton’s account of the reader’s role in fiction 
reading. I do this by examining four questions: 
1) What happens to the reader when she imagines a character(f)5 from within? 
2) Which kinds of narrative are created or influenced during fiction reading? 
3) How can emotions be evoked during fiction reading? 
4) If fiction reading leads to self-examination, does this also direct the reader 
towards a more realistic self-narrative? 
 
Current accounts of fiction reading focus primarily on the question of whether fiction 
reading has an influence on the reader’s future actions. The attention paid to this issue is 
important from an ethical and educational point of view, but it tends to neglect the 
intricate fabric of emotions that is triggered within the reader whilst they are reading. 
This web of emotions is not measurable from the outside, by observation of the reader’s 
actions, but only from inside, from the reader’s self and the story which weaves her life 
together with the world she lives in. The outcome of my investigations will be a deeper 
                                                 
4 Walton 1990, 273. 
5 In my discussion, the term ‘character’ is used in two different senses, either to denote a fictional 
character, or the character traits of a person. To differentiate between them, and to avoid confusion, I use 
different notations: ‘character(f)’ is a fictional character in a work of fiction, and ‘character(p)’ is 
character as an aspect of a person. 
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understanding of the effects of fiction reading on a person’s narrative identity, and thus, 
on her self and her self-unity. 
 
A Plan of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is structured in the following way: 
 
Part I focusses on Ricoeur’s model of narrative identity. In chapter 1, I give an overview 
of his account. An important feature of Ricoeur’s account is the definition of two 
aspects of personal identity which are not reducible to each other: the object (idem) and 
the lived self (ipse). In chapter 2, I compare Ricoeur’s model to other accounts of 
personal identity (psychological continuity accounts, bodily continuity accounts, other 
narrative identity accounts). This chapter includes a critical evaluation of the accounts 
of Derek Parfit, Eric Olson, Marya Schechtman, Kim Atkins, Christine Korsgaard, Peter 
Goldie, and Galen Strawson. I explain why Ricoeur’s model gives a richer account of 
personal identity than these other models. 
In Part II, I present Kendall Walton’s account of fiction reading. In chapter 3, I 
give an overview of his model of fiction reading as a game of make-believe, focussing 
on the topic of reader participation in fiction. I also discuss critical objections to this 
account by Noel Carroll and John Gibson. I show that Walton’s account of the reader’s 
playing a game is compatible with Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity. I also 
identify a gap in Walton’s account, which I am going to fill by the account I offer in 
Part III. 
The main body of my own account is contained in Part III. 
In chapter 4, I give a high-level outline of my complete model of fiction reading 
in connection with narrative identity. 
As the investigation of emotions is important for my account, I outline the 
notion of emotions that I adopt in chapter 5. I assume that emotions are intentional and 
structured, and that they develop in a way that takes narrative form. 
In chapter 6, I investigate the reader’s involvement in a work of fiction during 
her actual reading experience. I distinguish between three levels of participation in 
fiction reading, and I investigate what happens to the reader when she identifies with a 
character(f) from the inside. I define three types of narrative the reader can be involved 
in while engaging with a work of fiction: the other-narrative, the self-in-other-
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narrative, and the other-in-self-narrative. This is an important step for the 
development of my account: in the following chapter I claim that these three types of 
narrative differ regarding the chain of emotions they can invoke in the reader. 
In chapter 7, I pick up the notion of the three types of narrative which the reader 
can weave during fiction reading, and I argue that each type of narrative can trigger a 
complex structure of emotions. However, there are typical emotion chains for each of 
these narrative types. I say that self-conscious emotions play an important part in this, 
and I investigate the nature of reading-induced self-reflection. I argue that self-reflection 
is usually caused by self-conscious emotions, and that the nature of these emotions 
governs the depth and the direction of self-reflection. 
In chapter 8, I compare my account of fiction reading with Ricoeur’s account. I 
argue that although Ricoeur does think that the reader’s emotions form an important 
factor in the reading process, he stops exploring them too early. Ricoeur says that 
catharsis frees the reader from emotions, thus enabling her to learn from fiction. I 
challenge this view, pointing out that the emotions generated by fiction reading are too 
complex to be represented in this simple way. In addition to this, I argue that Ricoeur’s 
account of self-reflection is too optimistic. In my view, self-reflection does not always, 
as Ricoeur claims, lead to a more realistic self-narrative and an improved self-unity. 
In chapter 9, I compare my account of fiction reading with Walton’s account. I 
argue that Walton does not pay enough attention to the imaginings the reader has 
alongside the imaginings prescribed by the text. These subsidiary imaginings link the 
reader’s experiential memories and their own mini-stories to the fictional story. I argue 
that the subsidiary imaginings play a large role in the development of the self-in-other- 
and the other-in-self-narrative, and that they often spawn chains of self-conscious 
emotions. Walton does not investigate how the emotions which are generated during 
fiction reading persist and develop within or beyond the reading process. Hence, he 
misses the opportunity to explore reading-induced self-reflection and its possible 
consequences for the reader’s self-narrative and self-unity. 
In the summary of Part III, I recapitulate my account of the influence of fiction 
reading on the reader’s narrative identity. As a main point, I stress the importance of 
investigating the different kinds of narrative the reader weaves around the fictional text. 
These narratives can be sources of self-conscious emotions which often persevere after 
the reading process, urging the reader to reflect on her self-narrative, and sometimes to 
refigure it. 
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PART I: NARRATIVE IDENTITY 
1 Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity 
 
In this chapter, I am going to outline Paul Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity as he 
presents it. His work follows the tradition of so-called Continental Philosophy, which 
takes a different approach to questions of personal identity than the Lockean approach 
standardly taken within what is commonly understood as Analytic Philosophy. Ricoeur 
searches for the ‘hermeneutics of self’,6 combining the tradition of Husserlian 
phenomenology with philosophical hermeneutics.7 
In his main work on this topic, The Self as Another (1992), Ricoeur is primarily 
concerned with the central dilemma from which human beings suffer. As we are 
embodied, and experience the world around us through our body, we are subject to the 
restraints to which the physical world submits us. But we also see ourselves as agents 
and feel responsible for our actions. We are both objects and agents in our lives. This 
tension is often illustrated by the example of a person grasping her own hand. She 
experiences touching her hand as if it was an object, and at the same time she has the 
subjective feeling of being touched.  
I perceive my own body as both a subject and an object. Because of this 
ambiguity, my self cannot be completely reduced to a physical object, and my 
perception of myself is active as well as passive.8 The irreducibility of these two aspects 
of personal identity plays a pivotal role in Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity. 
In sections 1.1 to 1.6 of this chapter, I am going to show how Ricoeur derives 
his two-level view of personal identity (objective and subjective) from factors that 
influence the human situation: perception, embodiment, action, and responsibility. As a 
next step, in sections 1.7 and 1.8, I am going to outline Ricoeur’s view of mimesis as 
story-telling, and of the links between fiction and self-narrative. Finally, in sections 1.9 
and 1.10, I shall set out where Ricoeur sees connections between narrative unity and the 
unity of one’s own life. 
 
                                                 
6 Ricoeur 1992, 4. 
7 I shall explain this in detail in the next section. 
8 Atkins 2005, chapter 4. 
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1.1 Ricoeur and Hermeneutics 
 
As a first step towards presenting Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity, I shall give a 
brief summary of the philosophical framework on which he builds his model. He 
embeds his theory in two interconnected fields of research: phenomenology and 
hermeneutics. Being embodied in the world, he says, gives us sensations which provide 
an inseparable link between body and mind. Every sensation which we experience has a 
horizon of its own, extending over space and time. The structure of such an experience 
can be read and interpreted using the tools of hermeneutics. As Ricoeur’s model of 
narrative identity hinges on the link between the body and the experienced self, I shall 




Phenomenology as a philosophical discipline investigates the structure of different 
kinds of experiences. It deals with what experiences ‘feel like’ in our acts of 
consciousness. For philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty9, 
phenomenology does not restrict itself to investigating sensory experiences such as 
seeing, touching or hearing, but also includes the way in which we experience memory, 
emotion, volition, embodied action, social activity, and the self. The structure of these 
experiences requires intentionality – the experience is always directed towards an object 
of our lived world. Husserl holds that this directedness is possible only through the 
mediation of particular concepts or images.10 
Husserl’s method of reduction or epoché (bracketing) stipulates that all 
naturalistic assumptions about the world must be put ‘out of play’ so that the 
phenomenologist can attend to the phenomenological mode of presentation of objects 
without importing naive presuppositions about their attributes or their existence.11 In the 
phenomenological mode of presentation, the focus is on my experience of the perceived 
object, and specifically the content or meaning of the object in my experience. The 
phenomenological presentation of objects depends on instruments that mediate between 
                                                 
9 Merleau-Ponty 2005 
10 Smith 2011. 
11 Husserl 1997, 91. 
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the world and the experiencer. These instruments are the sensory organs (of sight, 
hearing, touch, smell, taste) given by human embodiment. 
Where the experience of being an embodied worldly subject is concerned, 
Merleau-Ponty claims that the essence of subjectivity is bound up with that of the body 
and that of the world because the subject that I am cannot be separated from my body 
and the world I live in.12 In opposition to the Cartesian model which separates mind and 
body, Merleau-Ponty holds that thoughts and sensations are possible only if there is a 
background of perceptual activity that we already understand in terms of the body.13 
Here, Merleau-Ponty goes a step further than Husserl regarding the role he sees for 
human embodiment. For Husserl, bodily intentionality is a phenomenon that bridges the 
gap between consciousness (the subject world) and reality (the object world). Merleau-
Ponty has the stronger view that the body in its perceptual capacity can be equated to 
the lived I. For Merleau-Ponty, embodiment blurs the distinction between subject and 
object: ‘When we say that the perceived thing is grasped “in person” or “in the flesh” 
(leibhaft), this is to be taken literally: the flesh of what is perceived, this compact 
particle which stops exploration, and this optimum which terminates it, all reflect my 




Hermeneutics, the philosophical study of interpretation of linguistic and non-linguistic 
expressions, is not only applicable to texts but also to forms of human consciousness.15 
The branch of hermeneutics that examines human awareness is known as 
phenomenological hermeneutics. 
Phenomenological hermeneutical research investigates the ways in which the 
structures of awareness influence our processes of understanding. One particularly 
important type of structure is the spatio-temporal horizon. No matter which objects I am 
concerned with in perception, I experience them as being in a world that extends 
spatially and temporally beyond my current situation. In an individual experience, I 
expect some of the objects I perceive to have additional attributes to the ones I currently 
perceive through my senses: I expect them to carry on existing for some span of time 
                                                 
12 Husserl 2005, 255. 
13 Carman 1999, 206. 
14 Merleau-Ponty 1964, 167. 
15 Mantzavinos 2016. 
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into the future, so that I will be able to perceive them during that future time period as 
well if I choose, and I often expect that I may have different sensory experiences of 
them in the future. 
All individual experiences have a subjective ‘horizon’ which reflects the 
relationship between the subject and the object. These experiences change with the 
subject-object relationship they are depending on and with the alteration of this 
relationship itself as it unfolds over time. They constitute what Husserl calls an 
‘intentional horizon’16 of reference. The intentional horizon refers to the possibilities of 
consciousness within the subject-object relationship. This means that I do not only 
perceive the object as presented to me by my senses, but I am also aware of other 
aspects of it that my experience horizon of this object already includes as possible. If I 
have a perceptual experience of a flower in a meadow, for instance, I am immediately 
aware of its shape and colour, maybe even its smell. But I also anticipate that if I step 
forward and grasp the stem, I will feel its texture, and the reluctance of its roots in the 
earth when I try to pull it out. The flower, the object of my perception, already 
transcends the information currently observable by me – the horizon of my flower-
perception goes beyond my sensual observation. 
The importance of the human body for phenomenological experiences, and the 
investigation of the different time horizons which can be distinguished in connection 
with personal identity, are the two key themes in Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity. 
 
1.2 Idem and Ipse 
 
Ricoeur’s account of personal identity differs from other accounts of personal identity 
in one central and very important respect: he examines personal identity on two levels, 
using two different categories. On the metaphysical level, personal identity is defined 
by sameness (Latin: idem), and this concerns the person as a spatial-temporal object. 
The idem provides the answer to the question ‘What am I?’. The idem relates to all 
attributes of a person that tend to be permanent over a long-time horizon, including for 
instance the body, the genetic code, and the character(p). Character(p), as Ricoeur uses 
it in this context, defines the set of lasting dispositions by which a person can be 
                                                 
16 Beyer 2007, chapter 4. 
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recognized.17 Although character(p) is subject to (usually slow) changes over time, 
Ricoeur sees it as part of the idem because it concerns the objective aspect of personal 
identity. Persons can be identified from the outside by their character(p): we feel 
justified to make statements like: ‘he is reliable’ or ‘she is unforgiving’. 
On a phenomenological level, personal identity is represented by the self 
(Latin: ipse). The ipse is the experienced or lived identity of a person, the feature that 
distinguishes the ‘I’ from the ‘other’. One of its most important aspects is that it is 
constitutive of self-constancy, the perseverance of faithfulness to a promise. A 
prerequisite for the ipse is the ability of a person to make plans and enter obligations 
towards herself and others for the future. The ipse covers all areas of a person’s life 
where the personal pronoun ‘mine’ can be applied in the sense of ‘what I feel 
responsible for’. It answers the question ‘Who am I?’.18 
Ricoeur describes the difference between idem and ipse as the ‘difference 
between a substantial or formal identification and a narrative identity’.19 
In his development of a hermeneutics of self, Ricoeur examines what it means 
to belong to one’s own world and one’s own body, as they are experienced. Ricoeur 
describes the involved processes in hermeneutic terms, exploring how the lived 
embodied self is affected by constant interaction with the world: by feeling, acting, 
suffering, reflecting, and taking responsibility for her own actions. In Ricoeurian 
terminology, the interaction of the self with the world can be described as ‘a discourse 
of appropriation’ that involves the acceptance of one’s world and one’s body as one’s 
own. In contrast to this, the typical analytic approach is concerned with the objective 
world and the objective body in what Ricoeur calls a ‘discourse of distance’.20 Ricoeur 
claims that the analytic examination of questions concerning personal identity is not 
sufficient to grasp all relevant aspects of the self.  
Ricoeur also makes a point of distinguishing his own account of selfhood from 
the existential proposition of the Cogito that states ‘I think, therefore I am’. In 
particular, he claims that Descartes’ approach of extreme doubt only provides a proof of 
the ‘I’ which is atemporal and must thus be reasserted from moment to moment.21 He 
says that Descartes proves a purely formal ‘I’ as a subject which cannot answer the 
                                                 
17 Ricoeur 1992, 121. 
18 Ricoeur 1992, 116. 
19 Ricoeur 1984, 246. 
20 Hünefeldt 2005, 153. 
21 Ricoeur 1992, 7. 
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question ‘what am I?’ as an object. According to Ricoeur, Descartes does not consider 
human embodiment as an aspect of personal identity, but as an unimportant 
contingency. Ricoeur says that if you view the body as nothing but an object, you lose 
important characteristics of consciousness. Consciousness is not contained within itself, 
but directed towards the outside world in two ways: through voluntary acts, willed by 
the self and carried out by the body, and through involuntary acts performed by the 
body.22 
Here, he adopts Sigmund Freud’s notion of the unconscious mind, saying: ‘The 
philosopher will not attribute thought to the unconscious, but he will admit the 
dependence of thought, which is consciousness itself, on a hidden psychic dynamism 
whose dramas often erupt at the very heart of consciousness and remove an entire 
region of intentions and actions from its control.’23 Although Ricoeur investigated 
Freud’s views on psychoanalysis in great depth, he does not take this to be a basis for 
his account of personal identity as narrative identity. Rather, the point that he takes from 
Freud here is the view of the subconscious as the seat of repressed emotions.24 
Ricoeur also examines the other extreme, the ‘shattered Cogito’ philosophy 
proclaimed by Nietzsche who says that truth can never be determined as Nature ‘threw 
away the key’ – humans do not possess, and cannot develop, the tools necessary for 
unravelling Nature’s secrets. 25 This can be roughly paraphrased as ‘I may think that I 
think, but this does not establish any truth’. Ricoeur comes to the conclusion that this 
anti-Cogito does not, as it claims, prove Descartes’ argument wrong but instead 
destroys the original question (‘Can I know that I exist?’) to which the Cogito claims to 
give an absolute answer.26 If I can never know the truth about anything, asking whether 
I know that I exist is just a silly question. Nietzsche holds that there is no distinction 
between lies and truth, that there is only illusion (Nietzsche calls this ‘Verstellung’), 
because Nature deprived man of the powers to decipher illusions.27 For Ricoeur, this 
                                                 
22 Ricoeur 1966, 6. 
23 Ricoeur 1966, 400. 
24 Ricoeur’s views on Freud are still subject to ongoing discussions in philosophy, see for instance 
Carney, Eoin, ‘Technique and Understanding - Paul Ricoeur on Freud and the Analytic Experience’ 
Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies, Vol 7, No 1 (2016), pp. 87-102. I shall not include these 
discussion in the scope of my work. 
25 Ricoeur 1992, 11. 
26 Ricoeur 1992, 14. 
27 ‘Wahrheiten sind Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, daß sie welche sind, Metaphern, die 
abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind‘ (‚Truths are illusions whose illusionary nature has been 
forgotten, metaphors which have become shopworn and sensually weak‘), Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche: 
Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne, 1873 - Kapitel 1, 
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/-3243/1, my own translation. 
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claim is a paradox in itself: either Nietzsche’s theory exempts itself from illusion, or it 
is itself a subject to it. Nietzsche claims to utter a truth, while saying that the truth can 
never be determined. Ricoeur describes this is as special case of the liar’s paradox.28 
Thus, Ricoeur distances himself from both the Cogito and the anti-Cogito, but 
he does not intend to posit the self directly. Although he uses analytic methods in order 
to examine the validity of his intuitions, his hermeneutic research is different from the 
deductive style of analytic philosophy, as we shall see. He develops his account by 
investigating three areas: the linguistic use of the term ‘I’, the relation between personal 
identity and action, and the role of personal responsibility within the concept of 
personal identity. 
To summarize this section: Ricoeur’s distinction between idem (sameness) and 
ipse (the lived self) is a central part of his account. The following sections will show 
how these two aspects of personal identity – which cannot be reduced to each other – 
define a person, and how they are able to characterize and clarify changes of personal 
identity over time. 
 
1.3 The Self and Language 
 
Reference to the self begins with language. Ricoeur starts his exploration of the self on 
a linguistic level by examining how we identify ourselves. In a descriptive speech 
utterance that uses ‘I’ (for instance ‘I see’) there is a logical gap between the referential 
function that picks out the ‘I’ as a public entity that can be identified by others,29 and 
the reflexive function that indicates the ‘I’ as a private entity that the utterer is conscious 
of, while speaking to a ‘you’. An utterance which has a purely referential function is, for 
example, ‘I was born on 9th May, 1953’. The utterance ‘I feel embarrassed’, on the other 
hand, is reflexive. 
It is an important point for Ricoeur that the object the referential function 
points at, the ‘I’, is irreducible to any other kind of particular, such as, for instance, a 
brain, or a psychological history. The referential function indicates the ‘I’ as a ‘basic 
particular’. Ricoeur follows Peter Strawson here who says that basic particulars belong 
to a distinguishable class of particulars that can be identified and re-identified without 
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reference to particulars of other kinds.30 In Ricoeur’s words, ‘Physical bodies and the 
persons we ourselves are constitute, in this masterful strategy, such basic particulars in 
the sense that nothing at all can be identified unless it ultimately refers to one or the 
other of these two kinds of particulars.’31 When an utterer uses this referential function, 
she denotes herself as ‘I’ – that is, the person who is speaking. The complete 
signification of the ‘I’ in the objectified view, as uttered by the person herself, is 
achieved by the person’s capacity for self-designation. 
Thus, when talking about herself, the utterer can use either (or both) of two 
viewpoints: the ‘I’ as the person whom the utterer refers to when talking about herself 
as an entity, and the ‘I’ of the utterer as she experiences herself.  
Ricoeur’s distinction between the referential and reflexive functions of ‘I’ 
acknowledges the puzzling fact that the ‘I’ plays two roles: the one that speaks and the 
one of whom the utterer is speaking, the objectified aspect of the ‘I’. When an utterer 
puts herself into a relation to the person spoken to, she exchanges information with a 
‘you’, and this information can have different kinds of intentional object. For instance, 
if someone hurts me, and I say to him: ‘I hate you’, I as the utterer give information 
about my psychological state to my tormentor as the person spoken to. Typical (though 
not all) utterances of this kind concern the utterer’s feelings, like ‘I admire you’ or ‘I 
share your grief’. The objectified ‘I’ fades into the background because the utterer is 
only viewing herself from within. I do not give the person spoken to any information 
about myself except my psychological states as they relate to him or her, and the fact 
that I have these psychological states.  
Regarding this reflexive function of the ‘I’, Ricoeur distinguishes between 
constative and performative speech.32 If the utterer makes a constative statement about 
herself, she describes a situation, an action, or a psychological state. In a performative 
statement about herself, however, the utterer also performs the action she describes. 
Here, the utterance does not refer to anything but this performance. A promise is an 
example of performative speech: it is a binding contract between utterer and person 
addressed. When an ‘I’ promises something to a ‘you’ in an utterance, this speech is 
already the actual promise.33 If I say to my neighbour: ‘I promise I will look after your 
children during the summer holidays’, I inform my neighbour of my promise, and 
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31 Ricoeur 1992, 31. 
32 Here, Ricoeur refers to Austin 1962. 
33 Ricoeur 1992, 42. 
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simultaneously I take over the obligation to actually perform the baby-sitting for her. As 
shown in the previous section, entering obligations for the future is an important power 
of the self, the ipse. In performative speech, the language use links the ipse to her social 
nexus. 
So far, Ricoeur’s approach has shown that an utterer can refer to herself in two 
ways: in an objectified way, and in a reflexive way. She can also refer to a commitment 
she makes, through the utterance of a promise. But how are these three types of 
reference connected? 
The referential and the reflexive approach to language theory can converge, 
Ricoeur claims, if the ‘I’ who is speaking to a ‘you’ and the ‘him/her’ of whom the 
utterer is speaking are assimilated in a ‘unique type of objectification’.34 This happens 
in utterances that contain both the referential and the reflexive viewpoint on the ‘I’ on 
the part of the utterer. For instance, if a father says to his son: ‘Your father will always 
support you’, he refers to himself objectively (speaking of himself, as seen from the 
outside, in his role as a father) and reflexively (speaking of his personal commitment). 
Thus, the idem and the ipse work together in performative speech: By joint 
reference to the objective person and her subjective aims, they create a personal promise 
to the ‘you’ to whom it is uttered, and they constitute a personal obligation for the 
utterer. 
 
1.4 The Self and Action 
 
In the previous section, we saw how the objectified ‘I’ and the subjective ‘I’ can be 
represented in speech. Ricoeur’s concept of action supplements his model of personal 
identity by showing the connection between the lived body that can be identified 
physically (the idem) and the sphere of mineness that I am conscious of (the ipse).35 A 
person interacts with the world through her body, and her actions are visible from the 
outside, by others who attribute intentions and causes to them, as well as from the 
inside, by the person who plans and experiences them. But what exactly defines an 
action, what is its time horizon, and how is the agent involved in an action? 
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For Ricoeur, it is important to get a clear analytic understanding of the terms 
‘event’ and ‘action’ to complement the intuitive interpretation obtained by 
phenomenological experience. Ricoeur differentiates between event and action by 
saying that an event is – in general – something which happens (connected to the 
question ‘what?’), whereas an action is something for which a person is responsible 
(connected to the questions ‘who?’ and ‘why?’). The question ‘who?’ is the most 
important point for him. He sets out his own account against Donald Davidson’s theory 
of action to highlight why he thinks that this question is essential for an account of 
action. His comparison with Davidson’s account is not, however, intended to cover all 
of Davidson’s arguments. Ricoeur wants to drive home one particular point: the 
importance of personal responsibility, as seen from the inside of the agent, in contrast to 
an objective accountability which could be proved in court.36 In Ricoeur’s view, 
Davidson is interested in the wrong question, ‘what?’, while neglecting the question 
‘who?’. Although it is debatable whether this does justice to Davidson’s theory,37 I am 
going to outline Ricoeur’s arguments here as they give a valuable insight into his own 
account. 
Davidson holds that human action can be explained by applying the same 
concept of causality that we use to explain physical processes. Ricoeur interprets 
Davidson’s account as taking an exclusively external view. This is where Ricoeur pins 
his criticism: he says that it is not enough to get an objective view on an action to fully 
understand it: an action needs to be viewed from the perspective of the agent’s self. In 
Ricoeur’s view, Davidson neglects this aspect of human action. Davidson says that the 
agent’s intention can be derived from outside observation; Ricoeur says that this is not 
the case, not even when all externally measurable facts about the agent are known. 
Davidson distinguishes actions from mere happenings by claiming that an 
agent has an intention to perform an action, whereas no intention is needed for a 
happening. He says that an action can be explained by a ‘primary reason’, which implies 
a pro attitude (a desire or goal) towards some not-yet-existing state of affairs, and a 
belief that the action is of the kind that brings about this state of affairs.38 Thus, the 
‘what?’ of the action is contained in the question ‘why?’, and, according to Ricoeur, 
                                                 
36 He distances himself from Locke, who said: ‘“Person” a forensic term. Person, as I take it, is the name 
for this self. Wherever a man finds what he calls himself, there, I think, another may say is the same 
person.’ (Locke 1999, Book II Chapter XXVI). 
37 For a wider discussion, see for instance Child 2006 and van den Hengel 1996. 
38 Davidson 1963, 686. 
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such an explanation does not require an examination of how the consciousness of the 
agent changed over time (from the first motivation to act via the actual action to the 
final completion of the action’s consequences), or of the impact the action has, has had, 
or will have, on the agent. 
Ricoeur claims that Davidson misses a crucial point in his account of action. 
Davidson considers the intention with which an action is done, but not the temporal 
development of the act of intending. He examines acts which have already been 
finished, looking at them in retrospect.39 For him, an intention can be either correctly or 
incorrectly identified; the naming of the intention has a truth value which is atemporal. 
What Davidson does not seem to consider, but what Ricoeur stresses as particularly 
important, is that intention is future-oriented before the action has started.40 I can say: ‘I 
intend to act’, and my intention regarding this action may change over time. For 
instance, I may intend to give lilies to my girl friend, then change my intention in the 
florist’s shop when their smell reminds me of a funeral, but later change it again when I 
remember how much my girl friend loves lilies. As Ricoeur puts it, ‘anticipation 
operates during the entire unfolding of the action’.41 
If the action is only analysed after it has been completed (this is what Ricoeur 
criticizes in Davidson’s model), the planned effect of the agent’s intention is substituted 
by the actual effect, and it cannot be determined how the causal intentions of the 
action’s beginning, performance and completion were developing.42 Although Davidson 
also sees the importance of determining the agent’s intention, he looks only for the 
trigger which starts the action. Any intentions the agent may have had before or 
afterwards are not part of his model. For instance, the sentence ‘the man desired to rise 
in his girlfriend’s estimation and believed that giving her lilies would achieve this’ has a 
truth value in Davidson’s model: either it is true or not true that the man wanted to rise 
in his girlfriend’s estimation when he acted to give her lilies. For Ricoeur, this sentence 
would not be sufficient to characterize the action: he would only see the explanation as 
complete if we knew whether the man always intended to rise in his girlfriend’s 
estimation – or whether he had any other intentions –, whether he learns something 
from the experience, and so on. 
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Hence, Ricoeur has two issues with Davidson’s account: first, the fact that 
Davidson does not distinguish between the experienced and the observed action, and 
second, that Davidson only examines the intention of an act in retrospect, after the 
action was performed. The causes of some kinds of actions can be typified, for instance 
mechanical actions (like pushing or pulling a tractor), leading to general rules of 
causation. But for the explanation of actions that have a series of reasons that shift while 
the action is being performed one needs information about the action as it is 
experienced. Only the actor herself can say what her intention is. Stating this knowledge 
– which is practical knowledge, knowledge without observation – constitutes an 
attestation of the agent to the act which acknowledges responsibility and confirms the 
confidence of the actor in her ability to follow her intention. This can only be given by 
the actor herself, in an utterance regarding both her accountability and her intention. For 
this kind of utterance, truth values cannot be determined, only degrees of veracity.43 She 
may be lying, or she may be telling the truth about the responsibility she has committed 
herself to. 
Put in a nutshell, Ricoeur criticizes Davidson’s account because its focus is 
analytic, not hermeneutic – he is accusing Davidson of asking the wrong question, while 
using Davidson’s account as backdrop for expounding his own model. Ricoeur claims 
that Davidson neglects the moral imputation of an action to its agent and, especially, its 
influence on the development of the agent’s self.44 Ricoeur raises the question whether 
Davidson’s ontology of events was not ‘condemned to conceal the problematic of the 
agent as the possessor of his or her action’.45 As we shall see in the next section, 
Ricoeur proceeds to re-examine the question of the relation of action to the agent with a 




We are only able to interact consciously with the world we live in on a social level, 
Ricoeur claims, because we have the ability to ascribe our actions and our sufferings to 
our self, to an agent we identify as. 
                                                 
43 Ricoeur 1992, 72/73. 
44 Harrison-Barbet 2008, 5. 
45 Ricoeur 1992, 85. 
 27 
Ricoeur combines three claims from Strawson’s account of personhood to 
define the term ‘ascription’. 46 The first claim is that there are two kinds of predicate in 
connection with a person: material and psychological. These kinds of predicate cannot 
be reduced to each other. The second claim is that we attribute both material and 
psychological attributes to the same entity, the person. For instance, if we say that 
Donald Trump is a rude misogynist, we are referring to a single entity, the person 
Donald Trump. The third claim is that mental predicates such as intentions and motives 
can be attributed directly to a person. I can attribute intentions and motives to myself as 
my subject-attributes, and to someone else as their supposed subject-attributes. This 
process of attribution shows that I perceive myself to be a person who can be 
distinguished from other persons. 
But – picking up Ricoeur’s point from the previous section – the ascription of 
an action to an agent is only successful if it is linked to the agent’s power to act. Having 
the power to act in a certain way means that I know what I want to change, what I want 
the outcome to be, and that I am confident that I have the physical, psychological and 
intellectual strength to perform the action. Ricoeur calls this ‘a basic capacity’ because 
it links the agent’s intention with the real world. As Ricoeur puts it, a person’s power to 
act is ‘the basic capacity to make one of the things he or she knows how to do (knows 
he or she is able to do) coincide with an initial system-state, thereby determining the 
system’s conditions of closure’.47 
Every action requires initiative, ‘an intervention of the agent of action in the 
course of the world, an intervention which effectively causes changes in the world’.48 
Initiative is enabled by the power to act. It is, however, not the only causal influence on 
action. Initiative can be seen as both disjunctive and conjunctive regarding the agent’s 
lived world: at one extreme, the original causality of the agent is antagonistic to other 
modes of causality, which are outside the agent’s influence; at the other extreme, there 
is a synergy effect between the original agent’s causality and other forms of causality, 
so that the forms of causality outside the agent’s influence actually further the agent’s 
action. For instance, if I want to pick up my dog, and he runs away from me, his 
behaviour is antagonistic to my initiative; if he jumps up to me, on the other hand, his 
action is synergetic to mine. The agent’s initiative depends on a distinctive causal 
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capacity that cannot be reduced49 to any other sort of causality, but can only manifest 
itself in conjunction with the other causalities of the agent’s world. In this way, Ricoeur 
explains the relation we have to the world we are linked to through our embodiment: on 
the level of the lived self (the ipse), we ascribe motives and actions to ourselves, and on 
the level of our object identity (the idem), we perform actions in the world, either 
helped or hindered by its contingencies. 
Establishing that the self is able to ascribe actions to herself is an important 
building block in Ricoeur’s model of the self in its twofold role: as embodied, and as a 
living entity who can take responsibility for her own actions. 
 
1.6 Time Horizons of Idem and Ipse 
 
How is self-ascription, as described in the previous section, linked to Ricoeur’s overall 
concept of personal identity? Self-ascription belongs to the concept of the lived self, the 
ipse, but taking responsibility also has consequences for objectified part of the I, the 
part by which a person can be identified from the outside. Are the promises I make 
consistent with my character? The answer to this question may depend on the time of 
asking. 
For Ricoeur (in contrast to Descartes, as we saw in section 1.2) the question of 
identity is tied to that of temporality. He points out that ‘the person of whom we are 
speaking and the agent on whom the action depends have a history, are their own 
history’.50 
The two aspects of personal identity that he defines, idem (sameness) and ipse 
(self), each have their own time horizon which is subject to change. In a constant 
dialectic51 between the idem and the ipse, these two horizons can overlap, or they can 
become distinct. For instance, a young man in a rural community might promise his 
father to work on the farm permanently after his studies, driven to this promise by his 
happily settled ways in the country: he likes to be responsible for the livestock, he likes 
to be respected for his physical strength, and he believes in stability. At this point in 
time, the time horizon of his character(p) and the time horizon of his promise overlap. 
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50 Ricoeur 1992, 113. 
51 I am following Ricoeur’s understanding of the term ‘dialectic’: a struggle between two positions, in the 
course of which each is becoming clearer, urging for a choice to end the conflict. 
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During his studies, however, he encounters new ideas and gets used to a new lifestyle. 
He now believes that it is more useful to spend his life in study, and he enjoys library 
research. His character(p) is no longer the same after many years of study, whereas his 
promise is still valid.52 The time horizon of his (former) character(p) has ended, but the 
time horizon of his promise has not. 
 
Identity as sameness over time 
 
Ricoeur criticizes analytic philosophers for conceiving of personal identity exclusively 
in terms of the identity of the idem. 
Traditionally, the question of permanence in time starts with two concepts: 
first, with the definition of numerical identity as the relation that holds between two 
relata when they are the self-same entity, that is, when the terms designating them have 
the same reference, and second, the definition of qualitative identity as the relation that 
holds between two relata that have properties in common.53 The concepts of numerical 
and qualitative identity are not reducible to each other. Ricoeur says that to get an 
understanding of personal identity over time, these definitions need to be supplemented 
by ‘uninterrupted continuity’54 between the different stages of the individual whom we 
consider to be the same person. If the changes to a person are small between time tn and 
time tn+1, it seems safe to assume identity of a person at time tn and time tn+1. On the 
other hand, if we view a person at the time of their birth and in middle age, the 
difference seems so great that there appears to be a threat to identity.55 
To dissipate this threat, Ricoeur says, it is necessary to conceive a principle of 
permanence in time which is based on resemblance and uninterrupted continuity. Even 
if the threat to identity appears to be small, if the development of a person can be 
reconstructed over a long time period by following the gradual changes, a structure 
needs to be identified which shows that all of these changes have been happening to the 
same person. Hence, Ricoeur sees the necessity for a ‘relational invariant’56, such as the 
structure of a tool that stays the same even if its parts are replaced. 
                                                 
52 As explained in section 1.2, Ricoeur counts the character(p) as part of the idem because it is one of the 
characteristics that make people recognizable from the outside. However, like the body, it is subject to 
slow changes over time. 
53 See http://www.dictionary.com/browse/numerical-identity. 
54 Ricoeur 1992, 117. 
55 For a detailed overview of these accounts, please see section 2.3 Psychological Connectedness 
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56 Ricoeur 1992, 117. 
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Regarding identity as sameness, he suggests the genetic code as a good 
candidate to measure the identity of a biological organism.57 But this criterion cannot 
apply to the identity of the self, which is the ‘I’ as it is experienced by the person 
herself, through which she enters obligations to the world she lives in. So Ricoeur looks 
for an identity criterion that is connected to the question ‘who?’ without reducing it to 
the question ‘what?’.58 He distinguishes between two models of permanence in time: 
character(p) and keeping one’s word. The latter is a commitment towards a person, or 
persons, or a community. 
In Ricoeur’s terms, character(p) ‘designates the set of lasting dispositions by 
which a person is recognized’.59 A disposition develops out of two activities: the 
formation of habits and the acquisition of identifications. 
Habits develop over time and can have different status: they can be in the 
process of being newly formed, or they can be in an already acquired, ‘sedimented’ 
state. The sedimentation of habits has a tendency to cover innovations which occurred 
earlier. As habits turn into lasting dispositions, they constitute character traits. They 
provide the character(p) with a history. If the sedimentation is strong, and the lived 
habits match the character traits, the idem overlaps the ipse, and they operate in 
harmony. 
Acquired identifications are the value predicates that a person takes over from 
the community she lives in. For instance, she may be known in her village as the 
parson’s daughter, the brilliant brain, the quiet one, or the village witch. If she takes 
over the social values of her community, she enters the community identity to a certain 
extent. As a result, she can be identified by these common values. The community 
values are values that concern things beyond our own survival; they can, for instance, be 
common ideals or common customs which strengthen the bond of the community. If a 
person identifies with such community values, this incorporates an element of loyalty 
into her character(p) and turns it towards fidelity, which is a defining element of the 
ipse-self. When these identifications turn into lasting dispositions, they also become 
character(p) traits. This is where the two poles of identity are in harmony with one 
another: the committed self and the settled character(p) share the same goals and values. 
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If, however, either the self or the character(p) undergo any changes due to other 
influences, this harmony can be destroyed. 
Character(p) has a history which is formed by two activities: the dialectic of 
innovation and sedimentation that takes place in habit acquisition, and the dialectic of 
the world’s otherness and my internalization of its values that makes up the process of 
identification.60 
 
Identity as self-constancy over time 
 
The other model of permanence in time mentioned above concerns faithfulness in 
keeping one’s word, or self-constancy. Self-constancy is an achievement of the self 
which belongs to the dimension of ‘who?’.61 If I give a promise to someone, I become 
accountable for it, and thus the action of promising has an ethical aspect. Word-keeping 
develops its own time horizon from the words spoken as well as the trust the other 
person puts in my faithfulness. For instance, if a colleague tells me that someone spoke 
badly of her, and I tell her: ‘I’ll back you up’, we both understand that this concerns her 
current work situation, and my conversations with her boss in the coming weeks. 
Neither of us expects me to be true to this promise in ten years’ time. 
Holding one’s promise within the pledged time horizon can be seen as a 
challenge against time: that I will honour my promise even if I should change my views 
on it, or my inclinations.62 For instance, I might suddenly see my colleague as a 
plagiarist of other people’s ideas, thus not wanting to speak up for her any longer. 
 
Two time horizons 
 
If there is great permanence of character(p) over time, this means that the idem and the 
ipse overlap almost completely – the faithfulness of keeping one’s word is always 
aligned with character(p). At the other extreme, a permanence of promise-keeping (self-
constancy) – while the character(p) undergoes some change – indicates that there is a 
large gap between the self and the character(p). This shows that none of these polar 
notions can be reduced to the other.63 In the extreme case of faithful promise-keeping 
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my character(p) (my idem) has changed, but my promise-keeping (my ipse) remains 
unchanged. 
An example from fiction can illustrate this: in Graham Greene’s The End of the 
Affair64, Sarah makes a solemn promise to God that she will break off her affair if her 
lover’s life is spared in the bomb attack. He survives, and as she is a devout believer, 
she keeps her word. For the rest of her life, she is miserable because her promise 
prevents her from being with her true love. Love has become more important to her than 
before, changing her outlook on life. Her promise-keeping self and her loving 
character(p) are far apart. 
Viewing the sameness of character(p) and the constancy of the self in 
opposition raises the question of how these can be viewed as part of whole, in a model 
of personal identity. 
Ricoeur stresses the necessity of such a model by examining the paradoxes of 
personal identity and the attempts made by other philosophers to overcome these 
paradoxes, in particular by Locke, Hume and Parfit.65 He claims that none of them give 
a complete account of personal identity because they do not distinguish between idem 
and ipse.66 By conflating these two aspects of personal identity, they fail to recognize 
the enduring dialectic between them. 
 
1.7 Narrative and Mimesis 
 
If there is, over time, a continuing struggle between a person’s lived self and her 
objectified identity, how is this established? Ricoeur says that all events in a person’s 
life are woven together in a fabric of a story, a self-narrative. To illustrate how and why 
this happens, he distinguishes three levels of narrative activity. In this section, I am 
going to show how Ricoeur links the concepts of idem and ipse to the concept of self-
narrative through application of these different narrative activities. 
As we have already seen in section 1.2, idem and ipse each have their own time 
horizon, which may or may not overlap. The development of idem and ipse over time is 
an important point in Ricoeur’s account. The changes in a person’s character(p) and in a 
                                                 
64 Greene 1979. 
65 These accounts, Ricoeur’s criticism of them, and state-of-the-art evaluations of these and other 
accounts of personal identity will be discussed in detail in chapter 2. 
66 Ricoeur 1992, 126. 
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person’s actions and commitment can be measured from the outside in chronological 
time: for instance, I failed my driving test in 1995, and I promised to marry my (then) 
boyfriend in 1998. But when a person weaves her own life together in a self-narrative, 
events and actions no longer follow the chronological sequence: It seems a long time 
ago now that I made that promise to that man, but I feel the shame of failing the test as 
if it had been yesterday. 
How, then, does narrative relate to time? 
In Ricoeur’s words, there is a correlation ‘between the activity of narrating a 
story and the temporal character of human experience’. 67 He says that ‘time becomes 
human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains 
its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence’.68 
To show how different levels of temporality come into being, Ricoeur defines 
three kinds of narrative activity: mimesis1 (prefiguration), mimesis2 (configuration) and 
mimesis3 (refiguration). As I shall explain, all of these three kinds of mimesis are 
involved in the weaving of a self-narrative. 
Of the three kinds of mimesis, mimesis2 provides the central concept. The 
composition of the plot is the main instrument in the building of narrative. The narrator 
chooses and orders events and actions and puts them into a time frame. 69 During 
plotting, she imitates and modifies these events and actions, using existing conceptions. 
The inspiration for the organization of events can vary – their choice and sequence can 
be driven by the character(p) of the protagonist, or it can follow a pattern which is 
embedded in the society’s culture. For instance, the plot of Henry James’ Portrait of a 
Lady70 is mainly structured by the psychological development of Isabel Archer, whereas 
Emile Zola’s Germinal71 is built on the awareness of social problems in the nineteenth 
century. 
In his definition of mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3, Ricoeur shows that 
emplotment (the process of selecting and ordering imitated actions) mediates between 
practical human experience and the application of narrative to human life. This is 
especially important for the configuration of a self-narrative: understanding a fictional 
narrative gives a person the opportunity to gain new insights into the world she lives in. 
                                                 
67 Ricoeur 1984, 52. 
68 Ricoeur 1984, 52. 
69 Ricoeur 1984, 33. 
70 James 2009. 
71 Zola 2008. 
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Ricoeur analyses the competences a person needs to have in order to participate in a 
narrative on these levels.72 To make the point clearer, I shall distinguish between three 
different roles here: The fiction reader, the fiction writer and the self-narrator. After a 
brief explanation of mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3, I shall summarize the specific 




Mimesis1 is the activity of understanding the world of action and its structures. In order 
to be able to compose or understand a plot, a person needs to be familiar with the 
symbolic, temporal and structural characteristics of action. 
Regarding the symbolic characteristics of mimesis1, a person must be able to 
distinguish action from mere physical movement. This entails identifying the agent and 
recognizing the agent’s motives and social situation.73 Many actions can be understood 
because they follow a symbolic convention that is specifically designed and 
acknowledged for the context in which the actions are performed. For instance, raising 
one’s arm means voting for something in an assembly, but in a busy street it means 
hailing a taxi. Thus, the use of symbols makes an action readable to those who belong to 
a society in which these symbols have a commonly acknowledged meaning. The same 
applies to the symbols which represent social or ethical norms: a debutante curtsies 
when being presented to the Queen as an acknowledgment of the Queen’s royal status, 
and in the nineteenth century it was customary for gentlemen to raise their hats to 
acquaintances in the streets as a mark of respect. 
The second area we must be familiar with to understand a plot is the 
changeability of time as we experience it. The way we perceive the temporal properties 
of action is determined by the fact that we notice time differently when we are 
preoccupied with doing something. Past events and future plans are drawn into the 
experienced present when we are engaged with an action. Ricoeur adopts Heidegger’s 
term ‘within-time-ness’ (‘Innerzeitigkeit’) for the time in which we ordinarily act.74 
                                                 
72 At this point of his inquiry, Ricoeur does not distinguish between the competences needed by an author 
of literary fiction, a reader of literary fiction, or a person in the normal process of building a self-
narrative.  
73 Ricoeur 1984, 55. 
74 Ricoeur 1984, 61. 
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Finally, we must know about the literary structures in which a plot is typically 
represented. In addition to the practical understanding of action and symbols, the author 
or reader needs to understand the rules of composition that enable the ordering of events 
into ‘the total action constitutive of the whole story’.75 These rules of composition form 
part of the society’s cultural background. As Ricoeur puts it, ‘To understand a story is to 
understand both the language of “doing something” and the cultural tradition from 
which proceeds the typology of plots’.76 He says that ‘knowing how to do something 
constitutes a ‘repertory’ common to the writer and the reader’.77 The most widely used 
convention is that of leaving out events which have no relevance for the story. If it is 
not important for the work of fiction that a character eats, drinks, or uses the toilet, the 
writer does not describe these actions, and the reader assumes that they happen in the 
background. 
The choice of subject also depends on a common cultural background of the 
writer and the reader. All societies have treasure-troves of orally transmitted myths and 
stories which are about gods, spirits, heroes and victims who behave in ways which are 
typical for a specific culture. For instance, many communities in the South Sea Islands 
have traditional mythical tales which deal with the dead, and the importance of 
preserving their honour and keeping in contact with them. 
All of these pre-narrative structures (symbols, temporal experience, and the 
organization of action and plot,) give human life the quality of a story not yet told – the 
meaning has yet to be drawn from all of these distinct elements by weaving them into a 
story. Understanding pre-narrative structures also encourages the creation of new 
fictional narratives and helps to understand the ones already told. Literature would not 
be comprehensible if it did not make use of existing figures of human action.78 How 
could we understand the tale of Cinderella if we did not know that sweeping the 
chimney is seen as low and dirty work, and that marrying a prince is considered the 
height of social climbing? 
 
  
                                                 
75 Ricoeur 1984, 56. 
76 Ricoeur 1984, 57. 
77 Ricoeur 1991b, 141. 




Mimesis2 is the activity of configuring a plot into a narrative. It is the central part of two 
processes: the weaving of a person’s self-narrative, and the creation of a fictional 
narrative.79 Building on the pre-narrative structures of mimesis1, mimesis2 organizes 
events into a narrative whole. In order to achieve this, the configuration has to mediate 
between different elements of the narrative. This works in three steps: unifying separate 
events into a story, providing them with relationships, and ordering the events over 
time. 
The first step is to find connections between the individual events of the story 
and the story as a whole. This can be viewed from two angles: as a unifying operation, 
when events are knit together into a story, or as an abstraction, when the story as whole 
is derived from a number of separate events.80 The mediation consists of the struggle 
between these two reciprocal relations: the influence of events on the story as a whole, 
and the influence of the story idea on the treatment of the events. As a result of this 
mediation, a configuration is created out of simple succession. 
For the second step of mediation it is necessary to find the most important 
factors of the story, and to create or identify relations between them. These factors can 
be agents, sufferers, goals, means, social interactions, external events, or turns of 
fortune. 
The third step of plot mediation is to order the events of the story over 
narrative time. Two dimensions of narrative time are combined: the chronological time 
slices in which single episodes take place are consolidated into a time sequence which 
gives sense to the story as a whole. This process can include conflation or extension of 
the time intervals and leaps between different points of chronological time. There is an 
additional requirement for the configuration of narrative time: a reader follows a story 
in expectation of an ending. The ending of the story needs to establish a point of view 
that makes all of these time configurations acceptable to the reader in retrospect.81 
In addition to these three functions of mediation, plotting also has to make the 
connection between the theme and the representation intelligible to the reader. The story 
                                                 
79 It also comes into play with the creation of non-fictional narratives, for instance of historical novels, 
biographies, or autobiographies. The distinction between fiction and non-fiction is, however, not part of 
this work. 
80 Ricoeur 1984, 65. 
81 Ricoeur 1984, 67. 
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becomes understandable to the reader because she is able to apply the schemata which 
are constituted in the cultural tradition of her society. For example, if the narrative starts 
with the words ‘Once upon a time ...’ the reader knows that she can expect a fairy tale 
with typical elements such as stereotyped characters, repetitions, and a moral lesson. 
These schemata themselves are constantly subject to gradual updates when cultural 
concepts change over time.82 
The factors which define mimesis2 are not only relevant to the plotting of 
fiction. They also come into play during the emplotment of a person’s self-narrative 
which extracts a personal configuration from a succession of life events, as I shall show 




Mimesis3 is the activity of the reader who creates her own version of the fictional story 
by reading it. The reader follows the set of instructions given by the text and applies 
them to the story according to her own understanding and experience of the world. This 
is possible because the reader recognizes rules and paradigms which are known to her 
from mimesis1. Based on these, she is able to fill the lacunae of the story, and finish the 
configuration of the story in her own way. Thus, she completes the plotting process the 
author set up in mimesis2.
83 
Mimesis3 finally applies the narratives which were plotted in mimesis2 to the 
time of action and suffering,84 providing an ‘intersection of the world of a text and the 
world of a reader’.85 The reader engages with the fictional narrative and the character(f) 
on the basis of her own knowledge and experience. 
Actualizing the story by following it is, however, not the only thing the reader 
does. When a reader engages with a work of fiction, she relinquishes the cares of her 
daily life, her self, and commits herself to the role of the reader as suggested by the text. 
She appropriates the text in the sense of letting her ego go and opening herself to the 
revelatory powers of the text. Hence, the reader is able to overcome ‘what could be 
                                                 
82 Ricoeur 1984, 68. 
83 Ricoeur 1984, 76. 
84 Ricoeur differentiates between action and suffering: an agent is an active participant in an action, a 
sufferer is a passive participant in an action. A character(f) can be an actor or a sufferer in a fictional 
story, and be understood by the reader, based on her own experience. A self-narrator can be an actor or a 
sufferer in her self-narrative. 
85 Ricoeur 1984, 71. 
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called ‘the narcissm of the reader’: to find only oneself in a text, to impose and 
rediscover oneself.’86 He draws a parallel here between the Freudian effect of self-
analysis and the relinquishing of the reader’s ego in a fictional text. 
By entering the realm of a fictional world, the reader gains a new perspective 
on the world, which enables her to perceive situations through other eyes, and 
subsequently to reflect on her own life. I shall discuss this process in detail in section 
7.2. 
 
The circle of mimesis 
 
Within the threefold mimesis, mimesis2 is the main force which is responsible for the 
building of narratives. Mimesis2, the process of emplotment, ‘opens up the kingdom of 
the as if’,87 and in mimesis3, the reader creates her own rendering of the story, with the 
help of the pre-understanding gathered in mimesis1. What does this mean in connection 
with one’s own life story? A fictional story is plotted by the author. A life story is a 
narrative which is derived from the events of a person’s own life. How do these two 
kinds of story relate to each other? Ricoeur claims that we continually weave the story 
of our lives into a self-narrative of which we are the co-authors regarding its meaning.88 
In the process of doing this, the three levels of mimesis form an ongoing cycle, assuring 
the continuity between the potential story and the actual story for which a person feels 
responsible.89 
The following matrix gives a brief overview of the involvement of the fiction 




Figure 1: Three levels of mimesis 
                                                 
86 Ricoeur 1991a, 95. 
87 Ricoeur 1984, 64. 
88 Ricoeur 1992, 162. 
89 Ricoeur 1984, 75. 
Level / Activity Fiction Writer Fiction Reader Self-Narrator
Mimesis1 learning about action learning about action learning about action
Mimesis2 plotting fiction N/A
plotting varieties of self-
narrative
Mimesis3 N/A refiguring fiction refiguring self-narrative
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In the matrix, there is an arrow from the ‘refiguring fiction’ activity of the fiction reader 
to the ‘plotting varieties of self-narrative’ activity of the self-narrator. This connection 
between these two activities is the main topic of my own account, outlined in part III. I 
am going to claim that the fiction reader’s reading experience can – under certain 
conditions – influence her self-narrative. 
But first, in the next section, I shall explore the general concept of the self-
narrator. 
 
1.8 Emplotment and One’s Own Story 
 
In Ricoeur’s model, a person’s narrative identity relies on two processes: emplotment 
and the personalization of the plot. 
In the previous section, I discussed Ricoeur’s definition of plot as the 
organization of events and actions which are included in the story. What does this mean 
regarding our own life, and our self-narrative? When things happen to us, we need to 
make sense of them; we feel the urge to link them to possible causes, and to anticipate 
possible developments. However, our affairs often do not work out as planned or 
expected. As a result, we have to re-assess the value and the importance of past events 
to accommodate new developments. For instance, if I buy a valuable-looking antique 
gold ring at a jumble sale for a good price, I will afterwards proudly recall how – over 
time – I built up the expertise to recognize the value of this ring. When I later show the 
ring to an acclaimed expert, and he proves to me that the ring is a cheap forgery, I will 
re-organize my self-narrative to assemble evidence of how I have often been too 
gullible in the past, and how people have warned me about that. 
 
Concordance and discordance 
 
Ricoeur claims that maintaining the connectedness of life as we experience it is an on-
going project that is configured by opposing forces. Our desire for an ordering principle 
(concordance) of the events in our life is confronted with the reversals of fortune that 
threaten to transform the ordering principle we have previously accepted (discordance). 
The resulting mediation takes place in the form of a narrative where the heterogeneous 
elements of our life are merged to form a consistent story: the concordant elements of 
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the story have to be conciliated with the discordant elements. Ricoeur calls this process 
‘discordant concordance’.90 Emplotment involves mediation on different levels: 
multiple events have to be integrated into the temporal unity of the story; intentions, 
actions, and causes have to be interpreted and integrated into the narrative flow; and the 
chronological order of the events and the order in which they are to be told have to be 
balanced against each other. This does not imply, however, that the resulting narrative 
forms an objective account of things that happened; it accommodates the narrator’s 
needs within the given contingencies of her life.91 We plot our self-narrative to make 
sense to our self. Thus, we become both co-author and reflexive character(f) of our own 
story. 
 
Emplotment in fiction 
 
Ricoeur draws a parallel between self-narrative and fiction reading: he says that when 
we engage with a story that links a character(f) to a plot, the events in that story cannot 
be viewed as impersonal because one invariably sees them as relevant for that 
character(f).92 Emplotment does not only order the elements of the story, but it also 
attributes actions to the character(f), thus giving her a role in the story that may be 
active or passive. Ricoeur says that we understand the relation between the character(f) 
and the story told because we possess a ‘narrative intelligence’, a practical intelligence 
based on the stories that are intrinsic to our culture. By applying narrative intelligence to 
the story told, we attribute possible, actual, or completed actions to an agent who plays 
a role in the story.93 Thus, a variety of different roles can be constructed. Ricoeur 
distinguishes between two extremes, the role of the agent who initiates a process of 
change or conservation, and the role of the sufferer who is affected by this process. In a 
complete narrative, action is interaction between different characters(f), and interaction 
is a rivalry between different projects of the characters(f) which might in turn oppose or 
promote each other.94 The basic moral problem told in the narrative is based on the 
appreciation of the dissymmetry between the role of the agent and the role of the 
sufferer, and this moral problem drives the action. 
                                                 
90 Ricoeur 1992, 141. 
91 Ricoeur does not introduce this issue at this point, but takes it up later, to be discussed in section 2.4. 
92 Ricoeur 1992, 142. 
93 Ricoeur 1992, 144. 
94 Ricoeur 1992, 145. 
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In a work of fiction, the author and the readers have a common understanding 
of how a story develops: the connection between action and character(f) causes an on-
going conflict that is internal to the character(f). The character(f), searching for 
concordance, draws her sense of herself as a singular person from the unity of her life as 
she perceives it. When unexpected events happen, this unity is in danger of being 
disrupted. In order to balance the impact of such intrusions, she has to integrate these 
events into the history of her life, thus changing contingencies into facts in her story. 
Ricoeur says that the identity of the ‘emplotted’ character(f) can only be explained in 
relation to this dialectic:95 the construction of the narrative constructs the identity of the 
character(f). Here is an example from literature: in The End of the Affair, Sarah holds on 
to a shaky concordance in the beginning. She is true to her passionate nature by having 
an affair with the man she loves, but she still feels guilty about betraying her husband. 
Then a bomb falls, and she fears her lover has been killed. This leads her to make a 
promise to God that does not only contradict her inclinations, but forces her to change 
her life completely. The effects of the bomb have created discordance in her narrative 
identity. 
 
How does the principle of emplotment apply to self-narrative? 
 
Ricoeur says that the plotting our self-narrative is similar to plotting a fictional 
narrative. Self-narrative inverts the effect that contingency has in real life: an event that 
might have happened differently, or not at all, assumes the nature of a necessity. It 
ceases to be a random occurrence as soon as it is reviewed in retrospect, after it has been 
transfigured into a given event that fits in with the story.96 In real life, a person is 
pressed to make decisions about her plans and her acceptance of obligations when 
unexpected events upset the planned course of her life. When such conflicts between 
anticipated events and real events occur, this can lead to a dialectic of the character(p) 
(idem) and self-constancy (the ipse). If, for instance, I am offered the job of my dreams, 
but find that this would prevent me from caring for an aged relative for which I pledged 
myself, my promise and my urge for self-realization create a conflict which can only be 
resolved by re-ordering my self-narrative. I need to re-evaluate the weight of my 
original promise in retrospect, making it either more or less binding, and I need to re-tell 
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the story of my travel towards self-realization, as well as re-order my plans for the 
future. In this way, I have to refigure my whole self-narrative, as it presents itself to me 
now. 
There are, of course, also other differences between plotting our self-narrative 
and plotting a fictional narrative. We can stop weaving the fictional narrative whenever 
we want, leaving the character(f) in their current dilemma until we choose to resume our 
work. In our daily encounters with the world and our social nexus, however, we need to 
regain our equilibrium quickly in the event of disruptions if we want to keep on 
functioning on an acceptable level. This means that in the event of severe conflicts, we 
often find it necessary to re-tell or re-order our own story in order to maintain a sense of 
self-unity. However, as Ricoeur says, the parallels between engaging with fiction-
plotting and self-narrating are impressive. 
 
The help of fiction for self-narrative 
 
Our self-narrative does not fall into a clear pattern automatically; on the contrary, it 
undergoes a variety of imaginative variations that we try out in the process of re-
interpreting our own life history. During this process, different scenarios are put to the 
test. Ricoeur points out that fiction provides a vast treasure trove of stories that enables 
the author/hero of a self-narrative to imaginatively try out possible courses of action: 
actions which are in line with stability of character(p), actions which are in line with 
self-constancy, and any number of variations between these extreme poles.97 The realist 
novel, for instance, typically explores the intermediary area of variations: the 
character(f) is transformed by the crises of the plot she goes through, and at the end her 
aims and values are often quite different from what they were at the beginning of the 
story, but her character(p) remains recognizable throughout the story. In Charles 
Dickens’ Great Expectations98, for example, the convict Magwitch is a violent man who 
undergoes a change of character(p) when young Pip helps him escape, and Magwitch 
promises to make a gentleman of Pip. Throughout his life in the colonies, Magwitch 
earns his income honourably, and he pays for Pip’s education. On the one hand, the 
change from criminal to honest business man that goes hand in hand with his promise-
                                                 
97 The careful reader will notice that I do not list the case where idem and ipse overlap completely, 
although this can happen in real life. I hold that it does not happen in fiction: it would be too boring to 
read about. 
98 Dickens 2008a. 
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keeping is surprising. On the other hand, we recognize the singleness of purpose that 
was so remarkable about Magwitch from the start. 
In contrast to the classic mode of fiction-writing, an extreme pole of possible 
variations is represented by novels that make the plot dependent on the character(f)’s 
character(p), as for instance stream-of-consciousness novels. Here, the character(f) 
escapes ‘the control of its plot and of its ordering principle’.99 In some cases, the 
character(f) herself appears to lose her identity in the text. Examples of this are Robert 
Musil’s The Man Without Qualities or Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway. We appear to 
see through the protagonist’s mind, and notice her peculiarities of perception, but she 
herself remains nebulous, unreachable. Ricoeur calls this style of writing ‘exposing 
selfhood by taking away the support of sameness’.100 For him, the erosion of story-
paradigms (like plot, hero, anti-hero, etc.) goes hand in hand with a loss of narrative 
configuration that gives us a text that does not actually tell a story because there is no 
recognizable character(f) to link it to. In some cases, fiction reads like an essay as it 
does not have an identifiable protagonist. Here, Ricoeur says, the self has lost the 
support of sameness – it has lost its anchor to the world. 
Now we come to the important question: how do these different ways of story-
telling feature in the imaginative variations that Ricoeur sees as the underlying exercise 
for the configuration of a self-narrative? For Ricoeur, the answer is clear: literary fiction 
provides a selective imitation of actions and life, built on a narrative pre-understanding 
that is common to all humans, thus providing possible models for the reader’s own life 
story. Hence, it is an important point for Ricoeur that literary fiction deals with life as it 
is experienced in the world through the body because imaginative variations need the 
‘anchor’ of the body to the world in order to be familiar with embodied experiences.101 
 
What is the link between action and narrative? 
 
So far, I have shown Ricoeur’s claim that a person attributes her own actions to herself 
because she possesses the two important skills that are necessary for this: she has the 
capacity to act, and she has the ability to ascribe actions to herself. An important part of 
his model still needs to be clarified: in which ways can narrative help us to find out 
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whether a person can be seen as morally responsible for her own actions?102 To prepare 
for this investigation, we need to explore the relation between action and narrative. 
Ricoeur re-examines the concept of action in two steps. First, he investigates 
how narrative influences the way we see ourselves and our actions, then he checks the 
ethical implications of the narrative function. 
For his first step, he organizes types of activities (or ‘praxis units’) into a 
hierarchy. He distinguishes two different types of actions: actions which require 
practices, and actions which do not. Basic actions are performed instinctively (for 
instance gestures or postures) and do not have to be learned explicitly – all other actions 
require practices. To master a practice, an agent needs to be trained, based on a 
particular tradition (specialist knowledge).103 Ricoeur says that a definition of actions 
without the concept of practices would leave a gap in the configuration of a narrative. 
Even if we link intentions, causes, and effects in a chain that explains all observable 
details (as in G. E. M. Anscombe’s man at the pump104), the missing aspect is the 
classification of actions in terms of professions, arts, religious activities or games (in 
Anscombe’s example, if we assume that the man was poisoning the water intentionally, 
the missing aspect would be the man’s indoctrination as a religious fanatic). Practices 
can be seen as second-order units:105 for instance, a profession like farming entails 
subordinate activities like feeding the poultry or starting a tractor, which are not 
practices in themselves. Taken out of context, the action of throwing seeds on to the 
ground does not make sense, but in the context of a farmer feeding free-range chickens 
it has a meaning. The rule that throwing seeds into a chicken yard ‘counts’ as feeding 
chickens, and thus, an act of farming, is an example of what Ricoeur calls a ‘constitutive 
rule’ of a practice: ‘The rule, all by itself, gives the gesture its meaning’106. 
In addition to that, a constitutive rule stresses the interactive nature of most 
practices. Practices typically involve actions of others, which makes them part of a 
larger social interaction. If the interaction is external, it can take the form of a conflict, 
or a collaboration, or a competition. For a chicken farmer, for instance, there could be a 
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fight for big customers with other farmers, or a cooperation with others to buy 
commonly used machinery.  
The interaction can also be internal, for instance in learning a profession. 
Usually, professions are taught from person to person, they are based on tradition, and 
they go through a process of innovation and adaptation. 
Summing up his definition of practices, Ricoeur concludes that the 
organization of practices contributes to giving a pre-narrative quality to real life 
scenarios, already providing roles for the agent who performs these practices. Narrative 
gives ‘the polemical form of a competition of the narrative programs of different 
persons to the forms of human interaction that practices are based on.’107 This means 
that the practices a person is involved in already form the grounds of her self-narrative. 
 
1.9 Narrative Unity 
 
In the previous section, we saw Ricoeur’s view that the roles we play in real life already 
have a pre-narrative structure. The next question is: how does my life become a unified 
story? To explore this, Ricoeur examines the relation between a person’s self-narrative 
and her overall project of existence. He defines ‘life plans’, a level above practices, as 
practical units that cover different areas of life, for instance family life, professional life, 
sports, or arts. Each of these life plans develops in an on-going interchange of values 
and weighing of possible choices.108 
Thus, the whole area of praxis is constituted by two different movements. From 
the bottom, basic actions and practices add complexity through the social interactions 
they involve. From the top, movable and elusive ideals and projects try to provide and 
enforce specifications on actions and practices. This double determination lends itself 
well to narrative configuration. 
 
Narrative unity in fiction 
 
Where the whole project of lived existence is concerned, Ricoeur uses the term 
‘narrative unity of life’.109 He says that the narrative unity of life is precarious, an 
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‘unstable mixture of fabulation and actual experience’.110 As literary fiction provides 
examples of possible life plans, he argues, it provides good material for thought 
experiments regarding the reader’s own life. In literary fiction, it is easier to recognize 
the connection between action and agent than in real life, and literary fiction also 
provides ‘an immense laboratory for thought experiments in which this connection is 
submitted to an endless number of imaginative variations’.111 He sees reading as a 
struggle between what he calls the ‘strategy of seduction’ followed by the author, and 
the ‘strategy of suspicion’ pursued by the reader who thus adds meaning to the text.112 
The reading process is based on a ‘pact of trust’113 between the author and the reader: 
engaging with a work of fiction, the reader grants the author the right to show the 
character(f)’s mind from the inside, and to make an assessment of this character(f) and 
the actions and events in the work. During the reader’s assessment of the character(f), 
the conflict between the author’s strategy of seduction and the reader’s strategy of 
suspicion comes into play. 
The real author transforms herself into the implied author, and in this role, she 
tempts the reader to adopt the specific values which underlie the presentation of the 
fictional text.114 The reader, on the other hand, refigures the fictional story during the 
reading process, fills the gaps with her own knowledge of the world, and decides 
whether the characters(f) and the fictional events are compatible with her own 
expectations. As Ricoeur says, the modification of the reader’s expectations ‘consists in 
traveling the length of the text, in allowing all the modifications to “sink” into memory, 
while compacting them, and in opening ourselves up to new expectations entailing new 
modifications’.115 Thus, the reader creates her own fictional world and her own 
understanding of the character(f)’s life plan. 
Reading fiction can only have a positive influence on the reader’s narrative 
unity of life, however, if it eventually leads to self-examination and self-adaption.116 
There will be a full discussion of this point in Part III, where I present my own account 
of fiction reading in relation to narrative identity. 
 
                                                 
110 Ricoeur 1992, 162. 
111 Ricoeur 1992, 159. 
112 Ricoeur 1992, 159. 
113 Ricoeur 1988, 161. 
114 Ricoeur 1991d, 391. 
115 Ricoeur 1988, 168. 
116 Ricoeur 1992, 159. 
 47 
Self-narrative and authorship 
 
An objection to the concept of narrative unity is that, obviously, we are not literally 
authors of our own lives.117 Our self-narrative is constrained by many things over which 
we have little or no influence, such as our genetic code, our family, the date and time of 
our birth, illnesses, or natural catastrophes.118 Ricoeur defuses this criticism by saying 
that we have three roles regarding the narrative of our own lives: we are narrator, 
protagonist, and co-author as to its meaning. The role of the co-author is, in the case of 
self-narrative, unstable because we can only be the weaker partner regarding the 
contingencies of our lives. Our life history is influenced by external events, and it is 
entwined in the life histories of others. Ricoeur claims that the important part of this co-
authoring with respect to our own life-narrative is our appropriation of externally 
induced life changes, in the sense of making them our own, and that this appropriation 
helps to maintain a narrative unity.119 At this point, there is a gap in the analogy of self-
narrative with fiction: regarding authorship, self-narrative can be better compared with 
historical fiction. The battles that Napoleon fought can be verified by so many sources 
that they cannot be ignored by a reasonably rational person, but the motivations and 
feelings of Napoleon regarding these battles can be interpreted in different ways. The 
removal of my wisdom teeth while I was living in Berlin is well documented in the 
records of my dentist and of my health insurance company, and remembered by my 
friends whom I told about this, but my stance towards this operation is open to 
interpretation. Was I brave, indifferent, or a coward when I decided to have this done? 
Different views on this are possible. 
 
How can there be a unity of life without an ending? 
 
Another difficulty regards the notions of beginning and end in connection with a self-
narrative. In fiction, the beginning and the end of a story are usually clearly defined 
(unless we have a capricious author who likes to play games with her readers), and in 
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many cases a piece of fiction ends with the death of its main protagonist.120 How can we 
tell a unified story of our own life, or aim for a successful life, when we do not know 
(and most of us will never know) how and when it is going to end? It is also 
problematic to define a starting point for our self-narrative. If we pick the time of our 
conception (as Laurence Sterne does in Tristram Shandy121), there are no memories of 
our own that we can build our story on, and the memories of our early childhood are 
bound to be hazy. 
Ricoeur argues that these objections against the notion that a person can 
represent her own life as a narrative to herself can only apply if you have a naive 
conception of the way we experience our lives. In fact, he says, these arguments 
themselves give strong evidence that life is ‘an unstable mixture of fabulation and actual 
experience’122 which needs the application of fiction to re-organize past events in 
retrospect, and to adjust the story our life appears to have followed. We experience 
narrative closure regarding the completion of actions and life plans that we initiated, and 
use fiction in addition to our own experience to plan new strands of our life. Even 
regarding the prospect of death, fiction can help by providing an ‘apprenticeship of 
dying’123 to the reader which makes her familiar with behaviour patterns she can then 
apply to the prospects of her own life. Thus, literary narrative and life histories can 
complement each other. As Ricoeur says, ‘narrative is part of life before being exiled 
from life in writing; it returns to life along the multiple paths of appropriation’.124 By 
imagining the progress and the ending of our life in the future, we can make these 
envisioned developments part of our self-narrative, thus shaping a unity of life. 
 
1.10 Narrative Identity and Ethics 
 
In the previous section, I discussed Ricoeur’s claim that humans are able to view their 
lives not only in narrative form, but even as a unified narrative. But how is such a 
narrative connected to the ipse, the lived self? Ricoeur says that we need to investigate 
                                                 
120 Sometimes, the reader gets the impression that the author chose this ending to get rid of the 
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what humans want, and he claims that a person’s ethical aims are linked to her life 
narrative, thus completing the unification. 
He picks up his earlier statement that when the self appropriates an action to 
herself as the agent, she also imputes its moral consequences to herself. What part does 
self-narrative play within the process of moral self-assessment and moral imputation, 
and how does moral assessment of actions unfold? 
 
What is good for us? 
 
Ricoeur develops his argument from Aristotle’s claim that a person always aims at a 
‘good life’, what she perceives to be a full life. Following Alasdair MacIntyre’s claim 
that regarding ethics, an individual cannot be separated from the roles she plays in the 
society of others,125 Ricoeur claims that the ethical intention of a human life consists in 
‘aiming at the ‘good life’ with and for others, in just institutions’.126 
The starting point for Ricoeur’s analysis is the ethical quality of action. As we 
saw in the previous section, Ricoeur categorizes action into the hierarchy of basic 
actions, practices and life plans. Practices group basic actions together, dependent on 
the role an individual has in society, and each of these role-based practices develops 
special virtues, called ‘standards of excellence’ by MacIntyre.127 These standards of 
excellence are subject to controversy and competition between the practitioners. This 
conflict is only possible, Ricoeur says, because the practitioners share a common 
culture, and these rules were originally developed and established on a social level.128 
The ‘internal good’ immanent to these practices evokes feelings of satisfaction in the 
practitioners who reflect on them, thus building a basis for self-esteem.129 
The next step on the hierarchy of action, the development of life plans, is 
achieved by the use of phronesis (practical intelligence): rendering distant ideals more 
precise and allowing us to decide how to prioritise them in practice. Human beings 
define life plans for themselves by adopting standards of excellence that have been 
defined for, and by, practices. Aiming to perform this task well leads to choices that are 
constantly challenged by experiences on the levels either of base actions or of practices. 
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For instance, a man may decide that in order to live a fulfilled life, he needs to become a 
doctor and help the sick. But if it turns out that he faints at the sight of blood, he has to 
reconsider his choice of profession which was an important part of his life plan. 
Ricoeur draws the connection between aiming at the good life and the narrative 
unity of a life by pointing out that the moral subject is the same as the subject to whom 
this life narrative assigns a narrative identity.130 He agrees with Macintyre’s view that 
the unity of a single life is the unity of a narrative embodied in this life, and that this 
narrative gives the answer to the question ‘what is good for me?’. The answer to the 
question ‘what is good for man?’ contains the common denominator of all the answers 
to the question ‘what is good for me?’.131 
 
Ethical aims and fiction reading 
 
The importance of our ethical aims becomes apparent when we read a fictional 
narrative: we invariably engage in evaluating the actions and characters in the story, 
approving or disapproving of them from an ethical point of view. Fiction provides us 
with a variety of thought experiments regarding possible actions and interactions. We 
judge these actions to be good or bad by applying standards to them. These standards 
represent the ethical aims that we have integrated into our own self-narrative. By 
applying our ethical aims and our practices to the action models outlined in fictional 
narratives, we come across warnings or incentives that assist us in examining our own 
aims and life plans. Thus, reading fiction can help us to form a unified self-narrative, 
which can be a good thing. However, fiction reading can also have other effects, and a 
unified self-narrative needs to meet certain prerequisites to be a good thing. I shall 
discuss this in detail in the presentation of my own account in part III. 
 
In this chapter, I showed how Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity is based on his 
two-level view of personal identity: the objective (the idem) and the subjective (the 
ipse) are both necessary to represent a person, and these two views cannot be reduced to 
each other. The idem and the ipse are linked on various levels: in language, in action, 
and in self-ascription. These links are incorporated in our self-narrative, which has two 
main functions: it works as a practical identity which helps us to deal with the conflicts 
                                                 
130 Ricoeur 1992, 178. 
131 MacIntyre 1981, 218. 
 51 
in our interaction with the world and our social nexus, and it provides our life with a 




2 Ricoeur’s model in relation to other accounts of personal 
identity 
 
Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity is one of many attempts to define personal 
identity over time. In this chapter, I shall give a brief overview of how Ricoeur’s 
account of narrative identity relates to other accounts of personal identity. I shall not 
attempt to give a full overview of all accounts, but shall instead focus on the main 
differences between Ricoeur’s model and the most relevant proponents of other models 
of personal identity. 
In section 2.1 to 2.3, I shall explain Ricoeur’s account against the background 
of non-narrative accounts of personal identity. My aim is to emphasize the difference of 
approach which sets Ricoeur’s Narrative Identity Account apart from Bodily Continuity 
Accounts and Psychological Connectedness Accounts. Narrative Identity Accounts 
address different questions about a person’s life than other accounts, and I show this by 
highlighting the special features of Ricoeur’s model. 
It is not in the scope of my work to defend Ricoeur’s account of narrative 
identity against non-narrative accounts of personal identity. My comparison is designed 
to show that Ricoeur is investigating a different issue from the one addressed by these 
accounts. 
My discussion will become more critical in section 2.4 where I defend 
Ricoeur’s model against other Narrative Identity Accounts, explaining why I chose his 
account as a basis for my own research. 
To outline the differences of approach between Ricoeur’s account and other 
accounts of personal identity, I shall explore some critical points of Derek Parfit’s 
account in the section about psychological connectedness accounts, and of Galen 
Strawson’s account in the section about narrative identity accounts. I would like to 
stress that it is not my aim to produce decisive objections to these thinkers; my objective 
is to use their arguments to clarify Ricoeur’s views. 
 
An inquiry into personal identity usually starts with the determination of what a person 
is. However, I shall not go into a detailed discussion here, but will assume the generally 
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held view that a person is a being capable of self-reflective consciousness and 
agency.132 
The question of personal identity over time contains many puzzles. After the 
determination or assumption of what constitutes a person, most research into the 
persistence of person over time engages with the definition of numerical identity as a 
next step.133 Numerical identity is the relation that holds between two entities when they 
are the self-same entity, that is, when the terms designating them have the same 
reference at all points in time and space. The relationship of numerical identity is 
reflexive, commutative and transitive. On this definition, identity claims must always be 
either true or false. 
Trying to apply this definition to persons, some problems become apparent 
immediately. Persons change over time, both physically and psychologically, so that a 
person x at time tn may look and act differently from person x at time tn+1 even though 
she claims to be the same person and bears the same name. If the time difference is big, 
for instance between the teenager x and the old-age pensioner x, it may be very difficult 
to find even resemblance, let alone qualitative identity. The properties of a person can 
change dramatically over time. Even if this can be traced back to gradual small 
alterations, the overall change can be so severe that an additional link seems to be 
necessary, a bracket that links the different stages of a person’s history. 
Three different strands of research have been developed in quest of an 
explanation of personal identity over time: the bodily continuity accounts (BCAs), the 
psychological connectedness accounts (PCAs), and accounts of narrative identity 
(NIAs). I am going to present the main arguments of the most influential contemporary 
representatives for each of these strands and confront their claims briefly with Ricoeur’s 
account. 
 
2.1 Examples of personal identity in question 
 
To outline the different approaches of accounts of personal identity over time (including 
Ricoeur’s account), I am going to discuss how each of them would deal with the 
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following four examples of ‘threatened’ personal identity (cases where the link between 
the various stages of a person’s history appears to be broken): 
 
Case 1: 
There is factual evidence (fingerprints and DNA found on the murder weapon) that I 
killed a man ten years ago, but I do not have any recollection of having done this. So I 
insist that I am innocent. Am I right? 
 
Case 2: 
I wake up in the body of a giant bug (like Gregor Samsa in Franz Kafka’s short story 
Metamorphosis134). Am I still myself? 
 
Case 3: 
I am going to be executed next week, but a friend of mine will create a complete clone 
of myself (body and the complete set of brain states at the time of cloning) just before 
the guards take me away. The clone will escape and live on. Should I be concerned 
about my execution? 
 
Case 4: 
My husband claims that I am now a completely different person from the woman he 
married, and consequently files for a divorce. Am I the woman whom he promised to 
love forever at our wedding? 
 
2.2 Bodily Continuity Accounts (BCAs) 
 
BCAs claim that where x is a person at time t1, and y is a person at any time tn, y is the 
same person as x iff y’s body is biologically continuous with x’s body. For these 
accounts, a person’s identity over time consists in the identity of her body.135 
Olson’s ‘Human Animal’ account is a currently popular variant of the BCA. 
Olson claims that people are human animals, that ‘each of us is numerically identical 
with an animal’.136 Thus, he avoids the difficulty of defining what is to ‘be’ one’s 
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animal body: how do I experience my animal body as my own? Animalism does not 
give any explanation of how the physical properties of the animal body and the 
psychological properties of the person interact. 
Olson focusses on a relatively easy question (is the animal body continuous?), 
while he does not attempt to tackle the hard part (what is a person?). As Olson says, 
‘Animalism leaves the answer to the Personhood Question entirely open’.137 
If we want to answer the question: ‘what makes me as a person persist over 
time?’, BCAs only answer the second half of the question. BCAs presuppose that the 
prerequisites for being a person are met, without defining what these prerequisite might 
be. Hence, it is easy for the proponents of these accounts to find clear-cut solutions to 
the four difficult cases of personal identity over time listed in section 2.1. 
In case 1, the fingerprints and the DNA on the murder weapon belong to my 
body. Under the assumption that the combination of fingerprints and DNA uniquely 
identifies a body, and that my body has persisted over time, I am the same person as the 
person who killed the man ten years ago, and hence, I am guilty. 
As a giant bug has a different body than a human being, and the change of 
body happened over night, it is obvious that my body change could not have been 
biologically continuous. Thus, in case 2, BCAs would say that I am no longer the same 
person, as I am no longer biologically identical with the same animal. 
A similar logic applies to case 3. If my body dies, then I die, because I am 
identical with my body. If a copy of my body is made, this has no influence on my 
identity or my survival – the new body will be a different animal. 
Under the assumption that I have not mysteriously switched bodies since my 
marriage, the answer in case 4 is yes, I am still the same person my husband has 
pledged to love forever, even though I may seem unrecognizable to him. 
A possible link between Ricoeur’s account and BCAs is the importance that 
both kinds of account place on embodiment, but apart from that Ricoeur does not think 
that they have much in common. Ricoeur has doubts about the application of 
identification criteria in general. In his view, the body belongs to the self through the 
process of attestation,138 and this process does not involve making truth-claims that can 
be proved.139 Ricoeur does not investigate any particular BCA models, but he criticizes 
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the assumption behind them. He describes them as ‘governed by the permanence of an 
organization observable from outside’.140 Ricoeur investigates the relationship between 
the lived self and the object world, and he views BCAs as interested only in persons as 
living objects. 
As BCAs do not include any explanation of what it is to be a person, Ricoeur 
does not consider them as helpful accounts of personal identity. He thinks that the 
BCAs’ focus on finding criteria for identification proofs prevents them from seeing a 
human being as a whole. For Ricoeur, the ethical responsibility of a person for her 
actions is an important aspect of personal identity, and this inner view (‘I affirm my 
own identity’) is not considered by BCAs. Thus, Ricoeur argues that an account of 
numerical identity needs to be extended by an investigation into how the lived self of a 
person persists over time.141 
We shall now look at Psychological Connectedness accounts. Let us see how 
they differ from Ricoeur’s model of narrative identity. 
 
2.3 Psychological Connectedness Accounts (PCAs) 
2.3.1 Overview 
 
Psychological Connectedness Accounts (PCAs) define criteria for the persistence of a 
person over time that consider the continuity of psychological states. They claim that 
where x at time t1 and y at any time tn are persons, y is the same person as x iff y’s 
psychological states are continuous with x’s psychological states, provided that these 
psychological states have developed from one another either directly (psychological 
connectedness), or through overlapping chains of direct psychological connections 
(psychological continuity). 
These accounts have evolved from John Locke’s claim that personal identity 
entails the consciousness (through memory) of having existed as the same being at 
different times.142 Psychological connectedness accounts have standardly focussed on 
                                                 
140 Ricoeur 1992, 126. 
141 Ricoeur 1992, 116. 
142 ‘Personal identity. This being premised, to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider 
what person stands for; — which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, 
and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places’, Locke 1999, Book 
II Chapter XXVII section 9. 
 57 
the existence of memories, and I am going to assume that standard version here. One 
objection against this criterion of psychological connectedness has been raised: if the 
concept of our memory entails that I can only recall my own actions and experiences, 
then the continuity of memory presupposes personal identity. 
To cope with this problem, philosophers defined the term ‘quasi-memory’ or 
‘q-memory’: Having a quasi-memory of a past experience entails that I seem to 
remember having that experience, that somebody had this experience, and that my 
apparent memory is causally dependent on that past experience in the right kind of 
way.143 Under these conditions, psychological connectedness is preserved. Ordinary 
memories can thus be understood as a subclass of quasi-memories. If we assume that I 
can also have a q-memory of an event that was actually performed by a different person, 
the continuity of memory does not presuppose personal identity. 
Derek Parfit’s view is a close cousin to PCAs that has raised much controversy. 
For him, all facts about persons and the persistence of persons over time can be reduced 
to more particular facts about brains, bodies, and a relation of mental and physical 
events (Relation R).144 Relation R consists in psychological connectedness and/or 
psychological continuity, with the right kind of cause.145 
Parfit claims that there is psychological continuity iff there are overlapping 
chains of strong psychological connectedness. A person x at time t-1 is psychologically 
continuous with a person y at time t-2 only if this continuity has the right kind of cause, 
and if it has not taken a branching form, i.e. if there is only one person at time t-2 who is 
psychologically continuous with person x at time t-1.
146 
He claims that although our existence involves the existence of our brains and 
bodies as well as our actions and our thoughts, our persistence over time just involves 
Relation R. However, Parfit does not take persistence in this sense to constitute 
continuing personal identity. His most provocative statement is ‘Personal identity is not 
what matters’.147 The only thing that does matter, to him, is qualitative survival 
represented by psychological states maintained in Relation R. 
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To illustrate his claim that Relation R is important, whereas the question of 
personal identity is empty, he compares a person to a club or a nation: A club exists for 
some time, following a set of rules, holding meetings. Then, it ceases to exist. A little 
later, some of its members may found a new club with the same name, setting up the 
same rules. Parfit says that in this case, there is no determinate answer to the question: 
‘Is it the same club, or a new club?’. But this is not important, he claims. We are in 
possession of all the facts, and finding an answer to this question would not give us any 
additional information.148 
In his view, a similar situation arises if a person dies, and an exact replica of 
this person lives instead. As a proof that personal identity is not what matters, Parfit 
presents his thought experiment ‘Simple Teletransportation’.149 In order to be 
teletransported to Mars, I have to press a green button that scans my blueprint and 
creates an exact replica of my body and my brain states on Mars, while simultaneously 
destroying my brain and body on Earth. I am informed about what is going to happen. 
Parfit argues that although I am intuitively afraid to die, the existence of my replica has 
the same quality as my ordinary survival. My replica is psychologically continuous with 
me as I will be when I press the button. She believes she is me. If – as Parfit claims – a 
person is nothing over and above psychological continuity, nothing is lost by my death 
if my replica is created as an immediate successor. 
Parfit would find the following answers in the example cases from section 2.1: 
In case 1, he would look for evidence / witnesses to establish whether there is 
psychological continuity between my person at the time of the murder I am accused of, 
and the person I am now. My current lack of memory that I committed the murder does 
not contradict Relation R – my brain states now might be psychologically connected to 
my brain states at some time between the murder and now, when I still remembered 
having committed it. If the conditions for relation R are fulfilled, I am wrong in 
proclaiming my innocence.  
Case 2 is more difficult. In a sudden metamorphosis like this, Relation R would 
require that the brain states I had before the transformation should exist unchanged after 
the accomplished change. If a giant bug is conceivable, is it also conceivable that this 
giant bug is capable of producing psychological states that have the same structure and 
quality as the human psychological states I had before? Parfit is fond of science fiction 
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examples, so he could perhaps assume that the bug was created by aliens who were able 
to copy my previous brain to something that processes information in the same way, 
especially as my immediate memories appear to be intact. Otherwise the transformation 
of human brain states to a bug brain would have been like trying to run the newest 
Windows version on a1980s Atari computer. Assuming that the bug’s brain is able to 
process information in the same way as my previous human brain, Parfit would say that 
I survive because Relation R persists, and qualitative survival is the only thing that 
matters. 
Case 3 represents a typical Parfit example. If my body and brain states are 
cloned before the execution, then Relation R continues, and I will still be there. So 
Parfit would say that I do not need to be concerned about my execution because the 
persistence of Relation R guarantees my survival. 
Case 4 requires the same kind of investigation as Case 1. If the conditions for 
Relation R are given for me from the time when my husband married me and the time 
when he files for a divorce, then I am still the woman he married. If, on the other hand, I 
underwent a sudden psychological change (for instance caused by a bullet entering my 
brain, but not killing me), this would break Relation R, and in Parfit’s view I would 
indeed not be the woman whom my husband married, and my husband could claim this 
as a reason for divorcing me. 
Summing up, Parfit’s two basic Reductionist claims are: 1) a person’s identity 
over time just consists in the holding of some more particular facts, and 2) these facts 
can be explained in an impersonal way, without holding that the experiences in the 
person’s life were had by this person, ‘or even explicitly claiming that this person 
exists’.150 
The one point where Ricoeur agrees with Parfit is that trying to define truth 
criteria for personal identity would be a futile exercise. They arrive at this conclusion 
for completely different reasons, though: Parfit claims that only Relation R matters, and 
that the question about personal identity is empty. Ricoeur, on the other hand, holds that 
personal identity must be investigated both in terms of sameness and in terms of 
selfhood, but that truth conditions can only be applied on the level of sameness. Where 
sameness is concerned, identity is a result of comparison: the relation of object x to 
object y is determined by the definition of identity, thus either verifying or falsifying 
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that x is identical to y. But, Ricoeur argues, whether a certain body or a certain set of 
memories belong to myself cannot be tested by the application of a criterion that leads 
to the result of either true or false.151 The characteristics of personal identity on the level 
of self come into being through attestation: I accept my memories, my actions and my 
body as my own.152 
As a result, Ricoeur rejects Parfit’s Reductionism. The two main targets of his 
criticism are: 1) Parfit’s statement that Relation R is the only thing that matters, 2) 
Parfit’s claim that everything about a person’s persistence over time can be described in 
an impersonal way, without referring to the notion of a self. 
 
2.3.2 Reductionism and what really matters 
 
According to Parfit, a person’s existence consists in nothing but the existence of a brain 
and a body, and a sequence of interrelated physical and mental events. Ricoeur argues 
that this definition disregards the intuitive concept of ‘mineness’. Although Parfit 
constantly uses personal pronouns like ‘mine’ or ‘our’ (see for example ‘Why Our 
Identity Is Not What Matters’153), he dismisses this concept as nothing more than a 
practical linguistic usage. He does not attach any importance to the process of self-
ascription in a person’s social relationships. 
Ricoeur disagrees with Parfit’s dismissal of mineness as nothing more than a 
linguistic custom. As Ricoeur points out, mineness is an important issue for a person in 
daily practical life as it generates a feeling of self-constitution. This is what our 
experience in daily life tells us: no matter whether something is a physical object, or a 
belief, or a personal attribute – it feels more valuable to us if we see it as ‘mine’. An 
interesting and more recent expression of this is the ‘Jesus and Mo’ cartoon in which 
Mo and Jesus agree that if our beliefs are based on bullshit, then so are our identities. 
But, they say, even if our identities should be bullshit-based, they are still ours, and 
‘that’s what makes them so precious’.154 
Another important point of Ricoeur’s criticism of Parfit’s view of a person is 
that Relation R does not account for the responsibility of a person as an agent, as 
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perceived by the person herself. Personal identity, Ricoeur claims, is important for 
persons regarding their own ethical behaviour. He says that when I ask the question 
‘Who am I?’, I re-evaluate my personal values and my plans for the future and reflect 
on whether my feelings and my beliefs are compatible. 
This view is shared by Kim Atkins (who supports Ricoeur’s view of narrative 
identity as a practical identity):155 I am confronted with the question ‘Who am I?’ in 
situations of social conflict, so the resulting reflections form an on-going process 
throughout my life. Within my social nexus, I need to define who I am, regarding both 
my own conscience and my relationship to others. I understand myself better through 
the regard of others with whom I interact within a complex network of commitments. 
My identity has to be recovered from the different views of myself that I experience in 
the course of my social relations. 
If I do not keep a promise I made, who is to be held responsible? This question 
can be asked from two sides: from the outside, from my social nexus, and from the 
inside, from my own conscience. In both cases, I would be in conflict because my 
actions do not match my obligations.156 Thus, according to Atkins, the ethical aspect of 
selfhood is an essential component of personal identity. 
Relation R consists of person stages at isolated points in time, linked by 
psychological continuity in a non-branching form. For Parfit, Relation R is the only 
thing that matters in survival. If this were the case, how could it be possible to impute 
responsibility for a promise that was given by a person stage at time t0 to a person stage 
at any time tn?
157 Viewed from the outside, this does not present a problem, but Relation 
R does not explain why a person should be in an inner conflict if she does not keep her 
promise. The event-ontology of Relation R does not support the self-accountability of 
an agent for a promise made, or an action performed, in the past.  
Hence, Ricoeur claims that Parfit does not ask the right kind of question when 
he investigates the conditions for survival. For Ricoeur, self-accountability is an 
important aspect of personal identity which cannot be reduced to anything else. 
Parfit does integrate ethical considerations in his account, especially 
discussions about the rationality of self-interest. He says, however, that it is credible to 
be more interested in the quality of future experiences than in the question whose 
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experiences they are going to be.158 Regarding past acts and commitments, he holds that 
if the psychological connections between a criminal now and the same criminal at the 
time of her crime are weak, she is less culpable than she would be if they were strong, 
and a similar principle should be applied to commitments.159 For Parfit, personal 
responsibility is proportional to psychological connectedness. As his approach does not 
consider self-attestation and self-constancy, it leaves out thoughts about ethical 
subjectivity.160 Atkins criticizes this aspect of Parfit’s account. She claims (in 
agreement with Ricoeur) that the requirements of daily life force us to be practical 
beings, and as such, we are less interested in the theoretical question ‘is there a moral 
guide on how one should act?’ than in the practical question ‘how should I act?’.161 This 
is an important distinction because a cause that explains general ethical concerns from a 
third person point of view might not be sufficient to justify an action from my own 
point of view. For instance, in Grahame Greene’s Brighton Rock, Ida urges Rose to 
abandon her husband Pinkie, who is a sociopath and a killer. Ida tells Rose that it is 
dangerous to stay with Pinkie, and that she should learn the difference between Right 
and Wrong. Here, Ida represents the ethical concern from a third person point of view 
that is grounded on the theoretical values of her society. But Rose, who accepts no other 
values than the ones derived from her own sufferings and passions, only distinguishes 
between her self-defined notions of Good and Evil. Having chosen Evil by choosing 
Pinkie, whom she loves, she is now convinced that sticking to him is the thing for her to 
do.162 For Rose, the all-important question is not the third person question: ‘Is it wrong 
not to bring Pinkie to justice?’ but her subjective question: ‘Considering that we are 
both of us on the side of Evil, shall I not stay with him in spite of his faults?’. Her 
ethical subjectivity influences her actions more strongly than the theoretical ethical aims 
of her society. As this example illustrates, personal accountability cannot always be 
measured by psychological connectedness alone, as Parfit argues. His impersonal 
perspective does not capture the complete picture. Ethical subjectivity – as an additional 
parameter – gives additional insights into a person’s choices and responsibilities. 
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The question whether we are right to be concerned about our own future is 
another problem on which Ricoeur and Parfit disagree. There are two different 
Reductionist claims about our concern about our own future: the ‘Extreme Claim’ states 
that there is no reason for our concern about our future at all, and the ‘Moderate Claim’ 
says that we are justified in caring about our survival.163 Parfit endorses the moderate 
claim. He argues that if there is no deep further fact about personal identity (and he 
claims that there is not), psychological continuity for any reason (as represented by 
Relation R) is an adequate replacement of ordinary survival. So, he continues, if I 
reflect on this on an intellectual level, I will lose the ‘false belief’ that I have reason to 
care about a person who will be the ‘identical’ me in the future,164 and I will also care 
less about my death; I will only care about someone being like me in the future. The 
experiences in my future life will not be linked to the experiences in my present life by 
chains of direct connections – and that is all there is about the fact that I shall be 
dead.165 
Ricoeur, on the other hand, argues that an individual needs to have grounds for 
the belief that she can make realistic plans for herself, because these plans form part of 
her narrative identity, as the protended future made present. He criticizes Parfit’s view 
as a self-protective illusion: it is only because Parfit does not link the anticipated future 
of a person to her past experience and present plans that he manages to maintain the 
illusion of an impersonal future.166 I worry about what is going to happen to me in 
future, not just in the sense of wondering whether I shall still be there. My worries are 
related to my current hopes and fears, to questions like: shall I pass my viva exam, or 
shall I suffer utter humiliation? Will my husband remember our wedding date, or will he 
forget again? All of these future-oriented desires and anxieties are closely linked to 
everything I perceive as mine. I need to have grounds for the belief that I can make 
realistic plans for my own future welfare. These plans feature in my current narrative 
identity, thus making my expectations of the future part of my present lived self. 
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2.3.3 Reductionism and the Impersonal Description claim 
 
The second area of Ricoeur’s disagreement with Parfit concerns Parfit’s claim that the 
identity of a person over time is determined by facts that can be described in an 
impersonal way, without referring to the notion of a person. 
Ricoeur sees the root of the problem in Parfit’s use of terminology. Parfit 
defines Relation R as a series of connected mental events, and Ricoeur claims that the 
word ‘event’ as a term of reference eliminates mineness. Mineness does not fit into the 
ontology of events – it describes the relation of one’s lived self to one’s own actions, 
one’s own character, and one’s own body. Ricoeur sees Parfit’s insistence on the term 
‘mental event’ as a further indicator that Parfit fails to make the necessary 
differentiation between the ipse and the idem.167 
Christine Korsgaard supports Ricoeur’s criticism. She stresses that before 
examining whether a person is a subject of experiences, or just a stream of experiences 
that can be described without reference to a person, it is important to investigate the 
underlying assumptions first. Korsgaard says that Parfit’s account is based on viewing a 
person as a location of experiences, and a person’s actions as experiences.168 Parfit 
begins by claiming that ‘a person is what has experiences, or is the subject of 
experiences’,169 and then, as Korsgaard puts it, he takes away the subject.170 
Korsgaard’s approach is similar to Ricoeur’s in that she also takes a practical 
view on personhood. In her own account, Korsgaard distinguishes between internal 
(authorial) and external sources of change. Following the Kantian view that the 
conception of ourselves as agents is the basis for the standpoint of practical reason,171 
she claims that internal changes preserve authorial connectedness and the continuity of 
the self, whereas external changes break authorial connectedness and change the self. 
She holds that a person is an agent who has to plan her actions, even the most trivial 
ones, some way into the future. In order to make the necessary choices, she needs to 
identify herself as a person who is constructing a specific life plan. To be what she is 
now, she has to identify with her future.172 She views herself as the author of her actions 
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and the leader of her life.173 Korsgaard says that Parfit’s Reductionist account disregards 
the authorial feature of our sense of identity.174 
Regarding the issue of impersonal description, Ricoeur raises the question 
whether subjectivity can be reduced at all. For him, the self depends on being embodied 
and interacting with the world. To illustrate his point, he points out the similarities 
between real life and realistic literary fiction. From a hermeneutical point of view, self-
narrative entails a process of ongoing interpretation and is thus closely related to 
reading realistic literary fiction. One of the reasons why we like to engage in realistic 
literary fiction is that the protagonists experience something similar to what we 
ourselves go through: they interact with the world they live in through sensations and 
actions of the body. It is an integral part of the story that they perceive their own body 
as a dimension of themselves. Literary narrative presupposes ‘our corporeal anchoring 
in the world’.175 The imaginative variations that literary fiction weaves around the 
protagonists’ embodiment are also variations on their self, on their lived existence that 
depends on relations with the world. This illustrates that subjectivity is an essential part 
of our interaction with the world. 
Ricoeur claims that it is of insurmountable importance for us that we live in our 
own body, calling the corporeal and terrestrial condition of the self the ‘existential 
invariant’. He criticizes Parfit’s thought experiments because – in opposition to realistic 
literary fiction – they render our corporal anchoring to the world contingent and so turn 
the invariant into a variable in an imaginary construction. 176 In Parfit’s account, brain 
states are taken to be the equivalent of the person, and they undergo various 
technological applications: blueprinting, cloning, transplantation, bisection, 
reduplication. Ricoeur holds that these science-fiction variations only deal with identity 
in the sense of sameness, whereas the variations of literary fiction apply to selfhood in 
its tension with sameness. 
Atkins also criticises Parfit’s denial that personal identity is in any way related 
to the conception of one’s experiences as being one’s own. She says that Parfit ignores 
an important feature of self-consciousness.177 Atkins endorses Kant’s third paralogism 
here: According to Kant, it is unsuitable to apply a model of permanence in time that we 
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use to understand empirical objects to understand the persistence of subjects as well. 
The numerical identity of a subject cannot be proven, as it can for objects, because a 
subject is not of the same epistemological status as an object.178 Atkins agrees with 
Ricoeur that the continuity of personal identity over time requires an integrated process 
of self-ascription that must be effected by its subject. It is not enough if others believe in 
the continuity of my life – I also have to live with myself.179 
In this and the previous section of chapter 2, I explained Ricoeur’s account of 
narrative identity against the background of BCAs and PCAs. The objective of doing 
this was to show how Ricoeur’s account addresses the question ‘who?’ (ipse) in 
connection with personal identity, whereas BCAs and PCAs concentrate on the question 
‘what?’ (idem). Thus, they do not recognize the enduring dialectic between ipse and 
idem which, according to Ricoeur, accounts for personal development and refiguration 
of the narrative identity. While offsetting Ricoeur’s account against Parfit’s reductionist 
account of narrative identity, I pointed out the main differences between their model, 
without – however – aiming to provide a conclusive objection against Parfit’s account. 
In the next section, I shall give an overview of other accounts of narrative 
identity, and I shall explain why I chose Ricoeur’s account – and not one of the others – 
as a foundation for my own account of the relationship between fiction reading and 
narrative identity. 
2.4 Narrative Identity Accounts (NIAs) 
 
Narrative Identity Accounts (NIAs) claim that a person shapes her sense of herself by 
weaving the events of her life together in an ongoing autobiographical narrative.180 In 
doing this, a person takes the role of author, protagonist, and narrator in parallel. As we 
have seen, Ricoeur’s account is a kind of NIA. There is, however, a fundamental 
difference between his account and most other NIAs: Ricoeur views personal identity 
from two perspectives, the question ‘what?’ and the question ‘who’, which cannot be 
reduced to each other. We shall see how this distinction gives Ricoeur’s account more 
explanatory power than most other NIAs can offer. But first, let us have a look at the 
general approach of NIAs. These accounts claim that narrative is an aspect of personal 
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identity: what does ‘narrative’ mean in this context, and how can narrative be connected 
to personal identity? 
Generally, a narrative is understood to be a representation of a sequence of 
events, which shows them as standing in some causal or meaningful connection.181 The 
recounted events should be organized in the form of a plot, laying out the events, the 
actions of a protagonist and the actions of other persons involved in the context of the 
story world. The plot has to arrange all of these element in such a way that one can both 
ask and answer the questions ‘who?’, ‘what?’, ‘when?’, ‘where?’, ‘how?’, and 
‘why?’.182 All NIAs agree that a self-narrative is a story, with ‘I’ as the main character, 
the narrator, and the co-author of the story. 
Weaving one’s life events together into a self-narrative may appear to be a 
leisurely, reflective activity, and this impression has given narrative identity accounts an 
air of the ivory tower in public reception. This is, however, not what most of these 
accounts say. They are more concerned with the needs of action and with ethical 
concerns183 than with reflection. Practical identity provides the guidelines that enable a 
person to act and make decisions in her daily life. NIAs claim that the continuous 
process of maintaining a self-narrative develops a set of rules that serves as a basis for 
moral choices and actions. 
The main point that NIA theorists argue about with their critics is how a self-
narrative presents itself. Is it explicitly communicated to oneself, in moments of self-
reflection, or told to others, in scenes of more or less truthful self-portrayal? Is it a 
running commentary in one’s head, or is there anything that gives it stability? Is there 
more than one self-narrative at a time, and, if there is, which, if any of them, constitutes 
the self? I shall discuss these questions in the subsequent sections, in particular in 
section 2.4.3. 
Some NIAs are descriptive, some normative. Descriptive accounts (NIDAs) 
claim that self-narrative is inherent in human nature: all human beings make sense of 
their lives by putting the events of their lives, their memories and their expectations into 
narrative form – although the theories differ on whether this generates a complete 
autobiographical self-narrative, or only selected strands of one’s life-story. Ricoeur’s 
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account is one of the most influential NIDAs in philosophy, although other models have 
been developing independently of his. 
Based on the general claim that humans develop their own stories about 
themselves, NIDA theorists take differing views of the importance of self-narrative. 
Some put forward the strong claim that self-narrative is constitutive of personal identity, 
or of the self.184 Others endorse the weaker statement that self-narrative does not 
constitute anything, but is involved in creating a practical identity; it functions to 
combine the different aspects of an embodied human life. I am going to discuss the 
importance of self-narrative in section 2.4.1. 
Normative accounts (NINAs) claim that the process of self-narrative is 
conducive towards leading a good life, which is generally understood to be a unified 
life. There is disagreement between the different theories about whether this is always 
the case, and under which circumstances building a self-narrative can be dangerous. I 
am going to evaluate these arguments in section 2.4.2. Ricoeur’s account, which is 
descriptive, also has a normative aspect – he says that we cannot help developing a self-
narrative, but that it would be better for us if we concentrated more on self-reflection in 
order to refigure our self-narrative towards an improved unity of life. 
Critics of the concept of narrative identity argue on two levels. First, on a 
phenomenological level, they claim that not all persons reflect on their lives, or if they 
do, they do not perceive the results of their self-reflection as narratives except in a 
trivial sense. I am going to discuss this criticism in section 2.4.1. Second, there are 
critics of the ethical version of the account: some of them claim that the creation of self-
narrative does not lead to a more fulfilled life; others say that a person does not need to 
reflect on a self-narrative to lead a good and meaningful life. I shall tackle these 
questions in detail in section 2.4.2. Finally, I shall give an overview of the main points 
of discussion in section 2.4.3. 
  
                                                 
184 Different meanings of the term ‘self’ will be discussed in connection with the specific accounts that 
have their own definitions for this. 
 69 
2.4.1 NIDA: do we narrate our lives? 
 
In this section, I shall deal with three questions: 1) What is self-narrative actually like?, 
2) Must self-narrative be based on experiential memories?, 3) Does self-narrative have 
to be realistic and explainable? 
 
What is self-narrative actually like? 
 
Regarding the first question, let us start with what descriptive narrative identity 
accounts claim. NIDAs are based on two assumptions: first, that we have ‘story-telling 
brains’ that enable us to put events and persons into a coherent narrative, and second, 
that we are forced to use this capability in order to perceive ourselves as subjects that 
persist over time, and thus see ourselves as unified agents who need to make decisions 
about their current life and future plans. For some NIDAs, the emphasis is on the 
practical concern raised by a person’s continuous need to act, others focus on the 
concept of personal continuity over time. All of them stress that self-narrative – whether 
we actively engage with it or not – gives us an understanding of ourselves, and of what 
we want and value. 
NIDAs do not imply that we consciously experience our lives as coherent 
narratives as we go through life– they say only that self-narrative is an ongoing process 
that we human beings perform. A narrative self-conception establishes itself in patterns 
of one’s actions, one’s commitments, one’s dispositions, and one’s relationships.185 
Ricoeur sees narrative identity as a necessary mediator between the actions of a 
person and her ethical values. The main feature that sets his account apart from others is 
his differentiation of the idem and the ipse. As we saw earlier, the dialectic between 
idem and ipse can lead to personal development. 
His model can be classified as a weak NIDA. He holds that a person develops 
her ability to weave a self-narrative as her interaction with the world moves from the 
simple articulation of desires and wants to the realization that she is a person among 
other persons.186 This insight leads her from simple desire gratification to the bigger 
goal of leading a life that feels continuous to her, in which she can develop self-esteem 
as a basis for interacting with others. To underpin her feeling of continuity, she tries to 
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entwine her past experiences and her expectations for the future into a unified narrative 
that contains the contingent events that happened in her life and integrates them into her 
own story. Her own point of view introduces causal connectedness in the narrative, and 
this gives her reasons to make plans for the future which then become part of her self-
narrative. 
Ricoeur sees self-narrative as instrumental in achieving a unified sense of self. 
Having a unified sense of self helps us to develop self-esteem. This makes his account a 
NINA as well as a NIDA: on the one hand, he depicts the struggle for self-esteem as an 
automatic procedure, but on the other hand, self-esteem is also a moral judgment of 
one’s self. Ricoeur describes it like this: if a conflict in my daily life and my subsequent 
actions prove to me that the values I act on are different from the values of my social 
surroundings, my sense of having a unified life is out of balance, and I suffer. My self-
esteem is jeopardized. This is an incentive to me to adjust my self-narrative so that this 
conflict is accounted for, either by an adjustment of my own values and obligations, or 
by a different interpretation of the world in which I move. So the conflict drives me to a 
dialectic between idem (sameness, which includes character) and ipse (the self that has 
entered obligations towards its social world) during which the self-narrative is reflected, 
reviewed and reconfigured whenever self-esteem is in jeopardy.187 
Not all changes of the self-narrative are due to conflict. Gradual changes of the 
ipse lead to changed habits and dispositions, which will eventually ‘sediment’ into the 
story, and thus into the core of its protagonist, the idem. In this way, practices of the self 
can gradually settle into the character(p). 
Ricoeur does not claim that the creation of self-narrative is always a conscious 
procedure, nor that a person always tells this narrative to herself or to others. Rather, the 
narrative serves two purposes: it is part of the process of personal development, and it 
provides values and rules for the person’s interaction with her social environment. In his 
view, narrative identity is a practical identity. 
Atkins’ account of practical identity is similar to that of Ricoeur. I am 
discussing it here because she adds some detailed arguments about the importance of 
embodiment which strengthen Ricoeur’s claims about the dialectic of idem and ipse. 
Atkins says that humans have selfhood because they are the kind of beings who 
ask themselves: ‘Who am I?” and ‘How should I live?’.188 This description is in keeping 
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with Ricoeur’s definition of the self, or ipse identity. Atkins builds her own narrative 
view on the thought that persons as agents are constituted by their bodies, where the 
body is interpreted as ‘one’s self-aware, proprioceptive sensory-motor, and cognitive 
body, a ‘my body’’.189 A person perceives her body under three perspectives: in the 
first-person perspective she experiences the world through her body and reflects on it; in 
the third-person perspective she reflects on herself; and in the second-person 
perspective she places herself into the social context of a personal relationship. In 
Atkins’ view, selfhood is developed during bodily interpersonal engagements during 
childhood. She says that a person can see herself as distinct from others only if she has 
experienced this in a personal relationship with a significant other.190 
These three perspectives are unified by the subject’s self-narrative:191 based on 
the learning process from second-person relationships, the subject perceives herself as 
the protagonist of her own story, and her sensory experiences and social encounters 
become events in her autobiographical narrative. This view is similar to Ricoeur’s 
explanation of the development of self-narrative, but Atkins goes a step further in 
stressing the importance of bodily contact in early childhood that constitutes the second-
person view. As Ricoeur would express it, the ipse-identity, the ‘self’, is involved in a 
dialectic not only with the idem-identity, but also with the ‘other than self’.192 Atkins 
adopts and expands Ricoeur’s view here.  
Atkins holds that the capacity for narrative is inherent in the human brain: 
narrative is imitation of action, and a person’s brain structures allow her from a very 
early age to learn to identify others by imitating them. As the ability to interact with 
others develops in a social context which is structured by a value system, a person as an 
agent is a subject of imputation whose actions can be judged by two sets of values: by 
her own standards and by the standards of her community.193 When a conflict occurs 
between one’s actions and either one’s own values or the values of the community, this 
leads to self-reflection as a necessary step to resolve the problem. For Atkins, being a 
self is basically an activity. This activity consists of self-constitution and self-
understanding, where self-understanding is articulated by narrative. So for both Ricoeur 
and Atkins, it is important that at least some of the process of self-configuration is 
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reflective. They both say that when we create a self-narrative, we follow the aim of a 
unified life, and they also claim that in doing so, we develop a practical wisdom in a 
‘dialogical process of critical solicitude’.194 In other words, our practical wisdom 
enables us to articulate the reasons for our actions. This is an important aspect of 
Ricoeur’s account which I am going to discuss later in connection with self-reflection 
and fiction reading. 
Summing up the discussion of the first question (what is a practical identity?), 
the accounts of Ricoeur and Atkins present a common framework for the claim that a 
person needs a practical identity which is built up during the course of her life. 
 
Must self-narrative be based on experiential memories? 
 
The second question (must self-narrative be based on experiential memories?) comes up 
in Peter Goldie’s account of narrative identity. Goldie’s NIDA aims to investigate ‘the 
narrative sense of self’, the way that human beings think about their lives in narrative 
terms. His account differs from Ricoeur’s and Atkins’ accounts in that he does not 
discuss the aspect of personal identity as sameness,195 and he is not interested in the role 
of embodiment in the development of the self. In his view, ‘having the ability to think 
about our past and future is part of what it is to be human’.196 He uses the term 
‘narrative sense of self’, meaning ‘a way of thinking of oneself, and of others, in 
narrative thinking’.197 A narrative sense of self does not require deep narrative 
coherence in the content, the only required coherence is that it reflects one’s own life.198 
We use this ability in our social interactions because we have a narrative sense not only 
of ourselves, but also of other persons. This definition is very similar to Ricoeur’s view 
that all persons weave a self-narrative, but – in contrast to Ricoeur – Goldie does not 
think that embodiment plays an important role in the configuration of self-narrative.  
Goldie combines his weak claim with the strong assertion that one does not 
need to have experiential memories in order to be able to think narratively of one’s 
past.199 Goldie says that even if I have lost all my experiential memories, I can still 
narrate my past, based on the testimony of others, and make future plans based on that. 
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This is a strong claim, and open to criticism. I hold – and Ricoeur would agree 
with me here – that Goldie is wrong on this point. For Ricoeur, memory can only be 
created by one’s own experiences, and these experiences weave the memory into the 
emotion-coloured narrative of our life. Goldie’s assertion would be true if my future 
plans only included armchair decisions about my pension plan or my travel itinerary. 
But as soon as I get into an ethical struggle which requires an urgent decision regarding 
social interactions, experiential memories with their emotion-laden stories can make me 
‘go the extra mile’, which a mere recollection of facts would not accomplish. Humans 
are continually involved in situations where they have to decide and to act, and as I 
showed earlier in this section, self-narrative is required at moments of conflict. So the 
question is: does it make a difference whether we resort to our self-narrative at a 
moment when urgent action is required, instead reflecting on our sense of self at a quiet 
moment? I say that there can be a difference when the conflict arises in contact with 
other persons: Our reaction to others often depends on how we can compare their 
situation with our own, and during this comparison, only experiential memories have 
enough psychological weight with us to play the required role. 
Here is an example to illustrate this. Imagine the following situation: you suffer 
from loss of experiential memory. A particularly unprepossessing homeless person 
stumbles on an icy sidewalk and falls down in front of you, vomiting profusely, and you 
see that she is seriously injured, her arms and face are bleeding. You have a disposition 
to be helpful, though you know from your self-narrative that you are not self-sacrificing. 
So you ring the ambulance and wait until they arrive, then you leave. If you had not lost 
your experiential memory, however, you might have re-experienced the memory of the 
time when you yourself fell onto an icy surface, how hard and cold it was and how the 
fresh wounds burnt. In this case, you might have overcome you disgust and done 
something to ease the unfortunate person’s discomfort, for instance putting a shawl 
under her face or dragging her away from the dirt. The experienced pain is part of your 
narrative sense of self. 
I hold that the loss of experiential memory makes you react in accordance with 
your character, whereas only the re-living of experiences makes it possible for you to 
react with sympathy, as a fellow human being who ‘goes the extra mile’, because you 
are familiar with the phenomenological sensations and the feelings of the other through 
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your experiential memories. You ‘relive’ them in your imagination prior to your 
decision on how to act.200 
This example shows that although it is possible for you to narrate the events of 
your life without experiential memories, you need to have experiential memories (which 
you remember because of the emotional impact of the stories in which they are 
embedded) in order to have a narrative sense of self that allows you to have social 
interactions which go beyond mechanical reactions. 
 
Does self-narrative have to be realistic and explainable? 
 
For the treatment of the third question, I introduce Marya Schechtman’s account of 
narrative identity. It adds a further assertion to the NIAs I have presented so far, 
therefore I discuss it in this separate section. 
For Schechtman, self-narrative constitutes the moral self, and this puts two 
constraints on the quality of the narrative: the reality constraint and the articulation 
constraint. As Schechtman’s account is both a NIDA and a NINA, I discuss it in both 
sections. I am including what she terms ‘the reality constraint’ and ‘the articulation 
constraint’ here because they contain conditions under which self-narrative could 
actually fail to be established. 
The reality constraint requires that the self-narrative is consistent with basic 
facts that we know about persons and about the world we live in.201 This is a stronger 
claim than that of Ricoeur, who merely stipulates that a self-narrative must be built on 
the principles of realistic fiction in order to form a basis for action. Atkins also endorses 
the reality constraint, but in a weaker form than Schechtman. For her, self-narrative 
must not be based on ‘factual errors of a major kind’,202 for instance about places and 
events, because ‘such errors would disable the semantic web that links ‘who’ to ‘where’ 
and ‘when’’.203 Atkins claims that our narrative identity is subject to defeat if our self-
view differs greatly from the view others have of us. In contrast to this, Schechtman 
says that such a situation will not lead to an overthrow of the self-view: even if a 
person’s self-narrative is built on major factual errors, it will still overlap with a 
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possible realistic narrative of this person sufficiently to enable self-constitution.204 So 
Schechtman and Atkins disagree on this topic: Atkins says that self-narrative will fail if 
based on factual errors, whereas Schechtman says that such a self-narrative diminishes 
personhood, but does not fail completely. But both Atkins and Schechtman say that self-
narrative urges us towards a correction if there is a clash between the narrative and the 
basic facts of the world: they say we cannot hold on to our current self-narrative if our 
perception of ourselves is biased by incorrect assumptions. 
To integrate this urge towards correction into the concept of the reality 
constraint, I suggest a different definition. Our self-narrative only fails if social 
interaction makes us aware of an incongruity between our narrative and the world. In 
the cases where it does not, our self-narrative feels stable.205 So an alternative 
formulation of the reality constraint could be: self-narrative fails if the basic facts it is 
built on are successfully challenged by members of one’s social environment. In this re-
formulation, however, it should be called a social acceptance restraint rather than a 
reality constraint.206 It is, however, important to remember that only strong NIDAs 
(NIDAs that claim that self-narrative is constitutive of personal identity) depend upon a 
reality constraint. For weak NIDAs (which claim that self-narrative is involved in 
creating a practical identity) the addition of a reality constraint is not necessary. It is 
possible for us to make our way through life with a practical identity that is based on 
some factual errors about ourselves. 
The articulation constraint requires that a person should be able to answer, 
either to herself or to others, simple questions regarding the ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of 
her actions. She should not be puzzled by the question, because in that case, she would 
not be able to appropriate actions to herself.207 
This constraint does indeed seem necessary, provided that one concedes that it 
is not necessary to answer these questions verbally. It should be enough to have a sense 
of self-ascription. 
In the preceding discussion, I have outlined the ways in which a narrative 
identity can be seen as a practical identity. In addition, I have presented an example that 
shows the importance of experiential memory for the narrative sense of self. As a last 
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step, I challenged the reality constraint on self-narrative, showing that only a very weak 
constraint is needed – i.e. one that rules out only extreme cases of factual error –, and 
suggesting that it should be renamed a ‘social acceptance constraint’. 
 
Do we have to relate to our past in a positive way in order to live a unified life? 
 
As a next step, I am going to discuss Schechtman’s claim that narrative identity only 
gives us a sense of self if it is based on past experiences for which we still feel a 
positive affective connection. 
Schechtman’s narrative account of personal identity differs from the accounts 
of practical identity by Ricoeur and Atkins. Schechtman distinguishes between basic 
and subtle survival of a person. For her, basic survival lasts until a person’s death, 
whereas subtle survival is only given if there is no serious psychological discontinuity 
between our past and our current self. Thus, her definition of subtle survival is always 
relative to a past self that is viewed in comparison with the self we are conscious of at 
the moment. Schechtman’s additional claim for self-narrative is that subtle survival is 
only given as far we have a positive affective bond with our past, as far as we have 
‘empathic access’ to our former self. If we do not still share the same values, emotions, 
likes and dislikes, she says, there is no subtle survival.208  
Unlike Ricoeur, Schechtman does not attach any importance to the role of 
human embodiment in the process of self-narrative, but her account is similar to 
Ricoeur’s in her criticism of psychological continuity accounts. She also argues that it is 
not enough to examine numerical identity and success conditions of survival. Trading 
numerical identity for qualitative identity, she says, works only at the cost of no longer 
being able to define a reason for caring about one’s personal concerns. Her main interest 
is in the quality of personal survival. She says that subtle survival implies personal 
continuation on a practical level that gives cause for morality, self-interested concern, 
autonomy, and authenticity.209 New decisions are informed by recognition and pull of 
characteristics which belong to a past self that we still feel positively connected with. 
Schechtman agrees with Ricoeur and Atkins that the appropriation of actions as 
one’s own requires self-narrative, but she has an issue with theories of narrative identity 
in general. She says that usually, theories of narrative identity have one fault: even 
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psychological changes that seem identity-threatening can be told in a coherent self-
narrative, and the narrative glosses over the fundamental change without being able to 
account for it.210 These theories of narrative identity, she says, hide losses of subtle 
survival, and she claims that her own theory mends this fault. 
To illustrate her own theory, she uses an example that Derek Parfit created in a 
different context:211 A young Russian socialist is going to inherit a large estate within a 
few years, and he plans to give it to the peasants who live there. Fearing that the 
irresistible enticement of money will weaken his current ideals in the future, he signs a 
document that binds him to give away the land as soon as he inherits, and which can 
only be revoked with his wife’s consent. He then asks her never to give that consent 
because the person who would ask her for it would only be ‘his corrupted later self’.212 
For Schechtman, this example shows that it is important for a person’s 
continued identity that no radical psychological changes occur. In her terminology, the 
corrupted Russian in the future will be only a case of ‘basic survival’ because there is no 
empathic access between his corrupted self and his idealistic past self. There would, 
however, be ‘subtle survival’ if he were to hold on to his ideals, as in that case the 
empathic access to his past self would allow him to base his actions and decisions on his 
past learnings and experiences.  
Schechtman criticises other narrative theories for making this kind of transition 
appear plausible too easily: the young Russian would be able to imagine many possible 
narratives that give good reasons for his gradual transition from an idealist to a 
capitalist. The change would be appear to be continuous, although the overall effect 
would be drastic. 
She uses another example to demonstrate the difference between basic and 
subtle survival: a party girl marries, gets a career and grows up into a serious matron. 
When serious matron looks back on her wild youth, she cannot evoke the emotions and 
predilections she had at that time. Schechtman claims that in this case, the change is 
identity-threatening because subtle survival is not maintained. NIDA followers would 
hold that the changes from giddy girl to responsible matron are woven into a coherent 
self-narrative, but Schechtman says that this is not enough to preserve identity.213 Here, 
we only have basic survival. If, however, the party girl grows into a less serious matron, 
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she recalls how exciting it felt to go to parties. She feels wistful when she watches 
party-goers although now she no longer wants to join them because she is wiser now, 
knowing how dull these parties turned out to be. Her values, emotions, likes and dislikes 
that drove her to her party life in the past have survived in some form. The not-so-
serious matron has empathic access to her past, although she recognizes that her tastes 
and circumstances have changed. Subtle survival has been achieved. 
Without empathic access, Schechtman claims, the rich continuity of 
consciousness is missing, which amounts to a loss of self. She concedes that there can 
be exceptional cases of gradual personal development in which there is no loss of self 
although continuity of consciousness is weak. But she limits these cases to personality 
changes that were brought about by internal motivations, and she claims that for these, a 
minimum of empathic access is possible. Such personality changes could be imagined 
in the case of the Russian nobleman: if he were to change his mind about giving his 
inheritance to the peasants not because the riches corrupted him, but because he found 
out that the peasants would use the money to ruin themselves, then Schechtman would 
probably concede that there is such a minimum empathic access.214 
Looking at Ricoeur’s definition of personal identity as the dialectic of idem 
(sameness) and ipse (self-constancy), it becomes apparent that there are similarities to, 
as well as important differences from, the account that Schechtman endorses. For 
Ricoeur, the case of the corrupted Russian and the serious matron would be examples of 
an idem and an ipse that cease to overlap in time. The Russian’s change of habits and 
predilections after inheriting the money would ‘sediment’ into his character(p) (which 
forms part of his idem), thus creating a crisis between his self-constancy demanding 
ipse and his changed idem. In Ricoeur’s model, all aspects of a person undergo 
permanent change and re-figuration. Schechtman criticizes narrative accounts for 
accommodating changes of character too easily, and thus masking a loss of self. 
Ricoeur, however, says there is never a ‘loss of self’, but there are different time 
horizons for the idem and the ipse. When they do not overlap, there are tensions and 
conflicts which lead to a painful process of self-refiguration. This process itself 
becomes part of a person’s self-narrative. 
Schechtman’s differentiation between ‘basic’ and ‘subtle’ survival might be 
seen as a simplified way of viewing the dialectic between idem and ipse: Her ‘empathic 
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access’ is achieved – in Ricoeur’s terms – when idem and ipse overlap. But Schechtman 
does not explain what happens to a person who loses empathic access to a past self – is 
this past self simply lost to her as a fund of decision-supporting knowledge? Does she 
just shrug it off? Ricoeur’s model of a dialectic between old obligations and new 
character traits shows that personal development cannot be described as simply as that. 
Thus, in comparison to Ricoeur’s account, Schechtman’s theory of empathic 
access has two gaps. First, although she claims that we create a self-narrative, she does 
not make an attempt to explain how the changes in our self-narrative are effected. 
Second, she cannot distinguish time horizons between current and past selves because 
she does not differentiate between ipse and idem. The investigation of time horizons of 
idem and ipse is an important part of Ricoeur’s account, because it explains the change 
process of the self-narrative. 
One aspect of Schechtman’s ‘empathic access’ view seems intuitively 
convincing at first glance: if we re-discover some of our current favourite character 
traits in a memory of our previous self, we experience a warm feeling of approval and 
commitment. But negative emotions can also constitute a strong emotional bond with 
the past. When I think of the time when I got helplessly drunk at a school outing as a 
teenager, I blush with embarrassment even now. This feeling is strong not because of a 
positive empathic access, but because I no longer have the values, emotions, likes and 
dislikes I had as a teenager. Unpleasant as such feelings are, they also constitute what 
Schechtman calls ‘thick continuity of consciousness’. Schechtman, however, says that if 
I no longer share the values, likes and emotions I had in the past, my past behaviour is 
no longer intelligible to me. In my example, however, this is not true – I remember the 
feeling of helpless insecurity that drove me to get drunk, but I no longer share it. Hence, 
her concept of empathic access does not cover everything that makes up a rich 
continuity of consciousness. This flaw in Schechtman’s account is highlighted by 
Simon Beck.215 He points out that the reason why he cringes at the things he did at the 
age of sixteen is that he has a negative affective connection to the past: he remembers 
what it felt like to do those things, he disapproves of doing them, and he is ashamed of 
having to call them ‘mine’. Without empathic access, there would be no need for him to 
be cringe at his former behaviour. So empathic access can only be a consistent concept 
if it also covers feelings of being alienated from our past desires and passions. 
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To sum up: In the preceding discussion, I compared Schechtman’s theory of 
narrative identity with empathic access to Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity and 
found two gaps where Ricoeur’s account can help. First, Schechtman does not explain 
how a person can have a unified sense of self. Ricoeur’s model of the dialectic of idem 
and ipse illuminates how radical personal changes can be woven into a self-narrative. 
Second, Schechtman cannot explain how a person can develop a sense of shame, pity, 
or guilt about her past. Ricoeur shows how conflicts between idem and ipse have an 
emotional impact that leads to self-reflection and self-refiguration. 
 
How many selves are there? 
 
As a next point, I shall discuss a general criticism of all narrative identity accounts. 
Galen Strawson is a forceful advocate of this criticism. His objection to narrative 
theories is mainly phenomenological. 
Strawson distinguishes between ‘one’s experience of oneself when one is 
considering oneself principally as a human being taken as a whole, and one’s experience 
of oneself when one is considering oneself principally as an internal mental entity or 
‘self’ of some sort’.216 He claims that there are four ways a person can experience life 
over time: narrative, non-narrative, diachronic, or episodic. In his view, all narrative 
identity accounts (descriptive as well as normative) are wrong because they are based 
on the assumption that life is always experienced in a diachronic way. The only way a 
descriptive narrative view can be true, he argues, is in the trivial sense of describing the 
necessary steps of an action, for instance, making coffee.217 
Strawson challenges the narrativists’ claim that self-narrative is necessary to 
develop a sense of self, and thus a sense of personal unity, in order to maintain one’s 
self-esteem. He holds that it is possible for an episodic person to lead a fully moral and 
satisfactory life, even if she is not interested in the idea that she has a past or a future, 
that is, if no self-narrative is involved.218 
He says that often, when we think about our past, we have the feeling that 
things that were done by us were done by a different self. Apparently Henry James was 
so awed by one of his early works in later life that he felt that it was the work of a 
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person other than himself. This thought moves Strawson to the claim that our lives 
consist of a sequence of selves, each of which is experienced for a relatively short 
duration.219 
Several objections can be made against this claim. First, Strawson’s use of the 
term ‘experience’ shows that his definition of ‘self’ is limited to the range of our current 
consciousness. This is a problem because the way a person acts in her social nexus does 
not only depend on the content of her current conscious experiences, but also on facts 
about herself which are outside her current experiential horizon. Strawson does not take 
any subconscious or unconscious facts about persons into account although they can 
influence their current lives. 
A Ricoeurian objection to Strawson’s theory of episodic selves would be that 
episodic experience takes diachronic self-experience for granted, as it presupposes the 
phenomenological structures of temporality. When Strawson anticipates giving a lecture 
before a large audience in two months’ time, for instance,220 he claims that any concern 
about this is just triggered by his instinct of self-preservation. What he does not consider 
here is that – even if he is not conscious of doing this – he draws upon his own 
experiences of what it felt like to give lectures in the past, of what he did when there 
were unpleasant questions, of how he dealt with aggressive students or insistent 
journalists, and that he evaluates these experiences to build story variations about how 
he is going to approach these situations in future. Even if he claims that for him, every 
experience is episodic, his past experiences shape his present plans regarding the future, 
although he may not be conscious of this. I argue that even if he is unaware of this, he 
uses narratives from his past to create narrative projections of his future, thus adding to 
the web of self-narrative that belongs to him. 
A second, and crucial, objection to Strawson is that his sole focus on 
experience in the sense of self-view prevents him from considering the other aspects of 
human life: the ongoing need to act and to interact with other persons. For Strawson, the 
case is simple: Everything that influences his actions and unifies his life is present in his 
current conscious experience, and there is no need for him to resort to a self-narrative in 
order to act. He says that he does not narrate his life. I would like to introduce some 
doubts about this. 
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Let us imagine a simple example: A boy was beaten up by a classmate at 
school. How would the boy decide what to do now? It is hard to see how he could do 
this without drawing on his past experiences and his sense of what sort of person he is. 
If he sees himself as someone who had better not stick his nose out too far, knowing 
from past experience that he has always hated pain more than anything else, he might 
think up an excuse not to go to school the next day. If his image of himself is that of a 
hero in the making who has history of successful fighting, he might take boxing lessons 
and pay the bully back in kind himself after more training. If he thinks he has been 
developing a Machiavelli-like cleverness, he might persuade his big brother to beat up 
the bully the next day. This everyday example shows two things: first, that even people 
who are not set on making ethical plans for their lives do make plans for the future 
which are based on the way they see their own life and their self-narrative, and second, 
that the future self involved in these plans does not seem remote to them. The direction 
of our concern for the future – of what exactly we want to achieve for ourselves – is far 
from being hard-wired, as Strawson claims.221 Strawson says that our concern for our 
well-being is based on our instinct for self-preservation – he does not, however, 
consider that our models of well-being are more complex than that, and thus subject to 
change, depending on the development of our life-story. Our concern for the future 
appears to depend on the experience and self-estimation of us as persons, which is part 
of the story of our lives. 
A third objection to Strawson’s theory is that his distinction between 
diachronic and episodic persons is not sharp enough to support his conclusion. On the 
one hand, he claims that the diachronic and the episodic style of self-experience are 
fundamentally different, but on the other hand he says that one is not necessarily 
consistent, across one’s life, in one’s experience of oneself as an episodic.222 Even an 
episodic self can have moments when she feels connected with emotionally charged 
moments in her past, or dreaded events in her future, such as imminent death. How 
consistently does a person have to experience herself as episodic to justify calling 
herself an episodic? The difference between episodic and non-narrative on one side and 
diachronic and narrative on the other side seems ill-defined. Even a diachronic and 
narrative person does not have to reconfigure her self-narrative continually to have a 
basis for her actions and decisions. As long as there is no conflict between the person's 
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self-narrative and the world she lives in, there is no reason to pay attention to the 
narrative. It could run on as ‘Galen Strawson happily defended episodic ethics until the 
end of his life’. Strawson’s distinction is too vague to enable us to establish that 
someone was truly episodic, as opposed to a self-narrator whose sense of self has never 
been challenged. 
It is worth noting that Strawson’s view of narrativity seems to assume that 
narrative is linear.223 He criticizes the metaphor ‘stream of consciousness’, claiming that 
there is no unity of conscious experience, that ‘consciousness is continually 
restarting’.224 Whether or not this may be true in neurophysiological terms, 
experientially it is not because consciousness is not one-dimensional. A more fitting 
metaphor for conscious thought would be polyphony,225 which provides a unified piece 
of music although different instruments play different melodies at disparate or 
overlapping intervals. This piece of music would not be one consistently composed 
work of art throughout a person’s life – it would gradually change in character. It might 
be a piece by Led Zeppelin during puberty, changing to a Freddy Mercury song in 
adolescence, and ending up like Fauré’s Requiem in old age. The important thing is that 
any changes would be gradually introduced or developed from earlier themes: for 
instance a new instrument (an interest in philosophy) could provide an occasional 
counterpoint before it begins to be involved in a new motif, whereas in the meantime 
other melodies (like enjoying a beer with friends, running a Marathon, planning a 
career, getting into fights) start, stop or run on, either in harmony or disharmony. 
Strawson’s focus on episodic self-experience cannot account for these aspects of 
consciousness. 
There is another, more intuitive, objection against Strawson’s view of episodic 
selves: we see other persons in a narrative way. When I watch Strawson debating with 
Schechtman on YouTube,226 I am conscious of the things I know about him (who his 
father was, what his articles are about), and I speculate on the private conversations he 
might have had with Schechtman, on philosophy or other topics. This is not because I 
am a particularly prying person, but because humans in general love to hear, or watch, 
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stories about other humans. If we tell ourselves stories about the lives of others who are 
in similar situations as we are, is it plausible to assume that we do not do the same with 
our own lives? So at least the claim of weak NIDAs seems intuitively convincing. 
To sum up: I challenged Strawson’s account of episodic selves on four main 
counts. First, his claim that one does not need a narrative sense of self to maintain one’s 
self-esteem is open to criticism because he does not consider the conflicts that we 
encounter in our daily tasks of interacting with other people. Second, his distinction 
between episodic and diachronic selves does not seem sharp enough to be helpful. 
Third, and most importantly, I pointed out that Strawson’s view of narrative as a linear 
activity does not do justice to the complex network of experiences which makes up the 
flow of human consciousness. Finally, his criticism of narrative identity accounts is 
counter-intuitive as it is highly plausible that we see our own life, similar to other 
persons’ lives, as having a narrative structure. The fundamental problem with 
Strawson’s ‘episodic’ account appears to be that he misunderstands the narrative view: 
narrative theorists do not say that we try to live our lives as if we were characters(f) in a 
novel, and they do not say that we are consciously aware of weaving a self-narrative. 
 
2.4.2 NINA: does narrative provide a unity to one’s life? 
 
Following the discussion of descriptive accounts of narrative identity (NIDA) in the 
previous section, I am now going to give an overview of normative accounts of 
narrative identity (NINAs). Most NINAs make claims about whether or not building a 
narrative identity, or developing a sense of narrative identity, can help a person to lead a 
fuller and more satisfactory life. On top of the descriptive claim that self-narrative is 
something that ‘we do’, they say that it makes a difference whether or not the secondary 
reflection involved in self-narrative is actively supported. All NINAs agree that it is 
beneficial for a person to have as much personal unity as possible in order to lead a 
meaningful life, but they disagree on how this could be achieved in the context of self-
narrative. There are two particular bones of contention between NINA supporters: first, 
whether it is necessary for personal unity that one’s self-narrative is based on facts, and 
second, whether it is necessary to endorse one’s favoured memories and character traits 
in order to maintain personal unity. 
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Does our self-narrative need to be based on facts? 
 
For normative accounts, this question is slightly different from the problem of the 
reality constraint discussed in the previous section. Here, the requirement that Atkins 
postulated for the descriptive account of narrative identity227 – that self-narrative fails if 
it is based on grave factual errors – comes in again, this time as a normative prerequisite 
for a good and unified life. 
This view is endorsed by Ricoeur, Schechtman, Atkins, and Goldie, in different 
degrees. Ricoeur and Schechtman both say that one’s self-narrative needs to stand the 
test of action, and that one’s major factual errors about one’s self can be corrected by 
interaction with one’s social nexus and subsequent self-reflection. 
Atkins partially agrees with this, saying that ‘all elements of a narrative 
identity must stand in relations of mutual implication and explanation’, but she does not 
make assumptions about how major factual errors about one’s self could be corrected.228 
She also says that delusional mental states can prevent a coherent narrative identity.229 
Ricoeur does not particularly mention delusional cases, but the following example 
shows that this case needs to be considered. 
In Patricia Highsmith’s short story ‘The Heroine’:230 a young woman works as 
a nurse for a family with two children, and she is disproportionally grateful for having 
the job. In her own self-reflective view, she is so unworthy of her position that she 
decides she has to do a heroic deed in order to deserve it. So she sets fire to the house 
with the intention of saving the children at the very last moment. She makes no special 
preparations for the rescue because she is convinced that her passionate longing is 
enough to ensure success. The story of the heroine ends when the fire becomes 
threatening, so we do not know whether she manages to rescue the children. If she does 
not, and survives, the terrible outcome might cure her self-delusion and lead her to a 
better life. However, if she does save the children, and survives, this success will 
probably strengthen her delusion. This example shows a flaw in the accounts of Ricoeur 
and Schechtman. They say that one’s self-narrative will lead to self-reflection in case of 
conflict – I am not going to argue with this statement –, but they do not investigate what 
happens if one’s self-narrative is never put to the test of action. I think they should add 
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this possibility to their accounts, and concede that in such a case, a self-narrative may 
persist even if it contains basic factual errors. 
Goldie is also much stricter on the subject of self-delusion than Ricoeur and 
Schechtman. He insists that our narrative sense of self must be based on facts – if it is 
not, it is not a sense of self, because it does not refer to us.231 To illustrate why a true 
narrative sense of self is important for a good life, he points out four ‘fictionalizing 
tendencies’ that endanger the creation of a realistic self-narrative. 232 The first one he 
identifies is that we plot our lives, meaning that we tend to forget that we are only the 
co-authors of the representation of our lives, not only dependent on our own plans but 
also on other agents, and on other contingencies beyond our control.233 The danger in 
this particular tendency lies in making unrealistic plans for the future. Nevertheless, it is 
not quite clear why Goldie sees this as problematic for one's sense of self. If a person 
has no confidence in her authorial power over her own life at all, personal development 
is impossible. On the other hand, Goldie's concern makes sense where extreme cases 
like Highsmith's heroine are concerned. The heroine imagines that she will be able to 
carry the children out of a burning house, and it is clear that she endangers them as well 
as herself by acting on the plot of her fictional self-narrative. 
The second fictionalizing tendency is detecting agency in the world where it is 
not.234 In works of fiction, events typically do not happen by accident, but because some 
action caused them, thus adding more coherence to the story. In real life, there is usually 
less coherence, and if a person tries to create it artificially by imagining action, her story 
moves away from reality and is no longer a reliable basis for planning. That is a 
convincing argument. However, it is not clear why this fictionalizing tendency should 
always lead to unrealistic plans for the future. There may be cases when this tendency 
actually helps a person to carry on with her life after a tragedy; for instance, a mother 
whose child dies in infancy might find the thought ‘The angels took her away to 
Heaven’ so consoling that she can overcome her grief. 
Goldie's third fictionalizing tendency concerns the desire for narrative closure. 
He claims that fictional persons have their end in them in the beginning,235 whereas real 
lives do not. Persons who suffer pain or loss are often tempted to find an answer to the 
                                                 
231 Goldie 2012, 127. 
232 Goldie 2012, 150. 
233 Goldie 2012, 161/2. 
234 Goldie 2012, 163. 
235 Goldie 2012, 165. 
 87 
question ‘why did this happen to me’, expecting the sequence of events in their lives to 
be tied up just as neatly as a piece of erotetic fictional narrative that provides answers to 
the question it raises. This fictionalizing tendency hinders the people who give way to it 
from accepting their pain and grief and going on with their lives. I endorse this view. 
In his fourth fictionalizing tendency, Goldie describes the danger of imposing 
genre on one's life.236 Genre assigns certain attributes to a main character, thus 
flattening the character to a cliché: the heroes are more heroic than in real life, the 
children more angelic, the clowns funnier. If a person sees herself in a particular role 
taken from genre literature, she might feel compelled to stick to this role, making 
decisions which she would not have made otherwise. Goldie claims that this has a bad 
side and a good side to it. If someone sees herself type-cast as a victim, her actions may 
be unnecessarily defeatist, and she will never be able to change because the outcome 
will always confirm her delusion. As a positive example, Goldie cites cases where a 
person deliberately overestimates her powers in order to deal with a situation, in order 
to be effectively either verified or falsified in the attempt. If the situation does not 
develop in the positive sense that the genre role seemed to demand, the person will be 
able to reflect on why it went wrong and how she should try to change to do better in 
life. If Highsmith’s heroine were to survive after not having saved the children, she 
might get rid of her delusion and do some real good for other children. As Goldie says, 
‘seeing oneself in a certain light can help one to stick to one’s resolutions, and this can 
be for the good’237. But it is not easy to say under which circumstances the good will be 
possible. In the case of Highsmith’s heroine, the price for her own good would be the 
lives of two children, and it seems cynical to call it ‘good’ under these circumstances. 
Summing up, I agree with the NINAs of Ricoeur, Schechtman, Atkins, and 
Goldie that NINAs (in contrast with NIDAs) should incorporate a (strong) reality 
constraint. However, in contrast to Ricoeur and Schechtman, I claim that factual errors 
in self-narrative cannot always be corrected by interaction. I criticised Goldie’s account 
of fictionalizing tendencies on two points: in my view, there can be cases when the 
tendency to plot our lives and the tendency to detect agency where there is none can 
actually help people to lead a unified life. However, I agree with his view of the danger 
of fictionalizing tendencies for narrative closure and for imposing genre on one’s life. 
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Do I need to have empathic access to my past life to achieve personal unity? 
 
The question whether it is necessary to favourably endorse one’s self-narrative in order 
to maintain personal unity comes up in connection with Schechtman’s account of 
empathic access. As discussed in the previous section, Beck criticizes Schechtman’s 
claim that only empathic access to one’s past secures rich continuity of consciousness. 
Beck maintains that empathic access in Schechtman’s definition does not cover strong 
negative emotional engagement to one’s past, but that negative emotional engagement 
also unifies the self. 
Goldie picks up this argument and applies it to his normative claim that self-
narrative should be used for self-development. He says that if survival means that 
empathic access to one’s past actions is maintained, and empathic access is only 
possible for past actions one feels positively connected with, this effectively prevents 
personal progress through radical change.238 For him, self-directed reactive attitudes to 
the past are especially important in cases of disapproval because they enable self-
forgiveness and personal progress. Once again, I endorse this point. 
In this section, I argued that normative accounts of narrative identity are right 
in claiming that the ongoing self-reflection involved in narrative self-constitution can 
help a person to lead a more unified and fulfilled life. On the other hand, there are 
fictionalizing tendencies, and dangers of self-delusion, which can have the opposite 
effect. Finally, I agreed with Beck and Goldie that affective recollection of the past is 
more likely to be good for self-development if it includes both positive and negative 
affects. 
 
2.4.3 NIA: summing up 
 
In the sections on NIAs, I outlined the most important accounts of narrative identity, 
both descriptive and normative. 
In the section about descriptive accounts, I presented Ricoeur’s account as one 
of the most sophisticated models of narrative identity as a practical identity. His 
definition of the dialectic between idem (sameness) and ipse (self) accounts for the 
ongoing struggle of the embodied person to maintain personal unity in her interactions 
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with her social world. After discussing the question of whether narrative identity is a 
practical identity in connection with the accounts of Ricoeur and Atkins, I showed that 
there are convincing arguments for the claim that a person has a practical identity which 
is being developed and re-configured during the course of her life, and that this practical 
identity is a narrative identity. I criticized the reality-constraint on self-narrative by 
showing that only a weak version is applicable to strong NIDAs, and that weak NIDAs 
do not require a reality constraint. 
Regarding the role of experiential memory, I contradicted Goldie by 
demonstrating that you can narrate your life without experiential memories, but you 
cannot have a full narrative sense of self without them. 
Schechtman claims that narrative identity can only provide us with a rich sense 
of self as far as we still share the values and emotions of our past selves. I came to the 
conclusion that empathic access needs to cover negative as well as positive strong 
emotional engagement with one’s past. 
As a last step in the discussion of descriptive accounts of narrative identity, I 
examined Strawson’s claim that there are people who are episodic, and do not narrate 
their lives at all. I argued that he does not consider the conflicts that we encounter in our 
daily tasks of interacting with other people. To deal with these, I argued, we require a 
deep sense of self which has narrative form. My discussion of Strawson’s account of 
episodic selves shows how and why his account differs from Ricoeur’s account of 
narrative identity: I do not aim to develop a conclusive case against Strawson’s account, 
as this would be beyond the scope of this work. 
In the section on normative accounts of narrative identity, I discussed the 
accounts of Ricoeur, Atkins and Goldie, with a special emphasis on the problems of 
self-delusion and ‘fictionalising tendencies’. I argued that ongoing self-reflection 
involved in narrative self-constitution is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for a 
person to lead a more unified and fulfilled life. 
For my own account, I am going to follow the general outlines of Ricoeur’s 
account of narrative identity as a practical identity. I adopt his definition of idem and 
ipse, I agree with his definition of independent time horizons for idem and ipse, and I 
take up his notion of self-narrative. For me, however, narrative identity is a descriptive 
account (NIDA) rather than a normative account (NINA). Regarding Ricoeur’s view of 
fiction reading in connection with narrative identity, I am going to fill two gaps in his 
account: how emotions can be generated in fiction reading, and how experiential 
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memories can influence the reading process. I am also going to challenge Ricoeur’s 
view that self-reflection always leads to an improved unity of life: I say that this is only 
possible under certain conditions. This is why I am not offering a NINA. I shall discuss 




PART II: READING AS A GAME OF MAKE-BELIEVE 
3 Walton: the reader as a reflexive prop in a game of make-
believe 
 
My aim for this work is to explore the connections between fiction reading and the 
reader’s self-narrative, bringing together and improving two philosophical models: 
Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity and Walton’s account of fiction reading. In Part 
I, I introduced Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity and compared it to other 
contemporary models of personal identity. Now, in Part II, I present Kendall Walton’s 
account of fiction reading as a game of make-believe. His account is an important factor 
in my own model of fiction reading in connection with narrative identity because it has 
a special focus on reader participation. The association of reader participation with the 
concept of make-believe set his account apart from other accounts of fiction reading. 
In the first section of this chapter, I shall give an overview of the account as 
Walton presents it himself; in the second section, I shall examine critical issues and 
open points. It is not my aim to defend Walton’s account against his critics. However, 
the discussion of these issues introduces some issues about the nature of the reading 
experience that I will continue to investigate as I present my own account. 
In Part III, I shall show how my own account relates to Walton’s model, and I 




In his work Mimesis as Make-Believe, Walton presents a theory of representation that is 
based on an analogy. He holds that engaging with a work of art is analogous to a child’s 
game of make-believe. I shall discuss this analogy in detail because I shall draw on it in 
chapter 8 where I compare Ricoeur’s view of narrative identity to Walton’s view of 
participation in a work of fiction. I shall also outline Walton’s accounts of fictional 
truths, of how fictional truths are generated, of fictional worlds, of participation in a 
work of fiction, and of ‘quasi-emotions’. Finally, I am going to examine Walton’s 
account of ‘identifying’ with a character(f). 
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The analogy of fiction reading with a child’s game of make-believe, Walton 
claims, leads to valuable insights into what it means to engage with a work of fiction. 
He discovers important parallels: for instance, the use of imagination is required for 
both activities. He also holds that a child’s practice of make-believe continues later in 
life in interaction with representational works of art.239 I am now going to outline the 
main points of his account. 
Imagine two children playing a game of ‘explorers’: in turns, each child draws 
a line as far away from herself as possible, and the other child has to jump onto this line. 
If she does not get both feet on to the line, she falls into an abyss and loses the game. 
To play this game successfully, the children need to agree about three aspects 
of the game: a fictional world, a set of relevant rules, and the props that can be used. In 
my example, the game world is a dangerous mountain territory. The set of rules 
specifies that if you land on a line with both feet, you gain a safe foothold on a 
mountain ledge; if you miss the line, or land only on one foot, you fall into the void. 
The props that can be used are: a stick that represents a torch to highlight a rock, lines 
that represent solid rocky ledges, and the unlined ground that represents an abyss. 
It is an important feature of games of make-believe that the players themselves 
are props in the game. In my example, they take the role of explorers and assign 
attributes to this role. They imagine, de se, that they are skilled mountaineers and can 
jump across chasms because of their training and experience. 
Where, then, are the parallels to fiction reading? When I read the first chapter 
of William Golding’s Pincher Martin240, for instance, I accept it as fictional that the 
action takes place during the Second World War, that a boat was torpedoed, and that a 
man called Pincher Martin is swimming in the sea, in danger of drowning. This defines 
the fictional world, and the text invites me to imagine further details of this world and 
the novel’s protagonist. I become moved by Pincher Martin’s plight and want him to 
succeed. Just as in the game of make-believe, I accept that there is a rocky ledge, in 
Pincher Martin, I accept that the hero is about to drown. 
Walton calls this kind of engagement ‘participation’.241 Participation can 
pertain to a game of make-believe or to a work of representational art. For Walton, 
participation in a work of fiction is a species of imaginative activity involving props, 
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very similar to participation in a game of make-believe. A work of fiction is a prop that 
generates fictional truths for the reader. Participation in a work of fiction means that a 
reader accepts the rules set by the work of fiction and applies them to herself, imagining 





What does the term ‘fictionally true’ mean? Walton calls a proposition ‘fictionally true’ 
if it is ‘true in a fictional world’, if there is a prescription that it is to be imagined in a 
game of make-believe. Walton says: ‘A proposition’s fictionality consists in a 
prescription to imagine it.’242 
In my children’s games example, it is true in the game world of ‘explorers’ that 
each player is an experienced and competitive mountaineer. The proposition that each 
player is an expert mountaineer is fictional, and the fact that it is fictional is a fictional 
truth.243 
There is, however, a big difference in the ways that fictional truths are 
generated in games of make-believe and in engagement with a work of fiction: In a 
game of make-believe, the players are free to choose their props and the rules under 
which they operate, as long as they agree about the rules and the props among 
themselves. 
In fiction reading, the chosen work of fiction will act as a prop for the reader’s 
imaginings when she participates in it. In contrast to games of make-believe, this prop 
already prescribes many of the features that the reader’s imagination will work on. 
These features include the work’s genre, aspects of the fictional world, characteristics of 
fictional persons and, in most cases, a fictional time setting. Among these, the work’s 
genre is the most important. For instance, The End of the Affair is a novel set in London 
during the Second World War. A reader who takes it to be a guide to London 
restaurants, or a science fiction novel about a war with the Martians, does not take part 
in the game which the novel requires her to imagine. If the reader is completely unaware 
of the social and historical background of the work of fiction and the intentions of the 
author, she is not able to engage with the game of make-believe suggested by the work. 
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Walton says that a fiction reader plays an ‘authorized game of make-believe’ if her 
imaginings are in line with the relevant rules given by the work of fiction. If her 
imaginings run contrary to these rules, she plays an unauthorized game.244 
 
Generating fictional truths 
 
The generation of fictional truths from a work of fiction depends on the ‘principles of 
generation’ that are valid in the ‘the relevant social context’,245 and on the reader’s 
grasp of them. Walton points out that a reader can obtain fictional truths directly 
(primary) or indirectly (implied).246 In The End of the Affair, it is an implied fictional 
truth that Maurice’s room has a window, although this is not mentioned explicitly – the 
reader is supposed to imagine this as given because in the novel, it is fictional that a 
bomb destroyed a tree that had formerly blocked the light in his room. In a work of 
fiction, the directly generated fictional truths are usually in the minority; the reader is 
required to fill the gaps of the described fictional world from the implications suggested 
by the work of fiction. 
Is it possible to find a full definition of which principles of generation for 
implied fictional truths there are, and how they work? Walton investigates two widely-
used approaches: the Reality Principle (RP) and the Mutual Belief Principle (MBP). 
Walton gives this definition of the RP: 
‘If p1, …, pn are the propositions whose functionality a representation generates 
directly, another proposition, q, is fictional in it if, and only if, were it the case that p1, 
…, pn it would be the case that q’247. 
If a reader follows the RP in order to fill the gaps in the work of fiction with 
implied fictional truths, she pretends that everything that is primarily fictional in the 
work of fiction has implications which can be followed through her own knowledge of 
the real world, and can thus be verified and filled out with more realistic detail.248 
On the one hand, RP does a good job of explaining why we assume that a 
fictional world and characters(f) are very much like the real world and real people. On 
the other hand, works of fiction are often not realistic. They can contain propositions 
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that contradict each other, or are incompatible with the features of the real world. For 
instance, in Jules Verne’s novel De la terre à la lune (1865), the reader is mandated to 
imagine that the space travellers are subject to gravitation until they have reached a 
certain point between the Earth and the Moon. As modern readers know, this is not in 
line with the laws of physics. Here, proposition p is ‘Space travel to the moon is 
possible’, and proposition q is ‘Gravitation decreases gradually when travellers to the 
moon move away from the earth, ceasing altogether at some point between the earth and 
the moon’. Here, the fictional truth of q cannot be derived from the fictional truth of p; 
modern scientific knowledge tells us that q is not true. So in this example, RP does not 
help with the generation of implied fictional truths because the novel gives a mistaken 
picture of the situation of the passengers within the projectile. To deal with problems 
like this, it is possible to apply the Mutual Belief Principle (MBP) instead. 
This is Walton’s definition of the MBP: 
‘‘If p1, …, pn are the propositions whose functionality a representation 
generates directly, another proposition, q, is fictional in it if and only if it is mutually 
believed in the artist’s society that were it the case that p1, …, pn it would be the case 
that q’.249 
MBP tries to account for the implication of fictional truths from direct fictional 
truths which are not accounted for by the Reality Principle. It holds that if a work of 
fiction generates a direct proposition, implied propositions are also fictional for this 
work if it is (or was, at the time of the work’s creation) commonly believed in the 
artist’s community that they can be derived from the direct proposition.250 In De la terre 
à la lune, all scientific details are based on what was known in Jules Verne’s time and 
society, so the reader following the MBP will accept that proposition q can be derived 
from proposition p. She will imagine the strange gravitational experiences of the 
travellers and try to fill out further details that go along with them. 
As Walton states, there are many other implications at work which are not 
sanctioned by RP or MBP.251 Among these are myths, legends, and fixed iconography 
which are part of the artist’s cultural background. Artists often devise new ways of 
generating fictional truths by challenging the reader’s power of association and her 
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knowledge of literary tradition as well as of the real world.252 Walton says that for a 
reader who wants to find the fictional truths suggested by a work of fiction, ‘there is no 
substitute for a good nose’.253 
The application of any principle of generation, however, can lead to problems 
where questions of ethics are concerned. I am going to show this in an example here 
because these considerations play an important role in my own account, as I shall 
explain in Part III. 
In Erich Kästner’s fantastic children’s book The Thirty-fifth of May, for 
instance, the daughter of South Sea chief and a Dutch typist is depicted as black- and 
white-chequered (to the protagonist’s delighted surprise). The work of fiction, first 
published in 1931, invites the reader to laugh about this, for two reasons: the mixing of 
races is represented as creative and wonderful, and the episode makes subversive fun of 
the Nazi ideology of racial purity. A modern day politically correct reader – eager to 
spot the slighting of minority groups – might find it problematic to imagine it as 
fictional that situations involving mixed race people are funny. Can a reader who has 
this problem generate fictional truths about the text? 
In this case, the MBP does not help: even if the reader accepts the proposition 
that Kästner’s society appreciated the joke about a mixed-race person, she cannot accept 
that it should be funny. The modern reader feels a reluctance to imagine that fictionally, 
it is right to laugh about people of mixed race. If she were to imagine it, she would – 
albeit fictionally – adopt a moral viewpoint that is odious to her. This dilemma is known 
as the ‘problem of imaginative resistance’.254 
Walton argues that in cases like this, different reader reactions are possible.255 
A reader might refuse to accept it as fictional within The Thirty-fifth of May that the fact 
of being of mixed-race is funny. She could turn a blind eye to it, thus avoiding the 
problem of accepting as fictional what she does not accept in real life. 
If she manages to accept it as fictional, she might also imagine it, accompanied 
by a feeling of guilt. 
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As a third possibility, she might accept it as fictional but refuse to imagine it. 
This leaves her two courses of action: either she could reject the story completely, or 
she could follow a convention which holds that we are not obliged to imagine things 





The discussion about the generation of fictional truths highlights an important aspect of 
fiction reading: it is necessary to distinguish between the fictional world suggested by 
the work of fiction, the ‘work world’, and the world imagined by the reader in her 
engagement with the work of fiction, the ‘game world’.257 
The game world contains many fictional truths that were prompted by the 
reader’s own associations and may thus be quite different from the author’s work, or the 
fictional world that is manifested in the work of fiction according to contemporary 
literary judgment. Every reader, and every author, creates her own appreciator’s world 
when engaging with a work of fiction. The work world, on the other hand, contains the 
fictional truths that an ideal reader of the work of fiction would generate.258 If the 
distinction between the work world and the appreciator’s world were not made, it would 
not be possible to account for the wide range of different responses that readers have to 
works of fiction.259 
 
Participating in a work of fiction 
 
As mentioned above, Walton calls the engagement with the fictional world suggested by 
the work of fiction the ‘authorized game’ if it follows the rules of generation for 
fictional truths that are generally accepted for this kind of work.260 The reader can 
deviate from the authorized game in two different ways: she can play a game that is not 
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authorized, or she can play the authorized game, but have either imaginings in addition 
to the game, or fail to imagine some key propositions authorized by the game. If a 
reader engages with The End of the Affair under the assumption that it is a guide to 
London restaurants, she plays an unauthorized game. If, on the other hand, she reads it 
as a psychological novel but during the reading process also indulges in ponderings 
about her own failures as a Catholic, she plays the authorized game, although the 
additional imaginings – albeit triggered by the novel and the protagonists’ conflicts with 
their faith – are not part of this game.261 
The phenomenon of imaginings that occur alongside the authorized game often 
arises when the reader is involved in psychological participation, imagining a 
character(f) from inside. What happens to a reader when she is ‘caught up in a story’? 
As Walton points out, we frequently have the illusion that fictional things are 
objects of our psychological attitudes, that fictionality is a species of the truth, although 
we know better.262 There is a link between the real world and the fictional world, and 
this link is manifested by the reader’s participation in a work of fiction. Walton says 
about our engagement with characters(f) that we are ‘sharing their joys and sorrows, 
rejoicing and commiserating with them, admiring and detesting them.263 Reading The 
End of the Affair, for instance, we know that it is merely fictional that Sarah gives up 
her love affair with Maurice because of a promise she made to God, but we still feel 
sorry because of her loss and her wasted life. We do not actually feel sorry for Sarah, 
because – as we know – Sarah does not exist, it is only fictional that she does. 
Statements about fictional entities do not refer to anything, it is only fictional that they 
do. But when we imagine that Sarah exists, we may feel sympathy with the imagined 
Sarah, and thus, experience an emotion that is very much like sorrow for a real person 
who is close to us. This emotion is – contrary to emotions in real life – cut off from 
action. If Sarah was a real person, and my friend in real life, I might visit her, give her a 
hug, send her to see a counsellor. But as I only feel for her as part of my participation in 
a novel, I am limited to experiencing sadness. I might even imagine Sarah from the 
inside and feel regret about a love lost and a life not fully lived. In real life, this might 
urge me to change my life plan, but in fiction, I just savour the emotion. 
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Walton says that it is fictional that we feel for fictional characters. We have the 
impression that we care about characters(f), but it is only fictional that we do. We do, 
however, have real emotions that are triggered by fictionally caring. To clarify his view, 
he coins the term ‘quasi-emotion’. For him, a quasi-emotion contains all the elements of 
an emotion except the cognitive element and the motivational element.264 Emotions 
generated by real-life situations are based on a belief that something is the case which 
prompts not only a quasi-emotion but also certain motivations. Emotions generated by 
engagement with a work of fiction, on the other hand, are based on make-believe that 
something is the case which prompts a quasi-emotion. Hence, the quasi-emotions 
generated by make-believe in fiction reading do not prompt us to action, the feelings 
and sensations may have a different intensity, and their duration can be different, either 
longer or shorter. 
Here is an example of quasi-worry in fiction reading to clarify this distinction: 
In Pincher Martin, the ship-wrecked protagonist tries to haul himself up a rock. When I 
read ‘A ripple splashed into his mouth. Immediately he was convulsed and 
struggling’,265 I find myself sitting tense and clenching my fists, worrying and wanting 
him to climb out of the water. On the one hand, I am inclined to say that my worry is 
like an emotion felt in the real world because my phenomenological sensations and my 
state of mind suggest that I experience worry. On the other hand, the worry I go through 
while reading Pincher Martin is different from the worry I would feel if I actually 
watched someone in real life who was in danger of drowning. The worry that is brought 
about by my game of make-believe with Pincher Martin is less intense, and it does not 
incite me to act, as a real life worry about a drowning man would. Hence, in Walton’s 
view, I have a quasi-worry that is based on make-believe that Pincher Martin is 
drowning. 
Emotions that are brought about by participation in a work of fiction often have 
a longer time span than those brought about by engagement in a real life event.266 If I 
were to watch somebody in danger of drowning in real life, my worry about him would 
end as soon as he was either saved or drowned. My worry about Pincher Martin, 
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however, is not limited to the question of his survival; it is deepened by the work’s vivid 
presentation of how a life-threatening situation can affect a human being. For this 
reason, it has been troubling me off and on ever since I first read the novel twenty years 
ago. 
Walton says that although the mental life we lead in reality is distinct from the 
mental life we lead in a participator’s game of fiction reading, there is a large overlap.267 
We carry likes, dislikes, and dispositions into the reading process, thus influencing both 
the fictional truths we generate and the emotions that arise from them. And this works 
the other way around as well: emotions generated through fiction reading can change 
our real lives. For instance, if a reader already has a fear of swimming in the sea before 
starting to read Pincher Martin, the worry induced by reading the novel might deepen 
that fear in reality. 
 
Identifying with a character(f) 
 
The experience of emotions brought about by fiction reading is closely linked to the 
process of ‘identifying with a character from within’. As Walton says, ‘We don’t 
observe fictional worlds from without. We live in them (in the worlds of our games, not 
work worlds)’.268 When I identify with a character(f), I imagine myself in that fictional 
role. For instance, when I read about Maurice meeting Sarah’s husband in The End of 
the Affair, it is fictional that Maurice is betrayed by Sarah and jealous of her husband. 
The features of the novel prompt me to imagine what it might be like to be in Maurice’s 
place. If I manage to feel empathy with Maurice, the pattern of my thoughts is shaped 
by my motivation to simulate his situation.269 
This is possible for me, although I am unlike the fictional Maurice in many 
aspects, because feelings of betrayal and jealousy are deeply human and known to all of 
us. So my emotions can be evoked by a simulation of a fictional person, based on my 
own experiences. My response does not only involve the reactions mandated by the 
novel, but may also induce other thoughts in me: how would I have reacted in 
Maurice’s place, is he right to be so bitter, shouldn’t he have forced an explanation from 
Sarah? Imaginings of this kind do not belong to the work’s authorized game but ‘occur 
                                                 
267 Walton 1990, 252. 
268 Walton 1990, 273. 
269 Feagin 1988, 496. 
 101 
along with it’.270 They give us the opportunity to try out roles and patterns of behaviour 
which we do not have in real life, without being troubled by our current personal 
concerns.271 These imaginings enable us to feel empathy with people whose outlook on 
life is different from our own, and to reflect on our own life in consequence. 
Walton says that the insights we gain in this way give us pleasure, that we care 
about the experience of fictionally caring,272 but he does not investigate the reasons why 
this could be the case. He merely assumes that there might be an evolutionary 
explanation for the fact that human beings enjoy experiences that produce insight.273 
What remains to be done in this area, Walton concludes, is to investigate the various 
ways in which participatory experiences make a contribution to our lives.274 
In this section, I gave a brief overview of Walton’s theory of representation in 
regard to fiction reading. Here is a summary of the most important terms he uses in his 
own words: 
Representations [ ... ] are things possessing the social function of serving as 
props in games of make-believe, although they also prompt imaginings and are 
sometimes objects in them as well. A prop is something which, by virtue of 
conditional principles of generation, mandates imaginings. Propositions whose 
imaginings are mandated are fictional, and the fact that a given proposition is 
fictional is a fictional truth. Fictional worlds are associated with collections of 
fictional truths; what is fictional in a given world – the work of game of make-
believe, for example, or that of a representational work of art.275 
Walton says there is room for further investigation on how participating in a work of 
fiction has an influence on our lives. I shall focus on this question in chapter 9 where I 
compare Walton’s and Ricoeur’s account of fiction reading and investigate how 
Walton’s account can be filled out in this respect. 
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3.2 Criticism of Walton’s model and open points 
 
In this section, I am going to address two specific questions that have been raised by 
Walton’s critics in regard to the role of the fiction reader. It is not in the scope of my 
work to explicitly defend Walton against objections to his account; rather, for the 
purposes of this discussion, I am assuming that Walton’s account is correct. In 
particular, I am going to take his idea of ‘imagining from the inside’ for granted. I have 
chosen to examine specific points of criticism of Walton’s account here because they 
are important for the discussion of my own account, in particular regarding the quality 
of the reading experience, the process of making-believe, and the generation of 
emotions through fiction reading. 
In my own account, I am going to focus on a reader’s empathy with a 
character(f), so the questions I am going to raise in this section prepare the ground for 
my discussions in Part III. These are the questions raised by Walton’s critics: Does the 
analogy to games of make-believe reflect the individual experience of a reader? Does 
the analogy to games of make-believe cover every aspect of what we value in literature? 
I am going to limit my discussion to the points put forward on these two questions by 
Noël Carroll and John Gibson because their arguments highlight the issues I am going 
to investigate further in the next chapter. 
 
Do fiction readers feel they are playing a game? 
 
For Carroll, this question is important. He claims that when a reader engages with a 
work of fiction, she is not aware of playing a game of make-believe, or of following any 
rules prescribed by such a game. In Carroll’s words, Walton attributes ‘too much role-
playing of a very strained variety’ to fiction readers. 276 
On close examination, however, it becomes apparent that Carroll mainly 
objects to the use of the term ‘role-playing’ on a linguistic level, not against the 
activities which Walton associates with role-playing. Linguistic custom makes us call 
the process of engaging with a work of fiction ‘reading’; the use of the term ‘game of 
make-believe’ for this is unusual. But here we only have a case of a novel use of a term, 
not of a different kind of personal experience. For Carroll, fictions invite a reader to 
                                                 
276 Carroll 1995, 98. 
 103 
entertain certain propositions as unasserted, that is: to imagine them. So far, his view 
does not differ very much from Walton’s: they both agree that fictions mandate the 
reader to imagine something. But what does the process of imagination entail?  
For Carroll, imagining something is to ‘entertain’ a proposition. He says that 
the concept of role-playing is not necessary to explain the reading process. 
This is where he runs into problems. Taking this stance, he avoids facing the 
problem of how the reader comes to entertain some propositions rather than others 
(Walton’s rules of generation), and he does not give sufficient weight to one of the main 
aspects of participation in a work of fiction: identification with a character(f) ‘from 
within’. Imagination gives a reader scope to get emotionally involved, thus paying more 
attention to some aspects of the work than to others. For instance, if a reader feels 
empathy for Maurice in The End of the Affair, she is playing a role, imagining herself in 
a situation of being left by someone she loves, she not merely entertaining the 
proposition that Maurice is hurt because he was left by Sarah. The empathetic reader 
tries to simulate Maurice’s situation in her mind, using her own experiences and her 
own observations of the world to fill out the picture. This simulation process is best 
described by Walton’s concept of role-playing because this indicates that by 
participating in a work of fiction the reader simulates a person in a certain situation. 
This simulation process is not explained by Carroll’s notion of entertaining a 
proposition as unasserted. 
The problem with Carroll’s account is that it precludes a deeper discussion of 
the role of the reader. This is because Carroll takes fictional propositions as merely 
unasserted, as opposed to simulated. If fictional propositions were nothing more than 
unasserted propositions, it would remain mysterious why they can provoke an 
emotional reaction in the reader. I am going to discuss this in detail in Part III. 
 
Does the concept of make-believe explain why we value fiction reading? 
 
The second objection to Walton’s model is that the notion of fiction reading as make-
believe does not cover everything that we think is important for us when we read 
fiction. Gibson claims that a make-believe theory represents fiction as nothing more 
than ‘fodder for fantasy’.277 If we see fiction like that, Gibson says, we under-estimate 
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the ‘critical and cognitive force of literature’.278 For him, literature bridges the gap 
between the mind of the reader and the reality of the world by linking the reader’s 
beliefs and concepts to something outside them: the forms of human activities going on 
in the world. Gibson says that our existing concepts are acknowledged and fulfilled 
through the insights we gain in fiction reading. 
He sees a problem here for make-believe models of fiction reading because for 
him, the vocabulary of make-believe does not account for the true insights into the 
world that we gain through literature. If we only imagined scenarios, he claims, we 
would not be able to ‘see reality in the fictional worlds of literary texts’.279 He says that 
make-believe models do not cover the whole scope of what he calls ‘literary 
humanism’, the conviction that participating in a work of fiction can illuminate reality 
for the reader. What we would fail to recognize, he adds, is not only the truth about 
human behaviour but also the validity of the world-adequate content of a work of 
fiction.280 He does not say that modelling fiction reading as a game of make-believe 
excludes the workings of literary humanism, but he insists that this kind of model does 
not explain how fiction readers come to achieve a richer understanding of reality. 
This is an interesting objection because it leads into the discussion of what 
‘making-believe’ actually entails, especially in fiction reading. As a counter-argument 
to Gibson, I hold that he underestimates the complexity of the make-believe process. 
Imagining something means simulating a situation in which a proposition is true 
although we do not believe it is true. In order to be able to simulate such a situation, 
however, we need a backdrop of other propositions which we do believe to be true: that 
London existed in the 1940s, that it was bombed during the Second World War, that 
lovers are often jealous, that religious belief can make people do strange things, and so 
on. Make-believe has to operate on elements of our beliefs, and this is why it is 
interesting to us. If someone told us to imagine that crylophants are crylomaric, for 
instance, we would not be able to do it because we have no beliefs connected with 
anything that might be represented by the words ‘crylophant’ or ‘crylomaric’. 
Making-believe is not equivalent to idle flights of fancy that are triggered by 
chance. In Part III, I am going to argue that in order to ‘make herself believe’ that 
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something is fictional a reader has to actively search for associations within her 
memories of experiences and images of the world. 
Another objection to Gibson’s claim is that – contrary to what he claims – we 
cannot rely on works of fiction to give us knowledge about what the activities and 
emotions of other humans are really like. All we get is an extended knowledge about the 
many ways that human behaviour might be like, and the experience of pondering on 
human behaviour. We play with the examples of human psychology shown to us in 
fiction, linking them to our existing concepts, thus changing them or creating new ones. 
When we read The End of the Affair, we do not get a textbook truth about male 
jealousy; we only get a plausible example. There cannot be a direct knowledge transfer 
about human behaviour between the work of fiction and the fiction reader. We see 
samples of good and credible mimesis, but not ‘reality’. The information can even be 
misleading, although intuitively convincing. As critics have pointed out, for example, 
autistic Christopher in Mark Haddon’s The Strange Behaviour of the Dog in the Night-
Time is made up from many stereotypes – as a result, Christopher does not possess the 
abilities of a real autistic person, but those of a lovable fiction who plays a successful 
role in the narrative.281 We do not gain knowledge about autism or Asperger’s 
syndrome here, we only see a representation of some interesting aspects which may or 
may not be true. 
This is why I hold that Gibson is mistaken in his claims: He under-estimates 
the make-believe process, and he mischaracterises the nature of the knowledge we gain 
from fiction. In my view, we can advance our knowledge from fiction reading in two 
ways: by gaining possible insights which we need to verify with reliable sources, and by 
actively reflecting on human behaviour. 
 
In this section, I addressed two questions that were raised by Walton’s critics, both 
connected with the role of the reader in Walton’s account of fiction reading as a game of 
make-believe. 
I discussed Carroll’s claim that the analogy to games of make-believe does not 
reflect the individual experience of a reader, and found that Carroll does not attach 
enough importance to the role of the reader in the process. In my view, making-believe 
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a fictional story involves the reader’s own experiential memories, and thus, the 
simulation of the story goes a long way beyond Carroll’s notion of entertaining a 
proposition. 
I also investigated Gibson’s assertion that the make-believe analogy for fiction 
reading does not cover the recognition of reality in literature, and came to the 
conclusion that Gibson’s understanding of the process of make-believe falls short of 
what is actually involved. Making-believe a fictional story is not arbitrary – the reader 
has to find associations for the work of fiction within her own life story and experience. 
Here, it was not my intention to defend Walton’s account against criticism. I 
explored these critical points because they pave the way to the exposition of my own 
view of the reading process. These discussions are important for the explanation of my 
own account of fiction reading in connection with narrative identity in Part III. In my 
own account, I am going to fill a gap left by Walton’s account: the role of the reader’s 
experiential memories during the reading process, and the subsequent generation of 
real-life emotions that may persist after the reading process. 
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PART III: THE SIMULATED SELF 
 
4 The Simulated Self 
 
How do participating in a work of fiction and imagining a fictional world intertwine 
with the reader’s life? Building on Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity and Walton’s 
account of fiction reading as make-believe, I am going to investigate two aspects of this 
question: the actual reading process and the subsequent self-reflection that is set in 
motion by fiction reading. Based on my discoveries, I shall propose a theory of the 
effects of fiction reading on the reader’s self. I shall show that my theory fills two gaps 
in Ricoeur’s account of reader engagement with fiction: how emotions can be generated 
in fiction reading, and how experiential memories can influence the reading process. I 
am also going to offer an answer to a question left open by Walton’s theory of fiction 
reading: how fiction reading can contribute to the reader’s own life. 
Here, I explore a topic that has not been examined in depth by other 
philosophical accounts of narrative identity or of fiction reading: the mutual influence of 
fiction reading and the fiction reader’s narrative identity. I show how the reading 
process intertwines with the reader’s self through the medium of narrative, both during 
and after the reading process. Thus, my theory enhances the explanatory power of the 
narrative identity account in a substantial way. 
A large portion of my work is concerned with the role and the nature of the 
fiction reader’s emotions, in particular with the emotional experience. I commit myself 
to a definition of emotion as a complex process that has a narrative structure. In chapter 
5, I shall outline the account of emotion that I adopt. 
I shall present my own account in chapters 6 and 7, leaving comparisons and 
contrasts until chapter 8. 
In chapter 6, I shall investigate the actual reading process. Section 6.1 deals 
with the degrees of involvement the reader can attain during this activity. I distinguish 
between three levels of participation: 1) reading ‘from the outside’ with aesthetic 
appreciation, 2) participation that includes sympathy with a character(f), 3) participation 
that includes identifying and empathizing with a character(f) from within. I say that it is 
possible for reader participation to occur on all three levels. 
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I am not making a general claim about reader participation. Every reader is 
different, and some readers may never experience sympathy or empathy with a 
character(f). The aim of my investigation is to provide a model that accommodates the 
effects of fiction reading that have been observed in socio-psychological and cognitive 
research. My assumption is that these apply in some, though not all, cases. 
In section 6.2, I define three different kinds of narrative that the fiction reader 
can develop during the reading process: the other-narrative, the self-in-other-narrative, 
and the other-in-self-narrative. I shall argue that the generation of these narratives is 
brought about by a psychological mechanism which I call the ‘doppelgänger function’. 
I am going to explain the working of the doppelgänger function with some examples 
from fiction. 
My main focus during this and the following discussions is going to be on the 
reader who identifies with a character(f) from within. 
In chapter 7, I am going to investigate the long-lasting effects that fiction 
reading can have on the reader. What can cause the reader to continue her engagement 
with a fictional story after the reading process has been completed? I am going to argue 
that a chain of emotions can evoke both spontaneous and purposeful self-reflection, and 
that self-reflection can trigger refiguration of the reader’s self-narrative. 
Finally, I shall summarize the differences between my own account and the 
two accounts that constitute its basis. In chapter 8, I am going to highlight two gaps in 
Ricoeur’s account of the connection between fiction reading and narrative identity, and 
show how my account helps to fill them. In addition to that, I shall discuss how 
Ricoeur’s concept of the configuration of the self-narrative through three steps of 
mimesis can be connected with Walton’s account of fiction reading as a game of make 
believe. Can the concept of make-believe, as described by Walton, be applied to any 
stage of Ricoeur’s mimesis process? I shall argue that the concept of make-believe is 
deeply involved in Ricoeur’s third stage of mimesis, and that Walton’s concept of 
appreciation with participation corresponds to Ricoeur’s concept of identifying with a 
character from within in an important respect: both Ricoeur and Walton say that the 
reader creates fictional truths about herself during her engagement with a work of 
fiction. 
In chapter 9, I shall provide additional support for two areas of Walton’s 
account of fiction reading: my account of the different levels of narrative woven by the 
reader, based on Ricoeur’s model of the narrative self, shows how deep emotions can 
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evolve and persist after reading, even if the reading process is understood as ‘only’ a 
game of make-believe. I shall argue that in order to understand the fiction reader’s 
engagement with the text, it is important to investigate the imaginings that occur 
alongside the ‘authorized’ game of make-believe. As a second point, I shall claim that 
Ricoeur’s account of self-reflection and subsequent self-refiguration is needed, with a 
refinement added by my own account, to supplement Walton’s account by showing how 
fiction reading can influence a reader’s self-narrative. 
More recent investigations of the influence of fiction reading on the reader tend 
to focus on one of two things: first, on the instruments used in works of fiction with the 
aim of influencing the reader, or, second, on empirical research of the readers’ reaction 
regarding empathy and ethics. As I shall explain in chapter 6, these enquiries have given 
me valuable suggestions for the direction of my investigations. In particular, socio-
psychological studies have confirmed my idea that the influence of fiction reading on 
the reader’s self-assessment is a topic that is worth exploring in connection with the 
concept of narrative identity. However, these accounts rarely tackle questions about the 
structure of the reader’s fiction-induced emotions and their possible impact on the 
reader’s self. Where they do, I have integrated a short discussion in the relevant 
chapters, in particular in sections 6.2, 7.1 and 7.2. 
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5 Emotion as a structured experience 
 
In this chapter, I shall outline the main points of the account of emotion that I am going 
to assume in my investigations of the effects of fiction reading on the reader. I shall 
argue that engagement with a work of fiction with participation develops in a similar 
way to an emotional experience that is directed towards a person in real life. 
My account is based on the assumption that fiction reading usually involves 
getting to know fictional people, hence it is important to investigate the causes and 
effects of emotions in this context. I am following Goldie’s view that when an 
emotional response carries on over a medium or long-term time range, the evolving 
emotional episode can expand into a complex narrative.282 Hence, whenever I use the 
term ‘emotion’ here and in the following chapters, I am going to refer to a complete 
emotional episode.283 In a nutshell, I shall view an emotion as a characteristically 
complex process which cannot be fully explained without taking into consideration the 
complete context in which it occurs. An emotion is paradigmatically embedded in the 
unfolding narrative of a person’s life. Thus, emotions play a big part in the refiguration 
of one’s narrative identity. In the next two chapters, I am going to explore the interplay 
between fiction reading, emotions, experiential memories, and the development of 
narrative identity. 
I hold that emotions are often long-lasting processes which are shaped by past 
and present emotional experiences as well as dispositions to think, act, and feel. The 
elements of such a long-lasting emotion are interwoven in a dynamic narrative which 
makes these elements intelligible by providing a context. For instance, I may be sad 
when I am passed over for a promotion, but my sadness can turn into anger when I learn 
that a colleague whom I judge to be less qualified is promoted in my place. An emotion 
is typically intentional, and the intentional target of an emotion can be different from 
the cause of the emotion. As an emotional experience unfolds, it can spawn new threads 
of emotion with new targets which inherit some of the original target’s attributes.284 
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In the following discussion, I am going to use emotion-related terms in the following 
way: 
• When I use the term ‘emotion’ what I have in mind is the typically 
complex process that constitutes an emotional episode. 
• An emotional episode is a continued emotional response, triggered by an 
emotional reaction, and united by being about the same theme. 
• The target of an emotion is a special case of an intentional object, namely 
the thing, person or event that an emotion is directed to. For example, if I 
am afraid of being killed by a bull that is charging towards me, the target 
of my fear is the bull. 
• The focus of an emotion is the background object or state of affairs that 
constitutes its main underlying concern.285 In the case of the charging 
bull, the focus of my emotion is my health. 
• An emotional disposition is the tendency to react with a certain emotion 
under certain conditions. 
• An emotional reaction is a short-term emotional response, which might 
last for a few seconds or a few minutes. 
• An emotional experience is the combined phenomenological feeling 
(including bodily sensations as well as psychological feelings) generated 
in the course of an emotional reaction or an emotional episode.286 
 
Emotion as a complex process 
 
In a multifaceted structure, an emotion merges evaluation, psychological and bodily 
feelings and responses into an intertwined phenomenological experience which feeds 
upon itself. The target of the emotion becomes the focus of increased attention. As 
Michael Brady says, emotions help us make important things salient to us, they capture 
our attention.287 
For example, I feel compassion for the fugitives from Syria who flee to Europe 
when I watch the scenes of long treks with sick and hungry families in the news, but my 
emotion does not stop there. I have become sensitive to the target of my emotion, 
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gathering up more information without being consciously aware of it: I read newspaper 
articles about the situation more carefully, I read the hysterical postings on Facebook, 
and I am snowed under with conflicting information and conflicting feelings which are 
now directed at the commentators. I am in turn feeling guilty about not offering help, 
disgusted at reporters exploiting the fugitives’ problems for their own stories and at the 
blind activism of do-gooders, then remorseful about not doing more for people who are 
in need. Thus, the development of my emotion about the fugitives includes the 
generation of emotional reactions about others (in this case repulsion against journalists) 
and about myself (remorse about not being a more caring person). Together, these 
reactions form a complex emotional experience. As they are connected, and have a 
unified strong influence on me by causing me to reflect on myself, I think it is right to 
see all of these instances as belonging to the same emotion.288 
The duration of an emotional experience is largely dependent on the type of 
emotion, in various ways. For instance, a self-directed emotional experience is likely to 
have more facets and a more intricate structure than an other-directed emotional 
experience because it has more and richer material to feed upon. A negative emotional 
experience typically has a stronger impact than a positive emotional experience; 
empirical evidence has shown that the focus of a negative emotion is usually narrower, 
and thus deeper, than that of a positive emotion, provided that these emotions have the 
same intensity.289 I shall return to these thoughts in chapter 7. 
 
The role of narrative 
 
An emotion is intertwined with the narrative of a person’s life, with her moods and 
dispositions, the past and present events in her life, and her past and present experiences 
and emotions.290 To make sense of an emotion and its connected emotional episodes, it 
is therefore necessary to appeal to this narrative. How does that work? I argue that 
having an emotion motivates me to focus on a particular problem, and to re-evaluate my 
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life story in the parts that seem to be related to the problem area, and to question the 
ways I dealt with this problem in the past. 
If I try to make sense of an emotional episode that I undergo, I examine my 
current self-narrative and look for features that relate to the emotion I am investigating. 
Here, the success of my search depends on the reliability of my self-narrative.291 For 
instance, when I try to find out why my catty colleague makes me so angry, I might 
remember that in my childhood, I was repeatedly blamed for my siblings’ 
misbehaviour, but never received any credit when I helped them to succeed at 
something. So I realize that I added up isolated events in my past life to the general 
impression that I am always put-upon, and tend to get angry about this in a way that I 
now see as inappropriate. If, however, my self-narrative tells me that I have always been 
an exceptionally talented career woman who has repeatedly been insulted by jealous 
colleagues, I might come to the view that I have a right to be angry. 
In comparison to understanding one’s own emotions, understanding the 
emotions of others requires an additional effort of imagination, and additional life 
experience. I try to piece together the evidence (my knowledge of the other person’s 
character and history, her facial and bodily expression, my knowledge of emotional 
concepts) and deduce which object her emotion is directed towards, and what she is 
feeling. Doing this, I access the other-narrative that I have constructed for her. The 
process is similar when I try to understand the emotions of a character(f): there, I also 
create an other-narrative. However, the props I can use in each case have different 
sources. For the creation of the other-narrative of a real person, I can use and deepen my 
personal knowledge of them, using all of the information available to me via my 
ongoing connection with the real world. Building the other-narrative of a fictional 
person, I must rely on the information given by the text, but I often have the benefit of 
having the thoughts of the fictional person spelt out to me, which is not (yet?) possible 
in real life. The other-narratives that a person creates for other persons in real life and 
the other-narratives that a reader creates for a character(f) have the same structure, but 
they differ in their function. Whereas the real-life other-narrative helps me to 
understand the other person so that I can interact with her in the way I think appropriate, 
the other-narrative for a fictional person helps me to feel for her from the inside with the 
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aim of actually savouring the experience of perceiving the world from the perspective of 
an other.292 
Regarding the reader’s activities during the reading process, I shall define the 
concepts of other-narrative, self-narrative, self-in-other-narrative and other-in-self-
narrative in chapter 6, and discuss the connections between them using representative 
examples from literature. 
 
The intentionality of an emotion  
 
An emotion is characteristically directed towards a target. The target of an emotion can 
be a thing, a person, an event, a state of affairs, or even a theoretical concept or a 
fictional entity.293 I can hate war, admire time travel, love Father Christmas, or despise 
Beavis and Butt-Head, for example.294 
In most cases, it is easy to identify the target of an emotion. If I see a bull 
charging towards me from a short distance, my initial intuitive evaluation identifies the 
most important part of the situation: I am in danger, and my emotional reaction is fear. 
The target of this fear is the bull which is about to kill me within the next few seconds, 
and I am urged to immediate action, in this case to run for cover. This is accompanied 
by a bodily reaction: my muscles tense and my heart beats faster as I see the beast 
approaching. I experience the target of my emotion as bound up with the 
phenomenological part of my emotion, which is made up of psychological feeling and 
bodily sensations. 
There are, however, cases where it is not clear to me what the target of my 
emotion really is. Being confused about the target of one’s emotion may have three 
causes: first, merging of ‘historical’ emotions with new ones; second, finding in 
retrospect that the cause of the emotion was based on false beliefs; and third, finding in 
retrospect that although the cause of the emotion was appropriate for an emotion of this 
kind, the intensity of the resulting emotion was out of proportion. I am going to present 
an example for the first of these cases, as I am going to refer to it in chapter 6 when I 
investigate the reader’s role when engaged with a work of fiction. 
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in section 2.1 of my work. Emotions generated by engagement with a work of fiction are based on ‘make-
believe that something is the case’. 
294 I am aware of the debate about the existence of fictional characters, but am not going to go into it here 
because it has no bearing on my project. 
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The first case, the ‘merging’ situation, can occur if my feelings were aroused by 
an event at some point in my personal history, and were never resolved. A typical 
instance of this is distress experienced in childhood. For example, I feel my blood 
pressure rising when my boss does not appreciate my work, and psychologically, I feel 
ill-used. In my consciousness, I have the impression that my extreme anger is directed 
towards my boss. This may be true, but it does not actually need to be the case – for 
instance, I may have been in an emotionally fragile state already before the incident 
with my boss. If I have a childhood trauma because my father always blamed me when 
something bad happened, while finding good excuses for my siblings, I already have a 
strong emotional disposition to feel unjustly treated which flares up at the slightest 
incident which fits into the same pattern. As a result, the anger I feel for my boss seems 
out of proportion – it also bears the weight of the childhood anger I still feel for my 
father. In this case, one could say that my anger is directed towards my father, who is 
wearing the mask of my boss. 
The context of the situation, created by my boss’s face in front of me in 
connection with the phenomenological experience which is part of my emotion, can 
mislead me about the target of the emotion – regardless of whether bodily feelings were 
involved or not. In my encounter with my boss, I have the impression that my boss is 
the target of my anger, although my anger was actually caused by two independent 
events that each have their own stories: the unjust censoring exercised by my father in 
my childhood, and the negative feedback of my boss in the present. As the second 
emotional reaction, that to my boss, is currently happening to me, it appears to bring 
about the complete unpleasant phenomenological experience and direct it towards my 
boss. The focus of my first emotional reaction (being treated unfairly by my father) 
slides over into the focus of my second emotional reaction (being treated unfairly on 
purpose by my boss) without a noticeable hitch. I am not aware at that moment that my 
boss and my father have morphed into a single hateful object. 
In such a case, phenomenology (in this case the angry feeling) is borrowed, or 
rather shared, between different narratives. We know what triggered them, and we know 
which target belongs to which emotion, but we are no longer consciously aware of it 
while engaged in the experience. Blustering against my boss who makes critical 
remarks about my work seems natural at the time. Afterwards, however, I realize that I 
became over-excited, and I start to wonder why. If the merging of an existing emotional 
disposition, or a previous emotion, with a current emotion is strong – because the 
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previous emotion was strong – this enhances the subsequent need for reflection and 
‘untangling’ the stories, thereby re-assessing them. 
I am going to discuss this confusion of feeling towards an object’s 
characteristics and feeling towards an object in the following chapters about fiction 
reading. In particular, I am going to examine the merging of emotions which are 
directed at a character(f) and emotions which are directed at the reader’s self. 
 
The development of an emotional experience 
 
When we have an emotional experience, our feelings are directed towards the target of 
the emotion. This is, however, not a one-sided transfer: as a consequence of the feeling, 
our perception of the object becomes more discerning in a way that is likely to enhance 
its emotional impact. The longer the emotional experience lasts, the more intense is it 
likely to become. The emotion tends to return to its object, feeding both on the object 
and on itself. During this ‘feeding’ process, we are stimulated to gather information 
about the object that is in keeping with the nature of the emotion as it started out. For 
instance, if a boy falls in love with a girl, he is bound to notice all of her features that 
can enhance love and admiration, like beautiful hair, bright eyes, or a gentle nature. His 
emotion motivates him to discover more about her, and he uses his imagination as a tool 
to find out more possible aspects of her. Finally, the information-feeding becomes an 
experience in its own right, which can trigger new emotions with new targets. The boy 
might be ashamed of spending all of his free time investigating the life of a girl; or he 
might be proud that for the first time in his life, he has the stamina to investigate 
something at greater depth. 
In section 6.1, I am going to argue that the engagement with a work of fiction 
with participation works in a similar way to the development of an emotional 
experience that is directed towards a person in real life. My investigations are based on 
the assumption that fiction reading typically involves getting to know fictional people. 
When I read a work of fiction, I gather information about characters(f) who are drawn 
as either human or anthropomorphous in some respect. Even if there are no characters(f) 
in the story that is told, there is always an implied author whose point of view gives us 
glimpses of his fictional persona. It is important here to distinguish between the implied 
author and the implied narrator of a work of fiction: An implied narrator is part of the 
work of fiction (regardless of whether or not he takes an active part in the action), but 
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the implied author is always outside of the story. The real author constructs the implied 
author by her choices of language, imagery, and topics, either intentionally or 
unintentionally. The reader recognizes that there is an implied author and creates her 
own version of this hypothetical person while reading the text, evaluating the author’s 
choices of language, presentation and subject matter. I am going to discuss this in more 
detail in chapter 6 when I examine levels of reader participation. 
Sometimes, I am moved by what I learn about characters(f). Being moved 
motivates me to imagine more about them, based on the information given in the work 
of fiction. I imagine what the fictional characters’ feelings might be like, from the 
outside and from the inside, getting emotionally involved in a way which is often not 




6 Within the reading process 
6.1 Levels of participation 
 
In this section, I shall examine the engagement of a reader with a work of fiction under 
three aspects. First, I am going to investigate the kinds of attitude a fiction reader can 
have towards a work of fiction. As a second point, I shall evaluate how these levels of 
reader involvement interweave and influence the reading experience. Third, I am going 
explain my definitions by applying them to a possible reading experiences of works of 
fiction, especially of John Williams’ novel Stoner295. 
The participation levels I use are similar to the ones Walton defines. In Mimesis 
as Make-Believe, Walton differentiates between appreciation without psychological 
participation and appreciation with psychological participation. For him, fiction reading 
typically involves both kinds of appreciation. He says that ‘we don’t just observe 
fictional worlds from without. We live in them’.296 
I do not assume that every reader is able to attain all conceivable levels of 
participation, or that every work of fiction is capable of provoking all levels of reader 
participation. My model of fiction reading explores the possible forms of engagement 
that a reader can have with a work of fiction, with a special focus on reader empathy. 
As my focus is going to be the interaction of a reader with a character(f), I 
separate the appreciation with participation into two parts. I shall distinguish between 
three levels of engagement: appreciative (in the sense of aesthetic appreciation of the 
way characters(f) are represented), sympathetic (from a third person point of view), or 
empathetic (from a first person point of view). 
 
Why focus on fictional characters? 
 
Why can the attitude of the reader towards a character(f) be important for the analysis of 
the reading process? One might object to this choice of focus by pointing out that 
people sometimes read fiction because they appreciate the aesthetic pleasure they get 
out of a finely crafted text, or because they want to be distracted by a thrilling plot, or to 
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delve into a ‘period atmosphere’.297 Fiction reading is not just about meeting fictional 
people, it is more complex than that. If the reading process is to be successful, the 
language and the imagery of the text have to capture the attention of the reader; the 
focus of the reader on a character(f) is not necessary for a successful reading 
experience. There are works of fiction which do not even contain fictional persons that 
are represented in any depth, as for instance Milorad Pavic’s novel Dictionary of the 
Khazars298. Still, it is possible for us to engage with such a work of fiction in a way that 
we find satisfactory. So why insist on the importance of characters(f)? 
Human beings characteristically look out for an ‘other’ in any area of life of 
which they become aware. As discussed in section 2.4 in connection with narrative 
identity accounts, a convincing explanation for this kind of behaviour is the typical 
development of selfhood in a young child: a human being is able to recognize herself as 
distinct from others when she has experienced a relationship with an ‘other’ who is 
important to her.299 This taught pattern of defining oneself by looking at others 
motivates a fiction reader to scan the work for an entity with human features whom she 
can either identify with or distance herself from. The fictional entity does not need to be 
represented as human being; it may have humanoid features in the guise of an animal, a 
plant, a machine, or an extra-terrestrial. 
In Dictionary of the Khazars, for example, there are no prominent characters(f). 
But even in such a case, the reader will discover the attributes of a particular person. 
Taking in the style and the perspectives which the author used in the novel, and 
interpreting it in her own way, the reader speculates about the author’s character and 
personal life. The reader will usually be tempted to do this because the urge to look for 
an ‘other’ is strong enough to motivate her. The template on which the reader works to 
find this ‘other’ is the implied author. As Ricoeur says in his account of fiction reading, 
there is typically a dialectic between the imaginings mandated by the work of fiction 
and the expectations of the reader where the ‘implied author takes the initiative in the 
show of strength underlying the relation between writing and reading’.300 
In every work of fiction, the implied author is defined by the choices made and 
representations created by the real author; the implied author is designed by the real 
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the honour of perusal: spite, vanity, and curiosity, hope and fear, love and hatred, every passion which 
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author, regardless of whether the real author intended this or not. As W. C. Booth puts 
it, ‘though the author can to some extent choose his disguises, he can never choose to 
disappear’.301 The reader, however, creates her own version of this implied author – I 
shall call the reader’s version the ‘inferred author’ from now on – by applying her own 
knowledge of the world and her preferences to the text. During the reading process, the 
reader discovers the inferred author to have certain attitudes and preferences, for 
instance an ironic stance towards gender questions, which the reader might endorse or 
reject. The reader interprets the inferred author’s point of view and, from the snippets of 
information given, immediately extrapolates these data into a guess about what kind of 
person this inferred author might be, and what her own attitudes towards this 
hypothetical person might be. It is important to note that the inferred author is not part 
of the fictional story – he is, however, part of the story the reader makes up in parallel to 
following the fictional story. One might call him a meta-fictional character – a 
character(mf).302 The reader interacts with him as the story develops, agreeing or 
disagreeing, being disgusted with him or awed by his powers. In general, the reader tries 
to identify with the person she takes the inferred author to be. The reason for this is that 
by reading the book, the fiction reader has already given the inferred author partial 
control over the direction of her imagination, thus creating a relationship of trust from 
the reader’s side. I agree here with Gregory Currie who says that if the reader adopts the 
framework and point of view provided by the author, the reader has an experience of 
sharing that depends on psychologically important mechanisms of joint attention and 
imitation.303 
 
Why distinguish between three levels of participation? 
 
My interest in the reader’s relation with characters(f) makes it useful to classify the 
reader’s engagement according to her degree of involvement with a character(f). Here, 
my approach differs slightly from Walton’s: His emphasis is on the difference between 
appreciation of a work of fiction with participation and appreciation without 
participation. He holds that participation involves taking part in the game of make-
                                                 
301 Booth 1983, 20. 
302 It is possible to imagine other characters(mf) besides the inferred author – for instance the inferred 
librarian who chose the book for the lending library, or the inferred original purchaser in case of a second-
hand book (most fascinating when they leave marks or comments in the book). Investigating this is, 
however, outside the scope of my work. 
303 Currie 2010, 87/88. 
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believe which the work of fiction mandates, where the reader becomes a reflexive prop 
who generates fictional truths about herself and gets caught up in the work of fiction. In 
appreciation without participation, he says, the reader is usually reminded of the falsity 
of fictional propositions and thus unable to take part in the game and imagine it from 
inside. 304 
I agree with his view of fiction reading as a game of make-believe, but I prefer 
to take a wider view of participation than Walton does. As an inferred author can always 
be discovered in a work of fiction (regardless of whether the actual author intended this 
or not), I hold that participation takes place on two levels: first, the reader negotiates 
with the inferred author about how and to what extent she is going to accept the given 
text, and second, the reader enters the fictional world offered in the text. Even what 
Walton calls ‘appreciation without participation’ has a playful aspect which involves an 
interaction between the reader and the inferred author. The reader creates a story of her 
own in which she has an ongoing dialogue with the inferred author, and on this level the 
inferred author becomes a character(mf) with whom the reader tries to identify during 
her appreciation of a work of fiction. This is why I think that all of my three levels of 
reader involvement (appreciative, sympathetic, or empathetic, from a first person point 
of view) can be termed ‘participation’. 
In order to participate in a work of fiction, a reader has to use her imagination. 
Currie defines two levels of imaginary action in fiction reading: primary imaginings are 
cases where we imagine what is fictional (for instance that Anna Karenina commits 
suicide),305 whereas secondary imaginings consist of an ‘empathetic re-enactment of the 
character’s situation’.306 I do not adopt this distinction because I think that Currie’s term 
‘primary imaginings’ covers the same area as the term ‘supposing that’, and I would 
like to use the word ‘imagine’ in the sense of not only accepting but actually processing 
a proposition. This includes having some psychological attitude towards the object of 
the imagination, like believing, disbelieving, doubting, wanting or regretting it. As 
Walton puts it, ‘Imagining (propositional imagining), like (propositional) believing or 
desiring, is doing something with a proposition one has in mind’.307 
For the fiction reader, I define three levels of engagement: appreciation, 
sympathy, and empathy.  
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When I appreciate a work of fiction, I accomplish at least four things, all of them from 
an external point of view: First, I understand the meaning of the text. If I did not do that, 
for instance if I thought that Graham Greene’s The End of the Affair was a light-hearted 
comedy, appreciation of this work would not be possible. 
As a second point of appreciation, I recognize the artistic features of the text that 
make it interesting to me. Usually these features are employed to present situations that 
I know from my own life, or my cultural background, from an unusual angle. To 
appreciate this, I do not need to be able to analyze how these features work, I just 
recognize that they make me see things differently. For instance, Jane Austen’s famous 
first sentence from Pride and Prejudice308 (‘It is a truth universally acknowledged …’) 
makes me view the limited outlook of English gentry in the countryside in the 19th 
century in a new light. 
The third aspect of appreciating a work of fiction is that I develop an interest in 
the story or in the character(f). I am motivated to read more of the narrative, to linger on 
the impressions gained, even to compare the actions of the protagonists with possible 
choices that I would make in their situation. For me to be able to appreciate a work of 
fiction, I do not need to feel for a character(f). Still, I can indulge in thought 
experiments of what I would do in Mrs. Bennett’s place, with five unmarried daughters: 
would I go to Bath to present them to society, would I go abroad with them to catch 
eligible suitors, would I train them to become governesses? 
This does not preclude, however, my having feelings for a character(f) – if I do, 
I participate in the work of fiction on more than one level simultaneously, on the level 
of empathy as well as of appreciation. Goldie’s concept of ‘in-his-shoes imagining’ is 
an attempt to span several levels with one definition. He says that for ‘in-his-shoes 
imagining’, one needs to merge two perspectives: the internal, to imagine the other 
person’s goals and fears, and the external, to judge the differences of characterisation 
between the other and one’s own self. 309 Thus, his definition can cover the scale of 
feelings for a character(f) from appreciation to empathy. This is an interesting approach, 
but I do not adopt it because I shall argue that the level of empathy is most likely to 
trigger strong emotions in the reader, and therefore, I am going to investigate it 
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separately. In my view, these levels of participation should not be conflated; they can 
exist independently of each other. 
The fourth point in appreciation is the game the reader plays with the inferred 
author, or vice versa. The inferred author offers the text to the reader, thus encouraging 
her to mediate between the world of the text and the world of the reader through the 
reading process. As we saw earlier, Ricoeur says that the inferred author ‘takes the 
initiative in the show of strength underlying the relation between writing and 
reading’.310 When I read the beginning of Pride and Prejudice, for instance, I 
understand that the inferred author is using irony to achieve several ends 
simultaneously: to amuse us with a gentle critical view of the fictional community, to 
make us feel comfortable by offering us the companionship with the inferred author in 
irony, and to make us inclined not to feel too deeply for the characters(f) about to be 
represented. My reaction as a reader could run into different directions, depending on 
what kind of person I am and in what kind of mood I happen to be. For instance, I could 
be happy to join the inferred author in her satirical depiction of English rural country 
life in the early 19th century; or I could sneer at the overly obvious attempt of the 
inferred author to capture my attention to a boring subject; or I could be offended by the 
coldness with which the inferred author approaches her characters’ pressing problems. 
All possible reactions (with the exception of an immediate closing of the book after the 
first sentence) show that reader interacts with the text, taking on the challenges the 
inferred author created, and building expectations based on both the story and the 
reader’s own life experiences. When the reading process starts, the world of the text and 
the world of the reader intersect, even if the reader keeps a distance from the text by 
remaining aware of its artificiality. The reader may view the text as contrived, but the 




Sympathy is different from appreciation because it requires that I take a personal 
interest not only in the text, but also in a character(f)’s plight. It takes three steps to 
develop sympathy towards a character(f): first, just as in appreciation, I need to 
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understand the meaning of the text regarding the character’s situation in the story (as far 
as the narrator has unveiled it to me). 
As a second step, I have a look at the character(f) from the outside, and if her 
situation in the fictional world seems familiar to me, I notice this immediately. There is 
a wealth of templates for human conditions which I, the reader, have internalized during 
my cultural education. For instance, I can recognize a character(f) in the role of a 
maltreated child, a war hero, a maiden in distress, or a victim of an unsolvable moral 
conflict. This recognition predisposes me to feel emotions when I read about the 
character being in a situation that is any way critical for her. Sympathy is an observer’s 
emotion – I observe and judge the character(f)’s situation from an external point of 
view. 
When I recognize a sympathy-deserving situation, I take the third step towards 
sympathy: I feel the emotion that I have learned to be appropriate in the situation: 
compassion, admiration, a general sense of fellow-feeling. This emotional reaction can 
be directed at a single character(f) or a group of characters(f) – it is not necessary to 
distinguish individual characters(f) to be able to have it. In order to feel sympathy, I 
need to fit the character(f)’s situation with a type of situation that is linked to an other-
directed emotion in my knowledge and experience of the world. 
Summarized like this, it looks as if emotions that are invoked by sympathy 
consisted of nothing but reacting to clichéd situations. Does this cover all aspects of 
sympathy? 
It certainly does not – sympathy-induced emotions can manifest themselves in 
different degrees concerning the level of reflection that accompanies them. At the lower 
end, we have the ‘button pushing’ phenomenon. If, for instance, a noble underdog is 
suddenly valued and praised, I feel tears gushing out of my eyes. A fiction example 
from Dickens is Our Mutual Friend311: when Sloppy first visits Jenny Wren and 
admires the quality of her hair and her craftsmanship, the reader is immediately struck 
by his unexpected appreciation of Jenny, and feels a sentimental joy about something 
wrong that has finally been righted. As this dramatic feature is strongly emphasized in 
the text, the reader is stuck with the image that forced itself on her, and there is no 
motivation for her to probe into the character(f)’s feelings from the inside. The button-
pushing effect is so strong that it even tends to blind the reader to subtleties of the text. 
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As if one had inadvertently looked into a dazzling light, the outlines of the obvious 
drama seem to linger for a while, obscuring everything else. Depending on the level of 
reflection the reader likes to adopt, she may either continue to enjoy her feeling of 
happy fulfilment, or she may be ashamed of her sentimental outburst (and subsequently 
become sentimental again on a more subtle level when she relishes the funny antics of 
the characters(f)). 
At the upper end of sympathy-induced emotions, we typically find more subtle 
feelings like compassion or sorrow. In Our Mutual Friend, an example of an emotion 
that requires some reflection is that evoked by the relationship between Riah and 
Fledgeby. The reader feels pity for Riah because he is oppressed and unjustly accused 
of being greedy and cruel. This is not an emotion that hits the reader immediately; at 
first, one is confused as to why Riah bears this treatment so patiently, without protesting 
against it. But then, one separates the mystery of Riah’s character from his piteous 
situation and feels for him, from the outside, because he has the role of the unjustified 
sufferer. 
Sympathy towards characters(f)312 differs from sympathy towards real people on 
three counts. First, the reader is not moved to immediate action by having sympathy-
induced emotions for a character(f) in distress, whereas someone encountering a real 
person in a similar situation can be moved to action. Reading Hans Christian 
Andersen’s The Little Match-Girl313, I cry when I realize that the girl is going to freeze 
to death, but I do not lift a finger to save her. The reason for this is, obviously, that I am 
unable to interact physically with a fictional world. Second, the reader usually tends to 
be more unforgiving towards a character(f)’s moral mistakes than to the same kind of 
mistake made by a person in real life. For instance, the narrator in Henry James’ novella 
The Aspern Papers314 can win our sympathy through his passionate search for the 
papers of a poet he admired, and through his astute and almost tender perception of his 
surroundings and the people he meets. When he recoils in horror from the marriage 
proposal by Tita, who inherited the papers, we are disappointed and disgusted with him, 
and our sympathy with him is gone. If a friend of ours behaved in a similar way, we 
would probably think of redeeming factors – that he was out of his depth, overwhelmed, 
only human. The character(f), however, earns nothing but disgust, all the more so 
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because we sympathized with him in the beginning. Third, the reader does not feel 
responsible for what happens to the character(f). In real life, I would probably feel 
guilty about living in a society that allows children to die from neglect. But in the story, 
I am in a fictional world, and thus exempted from civic duties. Even if the author 
appeals to the fiction reader explicitly to take responsibility for social change, there is 
nothing I feel compelled to do immediately.315 This is true during the reading process – 
although in further reflection after the reading, I might draw parallels between the real 




Empathy differs from appreciation and sympathy in an important respect: it involves an 
internal point of view. When a reader empathizes with a character(f), she simulates the 
fictional person’s feelings by imagining them from inside. 
In using the term ‘simulate’, I would like to be clear that I am not invoking the 
much-debated question of whether (so-called) ‘simulation theory’ can or cannot throw 
light on empathy. Rather, I am using the term in place of Ricoeur’s term ‘mimesis’ as 
‘simulation’ gives a clearer view of the active and creative role the reader has to play 
when reading with empathy. She does not only imitate, but also needs to make an active 
contribution by using her own associations to re-create the story with the knowledge 
and the memories that are available to her.317 Obviously, simulation requires the reader 
to have a deep insight into the character(f)’s mind, mood, and emotions. But this is not 
sufficient for imagining from inside – for this to be convincing, the reader needs to have 
detailed ideas about the character(f)’s perceptions, impulses, thoughts, beliefs, 
judgments, fears and desires in order to slip into their pattern of feeling.318 
No work of fiction can be meticulous enough to give this level of detail to the 
reader, and the reader does not expect this to be provided. An important prerequisite for 
empathy is the motivation for the reader to engage more deeply with the character(f); 
there has to be an initial spark of interest. As soon as the reader is motivated to simulate 
a character(f)’s inner life, she starts to fill in the gaps in the picture with 
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phenomenological content from her own experiential memories, with what it felt like to 
be in a similar situation. As already discussed in section 2.4.1, this strengthens the 
impact of the imagining, making the fictional truth feel more ‘life-like’. The links 
between the reading of the text and the recall of the reader’s embodied experiences 
create a number of new narrative threads which run alongside the text. The reader’s 
identification with a character(f) from the inside becomes richer and morally 
challenging. Depending on the nature of the reader’s empathy with the character(f), 
these new narrative strands can develop into a ‘self-in-other’ narrative or an ‘other-in-
self’ narrative when the reader’s focus has shifted from the text to the recall and re-
evaluation of her own experiences. I shall discuss the generation of additional narratives 
during fiction reading in section 6.2. 
 
Differences between identification, empathy, and adopting goals 
 
In psychological and philosophical literature, identification and empathy with a 
character(f) are often treated as the same. I hold that there are nuances of identification 
that do not fit into the concept of empathy, and degrees of empathy that are far removed 
from identification. These distinctions are important for my definition of the self-in-
other- and the other-in-self-narrative, which I shall discuss in detail in the next section. 
To clarify such distinctions, I am now going to discuss the arguments of an 
article by Mar et al. which deals with these issues, albeit on a relatively general level. 
Their article is about empirical psychological research regarding emotional responses to 
fiction reading.319 Based on their evaluations, Mar et al. classify three kinds of 
emotional reader reactions: sympathy, empathy, and identification with a character(f). 
My bone of contention lies in their distinction between empathy and identification 
Mar et al. argue that identification is different from empathy in one point: if a 
reader identifies with a character(f), she wants to be like that character.320 They say that 
in identification, the reader takes the goals of the character(f) as her own, and sees 
herself as that character, in order to be able to re-create the character(f)’s emotions. In 
contrast to this, they say, empathy requires that ‘we understand a character’s goals 
through our model of his or her mind, and feel something similar to what the character 
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feels, but we do not see ourselves as that character and identify these emotions as our 
own rather than as the character’s’.321 
This leads to an interesting question: When I imagine a character(f) ‘from the 
inside’, do I maintain a clear differentiation between myself and the character? 
The problem needs to be viewed on different levels. On a cognitive level, there 
is no doubt that during the whole reading process, however engrossing it might be, I 
remain conscious of the fact that I am a different person from the fictional person whom 
I am imagining. This is the reason why I am not moved to act on her behalf, and why I 
am able to imagine things alongside with the imaginings mandated by the narrative.322 
But does my emotional experience during the reading process really belong to me 
exclusively? Let us look at the scene in the novel Stoner where William Stoner, near the 
end of his life, ponders that maybe he did not love his wife enough.323 Reading this, I 
imagine him seeing Edith for the first time, in a dress of watered blue silk, looking out 
at the world as if she was always expecting something pleasant to happen, and I 
simulate his feelings of regret and remorse. At the same time, I recall the situations 
when I myself felt remorse at not having loved somebody enough, or for the wrong 
reasons, and I use these memories to flesh out the simulation. Thus, Edith’s silk dress 
may keep company with my mother’s hand-knitted sweaters or my grandfather’s pipe in 
the room of my imagination. In the phenomenological conglomerate it is no longer 
possible to say with certainty which of the feelings invoked belong to my own 
characteristics, and which to Stoner’s. This is why I hold that on the phenomenological 
level, differentiation between myself and the character(f) during ‘imagining from 
inside’ is – at best – fuzzy, but certainly not clear-cut. For me, empathizing with a 
character(f) means imagining the character(f)’s feelings from inside, and this entails 
recalling one’s own experiential memories which are affectively related to the 
character(f)’s feelings, and integrating these memory-stories into the narrative. 
In a nutshell, I disagree with Mar et al. about their definition of empathy – I hold 
that emotions evoked by empathy always involve a degree of merging of the reader’s 
and the character(f)’s feelings, in the experience of the reader. I do, however, agree with 
their view that empathy with a character does not require the reader to identify with a 
character(f) completely. 
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Psychological research supports my judgment of the relationship between the 
reader’s self and characters(f) during empathy. As Miall and Kuiken show, 
‘conventionally different narrative elements may seem ‘the same’ by virtue of the 
progression of feelings that are common to them’.324 In their studies of readers’ 
responses, they found that figurative fiction325 arouses the readers’ feelings and prompts 
them to ‘cross boundaries’, moving from the fictional situation of the character(f) to 
other situations of their own life experience which are affectively related to it. When 
this happens, Miall and Kuiken observed, readers recollect personal memories and the 
feelings connected to them, thus enriching and extending their perception of the 
fictional story. While this observation does not prove a merging of the self and the 
character(f) during empathy, it does at least show that the fiction reader’s emotionally 
charged memories play an important part in the reader’s reception in the story, and in 
the narrative the reader creates during the reading process. Similarly, in Frank 
Hakemulder’s The Moral Laboratory, we find reports of empirical evidence that 
‘character identification involves readers’ emotional experiences. ... Another indication 
of the involvement of readers’ self is that not having emotional experiences similar to 
those of a character hinders the development of empathy’.326 
My second point of criticism of Mar et al.’s definitions regards identification 
with a character(f). Mar et al. say that identification entails wanting to be like the 
character(f), and taking on the character(f)’s goals as our own.327 In my view, 
identification with a character(f) does not require the combination of these two 
conditions. 
I say that there is a way to adopt a character(f)’s goals without wanting to be like 
them, for instance by siding with them. I want Mr. Venus in Our Mutual Friend to win 
Peg Riderhood’s approval, although Mr. Venus is a strange character whom I would not 
like to meet in real life, and I would certainly not want to be like him. But I approve of 
him as a member of society and think that he ought to succeed. I root for him, I endorse 
his goals, I identify with him – but only up to (or down to) a certain depth, I do not want 
to go all the way. This is a curious hybrid of feeling: on one hand, I sympathize with 
Mr. Venus because I find him a likeable person, on the other hand, I cannot help 
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imagining his inner life from the inside because he is such an intriguing character that I 
want to find out what it might feel like to be like him. 
So here we have a hybrid form of feeling for a character(f): on the one hand, 
sympathy (I like him from outside), on the other hand, partial identification (I want to 
experience what he experiences from inside). But at no point do I want to be like him, 
and I am not sure whether I shall be comfortable sharing his feelings. I feel more like 
voyeuristic visitor to his inner life. 
A different, but also hybrid situation arises when I find myself empathizing with 
Humbert Humbert in Nabokov’s Lolita. I relate to Humbert Humbert’s problem of 
having self-destructive goals, but I do not adopt these goals. I feel extreme empathy 
with him as an excessively troubled human being, and weak identification with him as a 
whole person. 
Summing up, I criticized Mar et al.’s account on two points. First, I argued – 
contrary to them – that empathy with a character(f) does involve seeing ourselves as that 
character(f). Second, I pointed out that identification with a character(f) does not entail 
wanting to be like him, or wanting to adopt his goals. I also showed that there are hybrid 
forms of empathy and identification, but that one of these types of engagement is 
always distinguishable as the driving force. I am going to refer to this in the next section 
when I investigate the reader’s role in the fictional world. 
 
Ricoeur’s account of participation in the reading process 
 
Ricoeur distinguishes between two levels of participation in fiction reading: aesthetic 
enjoyment and identification with a character(f) from within. He does not use the term 
‘level’, though; presumably because it would suggest a stability within the reading 
process which he denies. For Ricoeur, the reader’s engagement with the text is an 
ongoing struggle between the inferred author and the reader, between the strategy of 
seduction on the inferred author’s side and the strategy of suspicion on the reader’s 
side.328 He describes fiction as an instrument we use in order to understand the 
connection between action and agent, as ‘an immense laboratory for thought 
experiments in which this connection is submitted to an endless number of imaginative 
variations.’329 He does not see these imaginative variations as an impersonal game, but 
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as a form of deep reader involvement in the work of fiction: ‘The reader belongs to both 
the experiential horizon of the work of fiction imaginatively, and to the horizon of his 
action concretely’.330 
There is, however, one area which Ricoeur does not investigate in detail: the 
significance of the reader’s emotional engagement during her fiction-related imaginings. 
I am going address this gap in chapter 8. 
 
Summing up levels of participation 
 
In this section, I explained why I think it is important to investigate the reader’s 
relations to characters(f). I distinguished between three levels of reader involvement: 
appreciation, sympathy, and empathy. A reader can be involved on all these levels at the 
same time: as Amy Coplan puts it, ‘Readers can have a wide range of psychological 
experiences during engagement with a single narrative. The reader is neither fixed nor 
immobile; he is neither forced to mirror exactly the characters' experiences nor forced to 
observe the characters' experiences from the outside’.331 Of the three levels of reader 
participation, I hold empathy to be especially interesting because it is most likely to 
evoke strong and lasting emotions in the reader. 
In the following section, I shall explore the role of the reader who feels empathy 
with a character(f) in more detail. In particular, I am going to examine the kinds of 
narrative the reader develops while empathizing with a character(f). I am going to argue 
that the role of the reader can be best understood by examining the emotions that 
stimulate the reader into creating layers of narrative which have different connections 
with the reader’s self. 
 
6.2 The reader in two worlds – real and fictional 
 
In this central part of my account, I am going to explore the process of empathizing with 
a character(f). The assumption underlying my discussion is that empathy with a 
character(f) actually occurs – being well aware that not all readers empathize with 
characters(f), and that even if they do, they do not empathize with characters(f) all the 
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time. Which elements are involved in the empathizing, and how are they connected with 
the reader’s self? The reader who imagines a character(f) from within appears to be 
‘inside’ another person (albeit a fictional one) – does this mean that she changes her 
identity? These are the questions I shall tackle in this section. As I shall explain, my 
account begins from Ricoeur’s account of fiction reading, but makes some important 
distinctions that Ricoeur’s account misses. These additional distinctions mainly regard 
the emotional involvement of the reader. In chapter 8, I shall give a complete overview 
of how my account of the relations between narrative identity and fiction reading differs 
from Ricoeur’s account. 
I begin my inquiry by investigating in which guises the reader and the 
character(f) appear during fiction reading with empathy. My underlying assumption is 
that both the reader and the character(f) are beings with human characteristics. 
First of all, I shall distinguish between different five kinds of being that can be 
involved in reader empathy: the idem (the reader’s body, character, and habits in the 
real world), the self (the reader’s lived self in the real world), the other (the character(f) 
in the fictional world as understood by the reader), the self-in-other (the self 
empathizing with the other), and the other-in-self (the other influencing the way the self 
views herself). It is important to note that although I call them ‘beings’ they are not to 
be understood as distinct entities. Each of these five ‘beings’ represents a different 
aspect of the central person involved in the process: the reader herself. So why do I 
differentiate between them? 
I hold that they are important because any of them, or any combination of them, 
can feature as protagonists in the narratives the reader weaves during fiction reading 
with empathy. Four kinds of narrative might become active in the fiction reading 
process: self-narrative, other-narrative, self-in-other-narrative, and other-in-self-
narrative. Working out the differences between them, I shall argue that self-narrative is 
largely suspended during fiction reading. We relinquish our ego and our self-narrative 
and enter the story of a character(f), the other-narrative. Typically, the other-narrative 
triggers a self-in-other-narrative when the reader starts to imagine the character(f) from 
within. However, when the reader feels that imagining the character(f)’s actions pushes 
her out the realm of her own ethical aims, the self-in-other-narrative eventually turns 
into an other-in-self-narrative. There is a shifting of protagonists from the character(f) to 
the reader and vice versa that continues throughout the reading process. As I shall 
explain, this transferral of roles is managed by the doppelgänger function that 
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accompanies the on-going dialectic between the text (represented by the character(f)) 
and the reader. Thus, the self-in-other-narrative and the other-in-self-narrative can be 




Figure 2: The doppelgänger function 
The doppelgänger function makes the reader check the other-narrative for similarities 
between a character(f) and herself. If the reader finds similarities which are compelling 
enough, she can switch to a self-in-other-narrative or to an other-in-self-narrative. I am 
going to explore this in more detail later on in this section. 
 
Summing up, I shall argue that the engagement of the reader with a character(f) can be 
formulated as a function of the embodied self and the other-narrative. This function is a 
psychological mechanism that combines the reader’s imagination with the recall of 
experiential memories and with the control mechanism of her ethical standards. As the 
function produces a self-in-other-narrative at one end and an other-in-self-narrative at 
the other end, I call it a doppelgänger-function. I shall give detailed examples of how 






Before going into the details of the doppelgänger function, I would like to introduce the 
beings that can be involved in the reader’s engagement with a work of fiction. 
The idem332 of the reader contributes to the reading process in a variety of ways. 
It includes the capacity to manage the physical part (for instance holding the book and 
reading the words), the reader’s character, habits and preferences (determining her 
approval or disapproval of the work of fiction and the characters(f)), and the intellectual 
part (understanding the kind of narrative it is, and how the story, the fictional world and 
the characters(f) are described). In addition to the semantic understanding of the story, 
the idem also provides the faculty of imagination. The imagination combines the 
fictional text with the reader’s internalized cultural images, her character traits and her 
habits, building new stories involving these elements and providing a setting that 
triggers the reader’s memories. The understanding of the narrative, the acceptance of the 
work of fiction as worthy of reading, and the identification of the cultural environment 
in which the work of fiction is embedded enable the reader to use her imagination and 
fill the gaps in the narrative with enough of her own material to create a fictional world 
where she can feel ‘at home’. Ricoeur speaks of a ‘fusion of horizons’:333 the reader 
merges the world of the text and her own world when she engages with a work of 
fiction. 
The reader’s self (or ipse334) is the lived identity of the reader in the real world. 
During the reading process, the self is mainly restricted to two phenomenological 
activities: the experience of imagining the fictional world and the characters(f), and the 
experience of the emotions that are prompted by the reading. 
In defining a character(f) as the other we have two choices: the other is the 
character(f) described in the text as imagined by either the ideal reader335 or the actual 
reader. In my investigations of empathy with a character(f), the only prerequisite I set is 
that the reader imagines a character(f) from the inside. She might do that for the wrong 
reasons, or she might misunderstand the character completely. I hold that this does not 
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make any difference for the reading experience.336 Therefore, I define the other as the 
character(f) seen by the actual reader. 
Similar to the reader’s self, the self-in-other is an experienced identity. The 
reader imagines the character(f) from the inside, following the directions in the fictional 
story. When I imagine Elizabeth Bennett at the ball in Pride and Prejudice, for instance, 
I feel for her from inside, experiencing amusement and anger at being snubbed by 
Darcy, while recalling similar events from my own life, for instance during dancing 
lessons at school when the best-looking boy asked somebody else to dance with him. I 
do not, however, imagine the volume of the dance music at Elizabeth’s ball, or whether 
it pleases me, or what the players are like, although Elizabeth would have been well 
aware of her surroundings. But these experiences are not important for her current 
conflict, so I can leave them as a blur in my own imagination. My experience is not as 
rich as hers would have been if the fictional world had been real; it is, however, richer 
than hers in other aspects because it contains experiential memories from my own life. 
The other-in-self comes into being when my imagining being inside the 
character(f) leads me to wanting to be either very much like her, or very different from 
her. If the conflict of the character(f) takes a strong grip on my own desires or fears, this 





Having listed the dramatis personae, I get to the point where I investigate which 
narratives the reader can develop during fiction reading with empathy, and how they are 
related to each other. The first candidate is the self-narrative. As described in section 
2.4.3, I follow Ricoeur’s definition of self-narrative. According to Ricoeur, a person 
weaves her past experiences and expectations for the future into a unified narrative that 
shapes her self-understanding, thus providing her with a practical identity which enables 
her to act in her social environment.337 
To what extent is my self-narrative active when I empathize with a character(f)? 
The experiences I go through mainly happen in my imagination; I borrow them from the 
                                                 
336 In chapter 7 ‘Beyond the reading process’, however, I shall point out that this may make a difference 
in shaping the reader’s self-narrative beyond the reading experience. 
337 Ricoeur 1992, 140. 
 136 
character(f). In order to feel for the character(f) from inside, I recall experiential 
memories that are of a similar kind as the experience the character(f) is going through. I 
can do that without reflecting on what kind of person I am – my memory-fishing is 
usually triggered by trying to simulate experiencing a current conflict, or the resolution 
of a conflict, which the character(f) is going through. I do not need to resort to my self-
narrative in order to do that. Typically, my memories are activated by the description of 
a phenomenological sensation of the character(f) presented in the text. As memories are 
characteristically embedded in event schemata338, they drag up mini-stories that run in 
parallel to my reading process. These mini-stories are event-related and do not need a 
connection to my self-narrative in order to be used during my empathizing. 
There are, however, occurrences during the reading process which can affect my 
self-narrative: if I am overcome by emotions, I try to put them on a rational basis by 
explaining, contradicting or confirming them. But this typically happens after the 
reading process; during the reading, I am usually too much caught up by the story to 
examine my reading-induced emotions. Imagining Elizabeth from the inside might 
cause me to feel a hot flush of anger at arrogant men in general, but I shall disregard it 
and continue to read the story. Thus, my self-narrative characteristically remains 




The other-narrative is the story of the character(f) as set up in the work of fiction and 
understood by the reader. My assumption is that every work of fiction contains an entity 
which can be interpreted as a character(f) (it could be a fictional person, a fictional 
animal, a fictional machine, or even a fictional landscape), and that a narrative involving 
the character(f) as an agent (or a sufferer) is constructed in the work of fiction, some of 
it explicitly, and a large part of it implicitly. 
As discussed in section 6.1, the engagement with a work of fiction may also 
induce the reader to imagine a character(mf), usually the inferred author. As the 
character(mf) is not part of the fictional narrative itself, the reader does not have an 
actual story to feed her imagination on, only a bundle of inferred attitudes, preferences, 
or passions. For this reason, I hold that although the reader can also build an other-
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narrative for a character(mf), this narrative will probably be too flimsy to trigger 
identification from within, and thus cannot be subject to the doppelgänger function. 
Hence, my following discussion only concerns the other-narrative for a character(f). 
As many philosophers have successfully argued,339 the story contained in a work 
of fiction needs the reception by a reader to be fully configured. Ricoeur says ‘To 
follow a story is to actualize it by reading it’.340 Each reader creates her own version of 
the plot and of the characters(f) involved, adding her own knowledge and experience of 
the world while missing meanings and associations in the text which are foreign to her. 
The reading process involves a struggle between the reader and the text, resulting in 
what Ricoeur describes as the ‘three dialectics of reading’:341 First, the reader defends 
her own expectations against the deceptive strategies used in the text; second, the reader 
tries to configure the implied but unwritten parts of the text; third, the reader sets the 
cultural paradigms she is familiar with against those which are either confirmed or 
challenged by the text. As a result of these activities, the reader continues to build her 
own narrative of the character(f) which is bound to change as the reading progresses. 
Does the reader need to feel sympathy for a character(f) to be able to create this 
character(f)’s other-narrative? It seems plausible that I need to have a minimal feeling 
of human companionship with a character(f) to be motivated to follow her story. 
Sympathy would include an interest that the character(f) should flourish, but I hold that 
one can be motivated to engage with a fictional story without wanting the characters(f) 
to get what they want. Even if a character(f) is objectionable, I might enjoy following 
her story. An example for this is Patricia Highsmith’s Tom Ripley. He murders in cold 
blood to achieve his goals, and I as a reader do not wish him to lead a happy life as a 
consequence. But his tortured personality is so gripping that I am motivated to construct 
his other-narrative until the end of the story. 
However, it must be noted that there are two variants of the other-narrative: the 
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When a reader empathizes with a character(f), she enters the fictional story and the 
fictional world – up to a point. Ricoeur says ‘reading itself already is a way of living in 
the fictitious universe of the work; in this sense we can already say that stories are told 
but also lived in the imaginary mode’.343 What exactly does this ‘way of living’ in the 
imaginary mode entail; can we define it? Some of the limitations the reader encounters 
while imagining the character(f) from within are straightforward. First of all, the reader 
cannot act in the fictional world (although in cliff-hanger scenes, for instance, the reader 
might imitate the action of the character(f) by grabbing the table or clenching her fist). 
Second, and following from this, the reader cannot suffer any real-life consequences 
from what happens in the fictional world. The climber in the story may fall to his death; 
although I suffered inside him until he died, I continue to live. In spite of this 
divergence, some things happen in parallel during the reading process: the fictional 
climber is released from his life, and I am also released from the fictional climber’s life. 
The other-narrative of the fictional climber comes to an end simultaneously with my 
self-in-other-narrative. If the story continues after this, I see the deceased climber from 
the outside. 
This is an indication that there can be many switches between the other-narrative 
and the self-in-other-narrative. To understand how this develops, and in which respect 
these two narratives mirror each other, we need to get back to the question of how 
empathy is generated. The first step towards empathy is typically that the reader takes 
an interest in the character(f) because the character(f)’s fears and desires are similar to 
her own. She can proceed to imagine the character(f) from inside if she is able to 
identify the shape of the character(f)’s conflict344 as something she knows from her own 
life. As Feagin points out, empathy only arises if the structure of my emotions evoked 
by the kind of conflict the character(f) goes through is similar to the structure of 
emotions the character(f) feels.345 It is not important here that the character(f) is often 
different from me in many ways: I can feel empathy with Pincher Martin although he is 
a handsome young naval lieutenant in the Atlantic Sea during the Second World War, 
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whereas I am a middle-aged woman sitting in a library in Zürich in 2018. What draws 
me into him is our common terror of near-drowning and existential annihilation. 
If I manage to feel empathy with a character(f), my imagination has already 
started to integrate me into the fictional story in a meaningful way: I let the part of my 
self that is affected by the conflict take part in the narrative to such an extent that I can 
build a story of my own. This story is about me, because I am the principal character in 
my own life, but I am transported into different conditions. In this imagined narrative, I 
perform the actions of the character(f), and I take over the events of the fictional 
narrative into my own self-as-other-narrative. My motivation to carry on with the self-
as-other-narrative is my desire to experience the resolution of the conflict presented by 
the work of fiction. There are many lacunae in my self-in-other-narrative; they open up 
in all the places where the character(f)’s story is incompatible with anything I ever 
experienced. Pincher Martin, for instance, is insanely jealous of his colleague because 
his colleague won the love of the girl he himself lost. As I have never been in a situation 
like that, this is not part of my self-in-other-narrative; it is, however, a part of the other-
narrative to which I switch back when I read the scenes that deal with excessive 
jealousy. Lacunae like this do not, however, detract from the poignancy of my self-in-
other-narrative; on the contrary, the focus on a single conflict enhances my interest in it. 
I allow myself to be carried into a world which is different from my own, and in which 
things are done in a different way. This is what Ricoeur calls the appropriation of the 
text by the reader.346 
The self-in-other-narrative can only be rich and satisfactory as long as my 
empathy with the character(f) continues, fleshed out by my own experiential memories. 
If – during the reading process – my empathy turns into sympathy or appreciation, the 
self-in-other-narrative I have been building is suspended. Are there any necessary or 
sufficient conditions that must be fulfilled to keep my self-in-other-narrative active? 
This question is very similar to the inquiry I encountered in Part I on narrative 
identity: what are the causes that make me refigure my self-narrative? I started out with 
Ricoeur’s model of narrative identity, holding that a narrative identity is a necessary 
mediator between the actions of a person as an embodied subject in the world on the 
one hand, and her ethics on the other hand. A self-narrative gives a person a sense of 
unity that she needs in order to maintain her self-esteem during her interactions with the 
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physical world and her social nexus. Any significant conflict with the given outside 
world triggers a revaluation of a person’s self-narrative, integrating past events and 
future expectations, with a special emphasis on her experiential memories. So the 
necessary condition for refiguration of my self-narrative is a conflict I encounter in my 
relations to the external world. 
In a self-in-other-narrative, the conflict does not arise from the real world, but 
from a fictional one. I (as the reader) adopt the character(f)’s conflict as my own. In 
order to simulate the character(f)’s feelings as richly as possible, I fill the gaps of the 
story with my own experiential memories. Ricoeur says that imagining a character(f) 
from within is like going through imaginative variations of one’s own life, and that one 
needs the ‘anchor’ of the body to the earth in order to recall embodied experiences.347 
The phenomenological part of my memories supplies my imaginings with depth and 
richness. Without the help of embodied experiences, my imaginative variations would 
not be convincing because they would lack an important aspect of real life: the 
irreducible link between the body and the self. 
I agree with Ricoeur here, but I go one step further: I claim that memories of 
embodied experiences generate stories of their own. When I as a fiction reader start to 
recall my experiential memories during the configuration of my self-in-other-narrative, 
the story I am engaged with starts to deviate from the story presented in the text. 
Recollected memories are usually not restricted to single flashes, but to event schemata; 
they are embedded in small stories of their own. During the integration of these 
memories into the self-in-other-narrative, these connected stories find their own place in 
the story, subtly moving the focus of the story away from the character(f) and in the 
direction of myself. I still simulate the conflict of the character(f), but at the same time I 
simulate a past conflict of my own in a different presentation. If I am primarily moved 
by my recollections at this point, I am not only simulating a character(f)’s emotion. I am 
then also feeling a real emotion, and I myself (in a simulated environment) am the focus 
of this emotion. A part of myself is now embedded in the character(f), making the 
character(f) precious to me in two ways: I care for myself in the character(f)’s guise, 
and I care for myself in a particularly controlled and intense way. Temporarily living in 
the fictional world, I am not in danger of having the contingencies of real world events 
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spoil my concentration, and I am also free of the inhibitions that limit the enjoyment of 
my emotions in the social context of the real world. 
If I should find that my empathy for the character(f) was misplaced, I can 
withdraw myself with no damage done. I care for the character(f), being interested in 
her well-being (through my self-involvement), but I am not committed to care for the 
character(f) forever. Reading Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, for instance, I feel empathy 
with Pamela in the beginning because she manages to preserve her sense of self-respect 
in spite of the pressure she is put under, and I rave with her against the ridiculous 
vanities and presumptions of Mr. B. When Mr. B. later proposes marriage to her, 
however, it turns out that Pamela has always loved him. Seeing her now revealed as one 
of the worst hypocrites in literature, I withdraw my empathy and slip out of her 
character(f). My relationship with Pamela is over, and there is no harm done, except for 
a slight disappointment on my side that the story continues in such an unappealing way. 
As this example illustrates, the possibility of experiencing a deep emotion without 
having to fear unpleasant consequences is one of the reasons why experiencing a self-
in-other-narrative is so attractive to the reader.348 
A self-in-other-narrative is one of the directions into which my other-narrative 
can swing when I recall experiential memories during fiction reading with empathy. The 




The other-in-self-narrative can come into being at the point where a character(f) starts to 
act in a way that does not follow the ethical norms which have governed my own 
actions in the real world, either in a positive or a negative way. If the character(f) reacts 
differently in a fictional conflict than I did in a similar situation which I just recalled, 
and the conflict is important to me, I receive unfamiliar information, which I need to 
process. Two things happen: I start to think differently about the character(f), I wonder 
why I acted – or would have acted – differently, and I begin to speculate whether I 
should think differently about myself, or whether I should change the way I lead my 
life. On the one hand, dealing with the unexpected information changes my expectations 
                                                 
348 Experiencing emotions during fiction reading can, of course, have side effects which are unpleasant to 
the reader. Children may have nightmares after getting excited by horror stories, or grown-ups may be 
miserable for days after reading Beckett’s Molloy. But the reader usually does not expect that before 
starting out on the reading experience, so this does not influence her motivation to read fiction. 
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of how the fictional story is going to continue (thus influencing the other-narrative). 
This aspect is part of what Ricoeur calls the reader’s response to the inferred author’s 
strategy of persuasion.349 
On the other hand, this fictional conflict also changes the role that my recalled 
experiential memories have in the ongoing self-in-other-narrative. The usual function of 
these memories during empathy is to strengthen my simulation of the character(f)’s 
situation, but when I no longer feel in the driving seat of the story they become subject 
to increased scrutiny and re-evaluation. I no longer see myself as the only possible role 
model for my own life. Tentatively, I try out the unfamiliar actions of the character(f), 
and thus, the other-in-self-narrative develops. 
In John Steinbeck’s novel The Winter of Our Discontent350, for example, I would 
have expected Ethan Hawley to overcome his resentment and find a way of changing 
his life in a morally acceptable way. Then, when I learn that he has betrayed his boss to 
the authorities, leading to the man’s deportation, I expect Ethan to encounter a major 
difficulty. I even anticipate him to perish in some way, because he has betrayed himself 
and his own values, which seems unforgiveable. On the other hand, I empathize with 
him, feeling his existential loneliness in the midst of his family and his home town, and 
I tentatively wonder what would happen if I ever gave in to an impulse to do something 
bad like Ethan: ‘What I had done and planned to do was undertaken with full 
knowledge that it was foreign to me’.351 
It is possible that my moral judgment of the character(f)’s action is different 
from my moral judgment of my own remembered actions in similar situations. If this is 
the case, I am forced into reflection about the simulated conflict. As this happens 
unexpectedly during the reading process, I cannot plan this in a structured way. Instead, 
the character(f) seems to enter my own experiential memories, performing 
counterfactual actions in my own past life. Depending on my moral judgment, the 
character(f) can then slip into the role of either a dangerous devil or a wonderful role 
model. I watch him ‘taking over’ my life in an imaginary mode. Thus, I can imagine 
and evaluate possible outcomes of actions which I would normally judge to be either 
immoral or beyond my power in real life. 
                                                 
349 Ricoeur 1988,168. 
350 Steinbeck 2001. 
351 Steinbeck 2001, 187. 
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Because it is unexpected, and because it interrupts the reading process, the other-
in-self-narrative is usually put on hold deliberately by the reader as soon as she becomes 
aware of this, to be evaluated in a more organized and differently structured way after 




The doppelgänger function makes the reader, as it were, look into a mirror while 
imagining the other-narrative, swinging either into the direction of the self-in-other-
narrative or in the direction of the other-in-self-narrative. As we saw in the description 
of the self-in-other-narrative and the other-in-self-narrative respectively, there are 
attributes they have in common: both are induced by the integration of the reader’s 
experiential memories into the simulation of the character(f)’s situation, and both are 
motivated by a judgmental comparison of the character(f)’s behaviour in the fictional 
story and one’s own behaviour in a similar situation as represented by the recalled 
memory. In the self-in-other-narrative, an imaginative variation of my self hijacks the 
fictional story, whereas in the other-in-self-narrative, an imaginative variation of the 
character(f) hijacks my recalled sense of self. 
The search for similarities between the character(f) and the reader appears to be 
a fundamental feature of fiction reading with empathy. This does not seem surprising 
because – as already discussed in section 2.4.1 – it is an integral part of personal 
development, starting in early childhood, that a person learns to see herself as distinct 
from others, and to compare herself to others. Because a person’s position in her social 
nexus is important for her self-esteem, a part of her is trained to keep on scanning her 
environment for other persons to relate herself to, although she may not be conscious of 
this.352 
Social psychologists have been investigating the question of how and why 
people perform social comparisons. Recent research has shown that people often 
compare themselves to others spontaneously and unreflectively, and that this occurs on 
a regular basis because it is an efficient way of gaining self-knowledge.353 
                                                 
352 See for instance Corcoran et al. 2011, 119-120 and Garcia et al. 2013, p. 634 for a literature overview 
on psychological research on the topic of self-evaluation by social comparison. 
353 Corcoran / Mussweiler 2010, 79 and Taylor 1981, 195. 
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During the reading process, the reader’s spontaneous social comparison – in my 
terms, the doppelgänger function – is directed towards the characters(f), in particular 
towards the ones the reader imagines from inside. I call this procedure the doppelgänger 
function of narrative generation because it becomes stronger and more effective 
whenever it discovers a large overlap between the character(f)’s attributes and the 
reader’s own. My hypothesis, supported by an inference to the best explanation, is that 
the doppelgänger function is a general human capability. It works as a monitor, 
constantly switched on, alerted to find relations between the reader and the character(f). 
On a meta-level, it steers my attention, influencing the direction of my imagination. 
The minimal likeness I need to discover to empathize with a character(f) is a 
similarity in a disposition or character trait that is important to me; at the maximum 
stage, I would find out that the narrative is really about myself. As soon as I have 
acknowledged that a character(f) is my ‘doppelgänger’ in an important respect, I watch 
her actions critically: does she come up to my expectations? This question becomes 
almost as important to me as if it was a question about myself. I draw on my 
experiential memories to simulate the character(f) in a more life-like way. As the 
situation I remember will never be exactly the same as the situation in the fictional 
story, I have to take new parameters into consideration when I build my self-in-other-
narrative and integrate the elements of my memory-story. The first story I typically 
switch to from the other-narrative is always the self-in-other-narrative: How would I 
have acted, endowed with both the characteristics of the character(f) and my own 
knowledge of life? 
As soon as the character(f), although so much like me in many respects, behaves 
in a way that that I judge to be morally superior or inferior to what I think my own 
behaviour would have been, my focus shifts. Suppose I could have been as good / as 
bad as my doppelgänger – how would this have influenced my life? At this point, my 
narrative changes from a self-in-other-narrative to an other-in-self-narrative, and I let 
myself be led through the story by the character(f). 
These narratives can be suspended at any time, to be taken up and changed 
whenever my engagement with the character(f) changes. The doppelgänger-function 
leads the focus of my imagination towards one of these narratives at a time. 
The following diagram summarizes the relation between the reader’s self and the 




Figure 3: Empathy with a fictional other 
In the next section, I shall use examples from the novel Stoner to show how the 
doppelgänger function can generate a change in the type of narrative during fiction 
reading. 
 
6.3 Example of the doppelgänger-function: reading John Williams’ 
Stoner 
 
In this section, I am going to give an example of how the doppelgänger function 
prompts me as a reader to generate fictional narratives on different levels, with different 
protagonists. The work of fiction I choose to illustrate a possible reading experience is 
John William’s novel Stoner. I selected this novel because it is widely acknowledged to 
create a particularly vivid reading experience, evoking readers’ emotions, so the general 
processes I describe here are not likely to be idiosyncratic but shared by many. 
The novel’s protagonist, William Stoner, is presented to the reader slowly. We 
have to build the other-narrative (in this case: the Stoner-narrative) step by step. This is 
in keeping with Stoner’s character and development: He is introduced to the reader as 
an introverted man who takes a long time to confront his own fears and desires, and 
who is also slow in recognizing the driving emotions of the people close to him. This 















makes it easy for a reader to imagine him from inside: we all have moments of timidity 
and denial, and Stoner lives and suffers them openly for us. 
A particularly moving part of the book is the scene where Stoner furnishes his 
office, his sanctuary from a difficult world. 
The description of Stoner sanding a wooden board in his study is an image of 
what the book does to the reader: the old caked paint is rubbed off painfully with a 
rough surface so that the structure below begins to shine. In the same way, the reader 
begins to appreciate a character(f) who was initially presented as a nondescript, rather 
awkward man who dies unlamented and unremembered. The sanding of the board is a 
beautiful image which has many associated meanings, and it leads the reader to 
appreciate the work of fiction aesthetically. 
Simultaneously, this scene enables the reader to identify with Stoner from the 
inside in more depth. We already feel for him because in his relations with other people 
in the novel, he is generally treated unfairly. The others misjudge him, or are just not 
interested in him. We have all been in situations like that, and can thus contribute 
experiential memories to make Stoner’s conflicts more vivid in our imagination. When 
we read the description of how the wood begins to show its structure under Stoner’s 
workmanship, starting to glow, we are motivated to recall memories of occasions where 
we made a rough thing shine through the labour of our own hands – this might be the 
stripping of floorboards, the cleaning of an old painting, anything that involved a similar 
process of successfully making a physical object more attractive through our own 
manual labour. These memories bring their own mini-stories into the narrative as we 
read: for example of how our arms hurt after the room was finished, and none of our 
friends understood our elation at the job well done; or of how the wood-dust tickled our 
nose, or how an artistic mural was revealed when we took the paper off the wall. All of 
these stories run on together with the Stoner-narrative we are building, producing a new 
self-in-Stoner-narrative. The glow of the remembered experience, enhanced by the 
Stoner story, is rekindled in our breast. Through our near-doppelgänger Stoner, we are 
able to relive our pleasant or unpleasant memories, enhanced by new attributes from the 
fictional scene. Although caught up in the novel, we are happy about pleasing sensual 
experiences that happened to ourselves, or unhappy about conspiracies that were 
directed against ourselves. We are caught up in a self-in-Stoner-narrative. 
As the sanding-scene continues, we become awed by Stoner’s quiet persistence 
in his work and in his way of consistently ‘making’ himself into the man he feels he can 
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be, and should be. There is something inspiring about following Stoner’s actions: we get 
the impression that Stoner is a man who will always be true to himself, as best he can. 
Influenced by his example, we begin to feel guilty about the petty worries we often feel, 
or felt at the time of our recalled memories. We felt slighted when our friends did not 
praise the cleaned painting – and we suspect that Stoner would not have minded, being 
content with the result of his work. As we introduce an imaginary Stoner into our 
memory of restoring the painting, we generate a Stoner-in-self-narrative. We are glad to 
have Stoner as our near-doppelgänger, showing us the way we should go. The Stoner-
in-self-narrative will not last long, however, as it keeps us from reading on, but for the 
time being, it generates another emotion in us: the joy of having discovered a fellow-
feeling with someone else, feeling ‘worthy of being human’ based on our success of 
becoming aware of the importance and difficulty of the human situation. 
As the example illustrates, the doppelgänger-function manipulates the way our 
reading experience develops, and it leads us to create both self-in-other-narratives and 
other-in-self-narratives as variations of the other-narrative that we need to build in order 
to understand the story. In the other-in-self-narrative, we simulate the emotions of the 
fictional ‘other’, but in addition, we have genuine emotions which are about situations 
in which we found ourselves in the past, through our recalled experiential memories. 
These are often self-conscious emotions like shame or pride. The other-in-self-narrative 
can lead to a slightly different kind of genuine emotion: to a fleeting elation about a 
lesson learned or a connection understood, or to a feeling of guilt about an 
unacknowledged desire to do something that seems wrong to us. I shall explore these 
emotions in more detail in section 7.1. 
This sums up the investigation of a kind of experience the reader can have while 
the reading still continues. As we saw, the reading experience includes simulated 
emotions (from ‘inside’ a character(f), as part of empathizing with this character) as 
well as genuinely felt emotions (from inside the reader’s self). 
In the next chapter, I shall investigate how the reading process affects the reader 
beyond the actual reading process. 
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7 Beyond the reading process 
 
In this chapter, I deal with the question of why and how fiction reading can invoke 
subsequent self-reflection. This is an important part of my inquiry because it addresses 
one of the gaps in Ricoeur’s account. I am going to outline my own views on self-
reflection in this chapter, leaving the dispute with Ricoeur’s views to chapter 8. 
The discussion of the influence of fiction on the reader’s mind and morals dates 
back to Plato, who famously stipulated in Book II of The Republic that only ethically 
uplifting stories should be told to the guardians, so that they cannot be confused in their 
moral judgments.354 In more recent discussions, there are two bones of contention, one 
of them quite similar to Plato’s worry. I am looking at two issues here. First: does 
fiction reading typically lead to conscious and voluntary self-reflection? Second: is 
reading-induced self-reflection always good for us? 
The first (Platonic) question is this: does fiction cause the reader to reflect 
consciously on the fictional content, and her own emotional reaction to it, or is there an 
insidious unconscious influence against which the reader is powerless? Typically, a 
mixture of both will occur, but which of these influences persists after the reading 
process? My aim is to find out more about the long-term effects of reading fiction when 
a reader imagines a character(f) from within, especially its potential of changing the 
reader’s self. 
There are a number of articles on empirical psychological research which 
suggest that readers who enjoy being ‘transported’ into a fictional story tend to be 
influenced by the preferences of protagonists whom they like, without being aware of 
this.355 These experiments are typically based on the readers’ self-assessment 
immediately after the reading process. As already discussed in section 6.1, their results 
have strengthened my resolve to investigate the relation between fiction reading and the 
reader’s self during the reading process. However, it remains an open question whether 
the short-term results gained in this way can be extrapolated into the long term, and the 
studies themselves state that there is no reliable basis for such an extrapolation. This 
does represent a challenge to my account; however, it is far from decisive because 
                                                 
354 For instance on Homer’s tales about the gods: ‘These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which 
will arouse our anger; and he who utters them will be refused a chorus; neither will we allow teachers to 
make use of them in the instruction of the young, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can 
be, should be true worshippers of the gods and like them.’ Plato, Republic, II, 383c. 
355 Green / Dill 2013, 1. 
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currently, there are no representative empirical studies that examine the longer-term 
effects that my account is concerned with. So for that reason, I am going to set the 
question aside for the purposes of this discussion. What I am doing here is building a 
plausible model that requires empirical testing. 
As a second topic, I shall discuss the positive or negative effects of fiction 
reading that can result from conscious reflection on the reading process. Do stories help 
me to reflect on my life, and thus find an inner equilibrium that supports me in leading a 
unified life? Normative accounts of narrative identity (NINAs) say that it does, provided 
that the reality constraint and the articulation constraint are met.356 If this were the case, 
all fiction readers (except the seriously deluded ones) would be happy people who are 
content with the life they lead. When I look at the discontented lives of some of my 
fiction-reading acquaintances, it is obvious to me that fiction reading does not always 
have this effect. It can even have dangerous consequences. As I discussed earlier, Peter 
Goldie identifies fictionalizing tendencies that can jeopardize a person’s self-narrative, 
and this kind of fictionalizing can also be triggered when a reader engages with a 
fictional story.357 I am going to investigate on which of the three narrative levels I 
defined (other-narrative, self-in-other-narrative, other-in-self-narrative) fictionalizing 
tendencies can occur. 
Other philosophers tend to place more importance on the positive aspects of a 
reader’s self reflection. Paul Ricoeur holds that ‘we need the help of fiction to organize 
life retrospectively,358 and, in the same vein, Martha Nussbaum says: ‘novels can be a 
school for moral sentiments’.359 I am going to refer to these thoughts in my discussion 
of the possible influence of fiction reading on self-reflection. Both Ricoeur and 
Nussbaum agree that fiction reading can be used as a ‘thought laboratory’ that allows us 
try out ways of acting / reacting to certain events in theory without having to take the 
risk of adverse reactions within the real world, thus inducing us to learn more about 
ethical behaviour. Jenefer Robinson argues that the emotions we experience during 
fiction reading lead us to make affective appraisals of situations and characters from a 
fresh point of view, reflect on these assessments, and thus undergo a ‘sentimental 
education’ which makes us more discerning in our perception of other people.360 
                                                 
356 See discussion in section 2.4.2. 
357 See Goldie 2012, 161-172, and the discussion in section 2.4. 
358 Ricoeur 1992, 162. 
359 Nussbaum 1990, 240. 
360 Robinson 2006, 157. 
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Starting with these ideas, I am going to investigate the influences of fiction 
reading on the reader that go beyond the actual reading process. I shall argue that 
emotional experiences invoked by fiction reading are just the starting point of a chain of 
emotional episodes which can culminate in stretches of self-reflection and subsequent 
gradual adjustments of the reader’s self-narrative. In contrast to Nussbaum and Ricoeur, 
I am going to claim that the success of self-reflection depends on the absence of bias in 
the self-narrative on which it is built. I define a self-narrative as ‘biased’ if the role the 
self plays in her self-narrative diverges from the role the self plays, or is capable of 
playing, in her real-life social environment. As discussed in section 2.4, I hold that a 
person can maintain their self-narrative even if it is based on factual errors, except in the 
most extreme cases. In a biased self-narrative, the reader bases her self-reflection on a 
weak or a purely imaginary aspect of her personality, thus giving it more than its due 
importance. I am going to argue that there is at least one drawback to a biased self-
narrative: self-reflection may not lead to an improved unity of self. 
My focus will be on three areas: the characterization of reading-invoked 
emotions as real-life experiences, the nature of self-reflections based on these emotions, 
and the effect of these reflections on the reader’s self-narrative. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, fiction reading can induce emotions in the 
reader at various stages of her engagement with the text. In some cases, these emotions 
give rise to spontaneous self-reflection which does not stop when the reader puts down 
the book. 
Building on the discussion in section 6.1 on levels of participation, I hold that it 
is important to distinguish between sympathy and empathy when investigating a fiction 
reader’s emotional responses. When we sympathize with a character(f), we feel 
compassion from an external point of view. Sympathy typically calls forth real-life 
emotions directed at the type of person, group, or role that the character(f) stands for. In 
contrast to this, empathy triggers simulated emotions from ‘inside’ the character(f) as 
well as real-life emotions directed towards the reader herself. As discussed in section 
6.1, the recall of experiential memories can invoke self-directed emotions in the reader. 
During the reading process, sympathy and empathy can fluctuate and interlace, but 
typically they belong to different types of reader-generated narrative – sympathy occurs 
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more frequently during the observance of the other-narrative, whereas empathy is 
characteristic for the self-in-other- and the other-in-self-narrative.361 
I claim that real-life emotions which are invoked during fiction reading can 
continue, and continue in parallel, beyond the actual reading process if they are strong 
enough, and if they of the right kind. My second claim is that if real-life emotions were 
generated during fiction reading at all, these emotions typically start (or continue) a 
process of reflection and self-refiguration. Depending on the quality of the reader’s self-
narrative, this self-refiguration can either help or hinder the reader in her quest to 
maintain a unified self. 
This chapter outlines the claims of my own account of the relations between 
narrative identity and fiction reading. 
 
7.1 Emotions from fiction reading 
 
In this section, I examine if and how emotions that were triggered by fiction reading can 
persevere and call forth additional emotions when the reader puts down the book and 
carries on with her ‘real’ life in the real word. Again, I would like to stress that I am not 
making a general claim about all readers and all texts – in some readers, fiction reading 
may never induce emotions. 
As shown in the section 6.2, emotions can be invoked at different levels of 
participation during the reading process. Some types of emotion are more likely to 
persist after the actual reading process has been finished than others, and I am going to 
investigate how far they can have an influence on the reader’s self-reflection. 
I shall distinguish between different types of emotion that can be triggered by 
fiction reading, putting a special focus on self-conscious emotions and the way they can 
develop from the other-narrative, the self-in-other-narrative and the other-in-self-
narrative. I hold that all of these emotions are real-life emotions; they are not imagined, 
but they affect the reader directly. 
In the context of fiction-reading, I understand self-conscious real-life emotions 
to be emotions whose focus is the reader’s lived self. Self-conscious emotions come 
into being because we are aware of other people’s reactions to us. Our self-conscious 
emotions are based on our own judgment of our self, evaluating our situation, our 
                                                 
361 See definitions in section 6.2. 
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actions and our feelings as either failing to reach a given goal, or exceeding it.362 The 
goals that serve as guidelines for such a judgment can be derived from, and motivated 
by, either the practiced rules of our social nexus, or our own internalised value 
system.363 Self-conscious emotions like guilt, shame, embarrassment or pride are related 
to our self-esteem. As Kristjánsson has argued, self-esteem is not necessarily global, but 
it can also be ‘domain-specific’,364 concerning only certain aspects of the self. When the 
aspects of our self on which we want to build our self-esteem suddenly appear to 
diverge from the aspects we defined in our self-narrative, the practical identity we rely 
on in daily life can get out of balance. 
Under which circumstances are such self-conscious real-life emotions induced 
by fiction reading, and how do they influence my motivation for self-reflection? 
 
Experience of ‘self-conscious’ emotions 
 
Empirical psychological research has shown that self-conscious emotions like shame, 
guilt, embarrassment or pride have a particularly high influence on people’s motivation 
to change their lives, or their life story, much higher than non-self-conscious emotions 
like fear, disgust, joy or sadness.365 Self-conscious emotions can be distinguished from 
non-self-conscious emotions as being secondary in the sense that they involve an 
appraisal of how a situation affects the self. 
The influence of self-conscious emotions on a tendency for subsequent self-
reflection is widely corroborated by empirical research. As Tracy and Robins point out, 
self-conscious emotions ‘require self-awareness and self-representation’366. Self-
reflection has already started when these emotions occur, and it does not stop with their 
emergence. Empirical evidence has shown that people tend to experience self-conscious 
emotions when they become aware that they have not lived up to their own standards in 
some way.367 During these empirical tests, the participants are confronted with real or 
fictional cases in which people have reason to feel self-conscious emotions, and they are 
required to imagine themselves in these situations. 
                                                 
362 Lewis 2011, 2. 
363 Kristjánsson 2010, 127. 
364 Kristjánsson 2010, 112. 
365 Lickel et al. 2014. 
366 Tracy / Robins 2004, 105. 
367 For a literature overview of typical empirical tests, see in particular Tracy / Robins (ed.), The Self-
Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research, New York / London, 2007. 
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Can the detailed findings of these studies, as far as they go, be extended to self-
conscious emotions which are evoked during ‘private’ fiction reading? I hold that in 
general, they can, and I am going to refer to empirical studies during my discussion in 
this chapter. There is, however, one significant difference between reading for an 
empirical test and reading on one’s own. This concerns the difference between self-
oriented and other-oriented emotions.368 Shame is usually regarded as an other-oriented 
emotion, because it concerns our moral standing within our society. If fiction reading 
induces us to feel shame, we are often in a situation where we empathize with a 
character(f) who is in a type of shameful situation which we know from our own lives. 
This should, I think, enable us to treat even such an unpleasant emotion as self-oriented, 
because in company of the character(f) we are able to think about it without feeling 
threatened. There are no real-life others whose disdain we need to fear if we imagine 
ourselves to be in the shameful situation of a character(f). If we write about this in a test 
report, however, the real world looks over our shoulder. Hence, I hold that the impact of 
self-conscious emotions on the reader’s self may be different in ‘normal’ reading, 
compared to test study reading.369 
In my investigation, I want to explore under which conditions fiction reading can 
invoke self-conscious emotions, and subsequently cause a process of self-reflection 
which may lead to self-revaluation. 
In general, self-conscious emotions can arise when the subject either fails to 
conform to social or personal moral standards, or manages to rise above them. Moral 
emotions in general can be directed against one’s own behaviour as well as against the 
behaviour of others, so self-conscious emotions form a special class of moral emotions. 
Self-conscious emotions typically create a feeling of imbalance in the emoter, 
which in its turn motivates her to ‘set things right’ in order to regain her feeling of 
personal unity and self-esteem, and to fit the new situation into her life-story. With 
negative emotions like guilt or shame, the ‘setting right’ may involve getting rid of bad 
habits or attitudes, whereas with positive emotions like pride, it may involve getting rid 
of self-imposed restrictions like shyness. This ‘setting things right’ usually involves 
refiguring her self-narrative, either for past events or future plans. The directions the 
                                                 
368 Fessler 2007, 187. 
369 I assume here that the reader does not use electronic books which collect statistical figures about her 
reading, or if she does, that she is not aware of that. 
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refiguring will take depend on the bias (or genre) that accompanies her self-refiguration. 
I shall discuss the problem of bias and genre later in section ‘Self-examination’. 
In the current section, I shall start by examining how, and why, the fiction 
reading experience can have a different influence on a person’s self-conscious emotions 
than experiences in real life. 
 
Are self-conscious emotions from fiction reading different from self-conscious emotions 
evoked in other situations? 
 
Are the self-conscious emotions triggered within the self-in-other-narrative of a 
particular kind, and do they differ from the self-conscious emotions experienced as a 
result of real life events? Fiction reading with participation typically has several features 
which a real life situation does not offer, or at least does not offer to the extent that 
fiction reading does. These features are: detachment from current concerns that require 
decisions or action, combined with concentration on a single source of information; 
unrestrained and risk-free use of imagination, free from social judgment and real-life 
passions; and motivation to imagine a character from inside. I am going to have a look 
at these particular attributes of fiction reading (detachment, risk-free imagination, 




The first difference that comes to mind is that in real life, self-conscious emotions are 
often evoked in situations which require swift action and leave little room for self-
reflection. If we are caught in an embarrassing situation, we have to defend ourselves as 
soon as possible; if we receive a prize, we have to step up and deliver a speech. Even if 
the real-life situation does not necessitate an immediate response, there is usually a 
sequence of parallel events going on which needs our constant attention, so the 
opportunity for paying attention to the self-conscious emotion is limited. By the time we 
come to reflect on it, other emotions might already overlap it. In fiction reading, 
however, we shut ourselves off from the outside world, motivated to concentrate on a 
story without stopping in between to attend to other things. As fiction readers with 
participation, we are ‘lost’ in the fictional story. Self-conscious emotions have room to 
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grow on us, gaining weight that carries them beyond the reading process into a process 
of self-reflection that continues afterwards. 
It is therefore plausible that self-conscious emotions that are aroused during 
fiction reading may grow into self-reflection at leisure, in contrast to self-conscious 
emotions that occur during the wear and tear of our action-driven daily life. 
This does not, however, fully answer the question of whether fiction reading has 
a stronger influence on self-reflection than other activities that can be performed when 
the subject is at rest. What is the difference, in this respect, between fiction reading and 
patiently listening to a tale of woe presented by a friend? Here, it is interesting to 




When we read a fictional story, our imagination gathers associations and memories 
along the way to help fill the gaps in the story as it is told, to ‘generate fictional 
truths’.370 As examined in section 3.1, the reader has the opportunity to imagine 
situations and actions which she would not sanction in real life. One of the reasons for 
this is that imagining an action is different from performing an action. When I imagine 
doing something, I entertain the thought, I may even picture myself performing the 
action, but I do not perform it in real life, and thus do not take the responsibility for it. It 
is easy to explain that I do not take the responsibility for my imagined action socially; 
after all, nobody looks into my imagination, I am unwatched, on my own. Regarding 
my personal value system, there is, however, still a responsibility I may have to 
shoulder; I may consider some actions to be so morally reprehensible that I forbid 
myself even to imagine them. Or alternatively I may – as we saw in the discussion of 
imaginative resistance in section 3.1 – accept the outrageous action of a character(f) as 
fictional and imagine it, accompanied by a feeling of guilt. 
Is fiction reading different in this respect from listening to a story a friend or 
acquaintance tells me about her life? Listening, I can still be ‘on my own’ in my 
imagination, there is no obligation for me to give away my thoughts. But there is a 
disrupting element which is missing in fiction reading. When I listen to someone, I am 
in a dialogue situation with an other. Even if the other person talks at length, and I only 
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listen, I am aware of the presence of the other, and the social relationship between us. 
Whatever I imagine when I listen to her story will typically be studded with references 
to our relationship. The emotions I have towards her as a person who has been playing a 
role in my life, in combination with my own prejudices, will distort my perception. For 
instance, when I read about Stoner’s unhappy marriage, I am touched by the tragedy of 
the situation. I have a suspicion, though, that if I had an acquaintance who had a similar 
character as Stoner, and he would tell me about his wife, I would secretly think ‘why 
doesn’t he pull himself together and get a divorce’. The everyday life urge to solve 
problems instead of dwelling on them would probably prevent me from imagining the 
full situation. I cannot shut off this urge completely because it is part of my lived self 
which is in the process of listening. Thus, my imagination is likely to be more focussed 
than in fiction reading, but less rich. 
 
Motivation to empathize 
 
There is still one difference to discuss: Is there a difference between fiction reading and 
non-fiction reading regarding the evocation of self-conscious emotions? 
This is not an easy question to answer because there are many cases where 
fiction and non-fiction overlap. There may be some clear-cut opposites – Nussbaum, for 
instance, distinguishes between novels and traditional forms of philosophical writing in 
this context. Novels, she says, ‘enlist the reader as a participant by sympathy and 
compassion’, whereas philosophical texts typically ‘ask the reader to be wary and 
sceptical’.371 
In these clear-cut cases, the intention of the work is either to tempt the reader 
into emotional engagement, or to tempt her to analyze a problem rationally. As we all 
know, however, even the most ‘traditional’ philosophical literature contains many 
instances where the reader is lured into believing something by having her emotions 
touched through the polemics of the author. The emotional involvement of the reader 
can be compassion or revulsion. For instance, when Schopenhauer describes the 
‘common man’ as ‘factory-made’,372 I feel my blood boiling at this contempt for 
humankind. 
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Other works of non-fiction function in a different way, achieving a similar result 
as works of fiction. For instance, historical or political books often contain personal 
stories of historical or living persons, inviting the reader to empathize with these 
persons. 
So if fiction and non-fiction cannot be clearly separated from each other 
regarding style or intention, what can be the difference regarding their capacity of 
generating self-conscious emotions? 
There are two aspects here which create a dissimilarity. First, the reader engages 
with a work of fiction with a different expectation than she would have towards a work 
of non-fiction. As Lamarque puts it, the reader is invited to ‘attend to the story with a 
reader protocol that can be dubbed ‘the fictive stance’’, and this fictive stance regards 
the whole work, not only parts of it.373 This implies that the reader of fiction expects to 
have the licence to let her imagination run free, without worrying about any links the 
work might have towards the real world. Reading Frank Baum’s The Wonderful Wizard 
of Oz, I can sit back comfortably and imagine interesting pictures of a farmhouse which 
is torn off the ground by a tornado. If, on the other hand, I read a feature article about 
people suffering from a real-life tornado in the newspaper,374 I might get worried about 
my fellow human beings, and wonder whether I can make a donation to help them. So 
with fiction, we feel assured that our current real-life worries can stay outside. The same 
applies to historical works, with a caveat: if I find out that a historical work deals with 
one of friends or family members, my emotional involvement with the text will not only 
be evoked by imaginings, but will cover the area of my actual daily cares as well. 
The second aspect is also connected with reader expectations. When we read a 
work of fiction, we usually assume that the fictional characters were constructed to 
emphasize typical problems of the human situation. If a work of non-fiction contains 
characters, we expect them to be drawn from real life, having been shaped by 
contingencies. Ricoeur picks up this point and says (with Aristotle) that fictional stories 
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374 The difference between knowing and seeing is certainly one of the influencing factors on empathy in 
real life, as this example from G. B. Shaw’s St. Joan illustrates: ‘CAUCHON. Were not the sufferings of 
our Lord Christ enough for you?’ 
DE STOGUMBER. No. Oh no: not at all. I had seen them in pictures, and read of them in books, and 
been greatly moved by them, as I thought. But it was no use: it was not our Lord that redeemed me, but a 
young woman whom I saw actually burned to death. It was dreadful: oh, most dreadful. But it saved me.“ 
(Shaw 1924, Epilogue). 
However, the investigation of the influence of actual seeing on empathy goes beyond the scope of my 
work. 
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‘reveal universal aspects of the human condition’, whereas historical stories depend on 
anecdotic aspects of a particular life.375 If we do indeed expect this, we are inclined to 
take the outlined conflict in a fictional story more seriously. It is debatable in which 
cases the reader approaches the work of fiction with the explicit wish to learn more 
about the human situation; but if she does, this point is likely to influence her tendency 
to experience self-conscious emotions. 
Having discussed the influence of fiction reading on the generation of self-
conscious emotions in contrast to other means of information-gathering, I will now 
proceed to investigate how self conscious emotions grow in the three different kinds of 
narrative that are typically developed during fiction reading with participation. 
 
‘Self-conscious’ emotions from the other-narrative 
 
A typical emotion that can be evoked by the other-narrative in fiction reading is 
sympathy. Reading Toni Morrison’s novel Home376, I feel intense sympathy with Cee 
who is submitted to painful experiments by the unscrupulous doctor she works for. My 
feeling towards Cee never turns into empathy, as she is always presented from the 
outside, as a fragile human being who is not even fully aware of the evil things she is 
submitted to, who is too weak to stand up for her basic human rights. Through my 
feeling for her I become more conscious of the suffering of women in real life, in 
particular of women who are ill-treated and mutilated with the approval of the society 
they live in. This sympathy creates a new self-conscious emotion in its wake: I am 
likely to feel guilty about not doing enough for women’s rights outside my own social 
environment. If my guilt is strong enough, it may persist after the reading process, 
inclining me to find out more about the situation of underprivileged women, and adding 
to my motivation to re-examine my life in order to get rid of this feeling of moral 
failure, and to act in a way that I feel I am following the moral standards that I endorse.  
So my original simulated sympathy for Cee spawns a chain of subsequent real 
emotions and desires: sympathy with disadvantaged women, shame about my own lack 
of concern as shown in my life so far, and a desire to better myself. Depending on the 
degree of sympathy I feel for a character(f), my subsequent motivation may or may not 
be strong enough to lead to action; but if there was a follow-up incident in my real life 
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(for instance listening to a mistreated woman talking about her experience at a literary 
event), I might be more inclined to react with interest and sympathy than I would have 
been without the previous reading experience. Sympathy for a character(f) directs the 
reader’s attention to pitiable human situations that occur in real life. 
Shame, the self-conscious emotion in my example, is a follow-up emotion, 
brought about indirectly by engagement with the other-narrative. It is triggered by the 
experience of sympathy. As Michael Lewis points out, a person can feel shame (or any 
other self-conscious emotions) only if she possesses the ‘mental representation of a 
“me” or self-reflected awareness’,377 so having this emotion is already the first step of a 
self-reflective process which may lead to a refiguration of the self-narrative. 
 
‘Self-conscious’ emotions from the self-in-other-narrative 
 
The self-in-other-narrative involves empathy with a character(f) which feels ‘real’ and 
life-like to me because I have integrated my own experiential memories into the 
narrative. These memories bring their own stories with them, inducing me to have 
imaginings alongside the story simulation that is mandated by the text. I myself am the 
target of the emotions which I feel during the unmandated imaginings, although I 
appear to be inside the character(f), and the role that I play can be quite different from 
any role I would take on in real life. 
In Stoner, I feel for William Stoner from the inside when he has the opportunity 
to defend himself against his malevolent opponent Lomax and still remains fair and 
reasonable in the face of the most atrocious lies and accusations. Imagining the fights he 
has to go through, I remember my own conflicts with colleagues in the past, and how 
difficult it sometimes was to keep the fight clean. As a consequence, I admire Stoner (in 
place of any other person who can do this) for the ease with which he manages this, and 
this admiration is likely to continue after the reading process, urging me to focus on this 
kind of behaviour even more strongly. Before reading Stoner, I had not been aware that 
I was capable of reacting like this, and no tales of this behaviour featured in my self-
narrative, although I now distinctly remember the related events of my past. 
This is a special example of a domain-oriented feeling of self-esteem: pride of 
being able to maintain one’s standards in a threatening social encounter. Similar 
                                                 
377 Lewis 2011, 1. 
 160 
examples can be found for the other self-conscious emotions, like shame, 
embarrassment, or guilt. When reading Dickens’ Great Expectations, I always cringe 
with shame in the parts where Pip attempts to deny his social origins in order to be 
accepted by polite society. I manage to empathize with Pip because he is successfully 
represented as a likable and very human character, and so it hurts me to find this fault in 
him. It hurts me all the more because in parallel, I have already assembled memories 
from my own youth when I felt a misplaced embarrassment about the countrified 
language of my kind and caring grandfather. The other-narrative has slipped into a self-
in-other-narrative, and all my past instances of shame about my former misjudgement 
accumulate with the present one to such an extent that they overflow the reading process 
and carry on worrying me afterwards. 
The main difference between the self-conscious emotions experienced within the 
self-in-other-narrative and the self-conscious emotions invoked through the other-
narrative is one of distance, and thus intensity: in the other-narrative we only experience 
the self-conscious emotions on second thoughts, as a consequence of sympathy, but in 
the self-in-other-narrative our empathy with the character(f) can lead us deeply into 
ourselves, and into feeling for ourselves. 
 
‘Self-conscious’ emotions from the other-in-self-narrative 
 
In the other-in-self-narrative, a character(f) suddenly takes over my experiential 
memories and bends them into a different direction. An example for this is Edith Stoner, 
who is generally cast as one of the novel’s flat characters but who occasionally shows 
outbursts of despair that are gripping and empathy-inciting. When Edith comes back 
from her father’s funeral, she has changed into an aggressive outfit and into aggressive 
behaviour, starting what Stoner interprets as a ‘new declaration of war’.378 While it is 
difficult to feel for Edith in the beginning of the novel when she seems to be just a vapid 
and dreamy person, she is now shown to be aware of the complete disappointment of all 
she thought life had to offer to her. This awareness engages the reader by its compelling 
fury. The belligerent Edith reminds me of my own broken relationships, of many 
acerbic publisher’s rejections, and of the jobs I did not get. In my imagination, Edith 
now takes over my past life and runs it in a different way. She starts to do things in my 
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dug-up memories which I would have liked to do but never dared: accuse the head of 
the department of sexism during an award ceremony; demolish a faithless lover’s 
favourite car; kick an obnoxious colleague down the stairs as an answer to an insult. 
Simulating this, I run through a series of emotions: satisfaction of at least imagining that 
I got my own back on people who did me wrong, followed by shame on delighting in 
something that I would not condone. Overall, it makes me aware of areas in my past life 
which I have not dealt with sufficiently from an emotional point of view, and which 
need my attention in retrospect. 
My confusion about these mixed feelings is intensified by the memories of my 
own retributive actions in the past (on the occasions when I actually did fight back), 
which I ‘re-live’ in parallel to the reading. This compound of emotions (current and 
remembered) constitutes an experience which challenges the practical identity I live 
with, and it motivates me to refigure my self-narrative in order to maintain a stable 
sense of self. 
Summing up, the emotions that result from the three different kinds of narrative 
have several things in common: they are – in the end – all about myself, the reader. 
They can force me to recognize discrepancies between ways of dealing with a situation, 
and the way I have dealt with such situations in the past. As a result, I feel the need to 
either change my goals, or the way I interpret my past life, or both. These emotions 
differ in intensity: The emotions caused by the self-in-other-narrative are typically the 
strongest because they involve the most intense recalls of one’s own emotion-laden 




In this section, I am going to examine under which circumstances the self-examination 
triggered by fiction-induced emotions can lead to a refiguration of the reader’s self-
narrative. Although I base my model on Ricoeur’s account of fiction reading, I am 
going to develop two important amendments here: I am going to stress the experiential 
quality of the reading process which can generate strong self-conscious emotions, and I 
am going stress the danger of self-reflection with a bias. 
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If self-conscious emotions persist after the reading process, or emerge in the 
wake of other fiction-induced emotions, then – as we saw in the previous section – they 
typically lead to the reader’s awareness that her self-understanding, woven together as a 
self-narrative, does not stand the test of the actions / reactions which she imagined 
during her engagement with the text. This feeling of imbalance leads to a desire to put 
the self ‘back into kilter’, to re-establish a feeling of personal unity. 
According to Ricoeur, this is done by consciously examining the imagined 
actions of the fiction-reading process and confronting them with one’s self-narrative. 
The resulting dialectic between counterfactual actions and the story one has woven 
about one’s own life will, upon self-reflection, lead to a revaluation of the self. During 
this revaluation process, new ideas and new goals will be introduced, and old ones will 
be either deepened or disabled. As Ricoeur puts it, there is a ‘play of sedimentation and 
innovation applied to our understanding of ourselves’.380 
This thought suggests that self-reflection is a reliable tool to achieve self-unity 
and self-respect. Ricoeur holds that fiction reading helps to investigate and try out one’s 
own action in a non-threatening environment, thus receiving a wealth of self-testing 
material in a non-threatening environment.  
Following a similar train of thought, Nussbaum says that novels can distance us 
‘from blinding personal passions’ and cultivate ‘those that are more conducive to 
community’,381 and that novels also enable readers to give way to self-indulgence 
without harming real people. So, if this is right, reading has two good influences on us: 
It makes us reconsider our past and present actions from an ethical point of view, and it 
purges us from anti-social urges. 
Suzanne Keen conducted an experiment with her students, giving them three 
texts that were aimed at the reader’s emotions, all of them written in the first person, 
from the point of view of a down-at-luck orphan: a fraudulent email from Africa asking 
for a bank transfer, a hand-written letter with an attached report card asking for money, 
and a fictional text where the orphan character talks about her dreams of becoming a 
mechanic. A common factor of the students’ reactions to these texts was that they 
thought the fictional text was the most trustworthy.382 Keen sums up the results of her 
study like this: ‘My research suggests that readers’ perception of a text’s fictionality 
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plays a role in subsequent empathetic response, by releasing readers from the 
obligations of self-protection through scepticism and suspicion. Thus they may respond 
with greater empathy to an unreal situation and characters because of the protective 
fictionality, but still internalize the experience of empathy with possible later real-world 
responsiveness to others’ needs’.383 
Is fiction reading then always good for us, turning us into more empathetic 
persons, and restoring our self-esteem? When we look at the people who are part of our 
social circle, it soon becomes obvious that some avid fiction readers are not as socially 
capable as such a claim might lead us to expect. This suggests that some further 
prerequisites that must be met for the chain process that leads from strong self-
conscious emotions to self-reflection, and from self-reflection to self-refiguration, to be 
successful. Another question is: what happens to the reader who only reads fiction in 
order to be transported into the story and to enjoy the ride – does self-reflection enter 
this process at all? Is, in short, reading good for people who do not manage, or do not 
look for, self-reflection? 
In my view, the value of reading for the reader’s unity of self depends (among 
other factors) on the quality of her self-narrative. Even though a self-narrative is 
typically only accessible to the self-narrator, not to the external world, it can have 
similar attributes as fictional narratives. As discussed in section 2.4, I adopt Ricoeur’s 
view that we (unconsciously) use our self-narrative as a practical guideline to cope with 
the necessity to act and react in our daily lives. If we are not very discerning in our 
observation of the people in our social nexus, our self-narrative can be built on simple 
(and often idealized) lines. Hence, I find it useful to distinguish between literary fiction 
and genre fiction even in self-narratives. 
There are many common language distinctions between these two, with a huge 
grey area where they seem to overlap, so I shall use my own definition. I shall take 
literary fiction to be a fictional narrative that has the main objective of illuminating the 
human situation, without diminishing this aim by obeying normative generic 
conventions. In my definition, genre fiction has the main goal of providing stereotyped 
roles which are easy to recognize, and differentiated insights into the human situation 
take a subordinate role, only helping to make the story convincing.384 
                                                 




The objective of genre fiction is to provide the reader with easily recognizable 
types of character(f) and easily recognizable story patterns, thus achieving some, but not 
necessarily all of these three goals: giving the reader the pleasure of finding something 
that is familiar to her; making the reader feel instantly at home in the story; making the 
reader pleased with herself by echoing and confirming her values. None of these goals 
is likely to make the reader conscious of a conflict in her life while she is within the 
reading process, and the main emotion to be expected in the reader is a mild feeling of 
contentment.385 Hence, self-reflection is only likely to happen if the reader engages with 
a work of fiction that represents genuine conflicts of the human situation. 
What happens if the reader’s self-narrative resembles a piece of genre fiction, 
consisting of clichéd story lines? If a person manages to keep her self-narrative on 
simplified lines, without much discernment of social conflicts, she is likely to cherry-
pick the items of the fictional story that fit her expectations, and ignore potentially 
difficult story parts. Thus, I hold that self-reflection can only happen, and subsequent 
self-figuration can only lead to a stable sense of self, if the reader’s self-narrative has 
the nature of literary fiction, as opposed to genre fiction. 
A genre-based self-narrative is usually biased, giving undue weight to some 
characteristics of the self and her life, while ignoring other aspects. I am going to 
discuss the problem of genre in fiction and in self-narrative in detail in the course of this 
section. 
 
Self-reflection and unity of self 
 
As discussed in the previous section, self-conscious emotions have a tendency to persist 
after the reading process because they create a sense of imbalance in us which is 
perturbing. As we saw in section 1.9, shame, embarrassment, guilt or even pride can 
make us feel that we are playing the wrong role, in a current situation, or in our self-
narrative, or in both. They force us to recognize a conflict, and they motivate us to 
reflect on our life and on the way we have presented it to ourselves up to the present. 
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How do we deal with fiction-induced emotions when we reflect on our lived 
self, and our self-narrative? Depending on the strength and the valence of the emotion, 
there are three possibilities. 
The first possibility is that the emotion challenges our ethical values so much 
that we stop the reflective process as soon as we feel the onslaught. The most likely 
source for this would be a violent negative emotion generated during the generation of 
the other-in-self-narrative. If – for instance – reading the wittily written erotic scenes in 
Gore Vidal’s Myra Breckenridge386 should cause me to imagine forcing sexual acts on 
an unwilling partner, the realization of this would be so horrible that I would not be able 
to bear the shame of it. The only possible reaction (short of abandoning the reading 
process) would be a strengthening of my current values, and an added line to my self-
narrative saying something like ‘tends to get carried away by literature, but thoughts do 
not count’, thus stowing the problem away from further scrutiny. 
The second possible case is that my emotions from fiction reading have made 
me suspect that in some aspect, I am a better or a worse person than I thought I was. I 
feel urged to replay parts of my self-narrative in comparison, going through a strict 
investigation of the past. If the self-scrutiny confirms my suspicion, and my self-
conscious emotion is strong enough, the consequences are two-fold: I re-tell the past 
part of my self-narrative because I view some episodes in a different light now, and my 
future plans (which are also part of my self-narrative) take a slightly different turn. 
The third possibility is the most subtle one, and it is most likely to occur in 
connection with the self-in-other-narrative. During fiction reading, my attention to the 
situation of characters(f) is different from the attention I pay to the situation of real 
persons in real life. When I empathize with a character(f), I enjoy a privileged situation 
because the text allows me to read her mind: on the one hand, I am intimately 
acquainted with the character(f), and I share memories, actions, and friends with her. On 
the other hand, I am the only person who is aware of this, and my reactions are entirely 
private and unobserved. I can think what I like without having to fear censorship or 
punishment from outside. This frees my mind of self-protective thoughts, and I can 
concentrate on the details of another person’s life, using an unfamiliar point of view, 
thus discovering aspects of life which I have not noticed before. Ricoeur calls this 
aspect of the reading process ‘an immense laboratory for thought experiments’,387 but I 
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find Robinson’s term ‘sentimental education’388 more convincing because the fiction 
reading experience with participation has the quality of an emotional experiment (rather 
than a thought experiment). When I watch a character(f)’s moral evolvement, taking in 
the steps and the considerations made by this character, I may find them to be quite 
different from any I would have thought possible. The empathy I feel for the 
character(f), and for myself when I bolster the self-in-other-narrative with my own 
experiential memories, is enhanced by a feeling of surprise at having learned to look at 
life in a new way. The attention to new aspects of life learned during fiction reading 
may not always lead to strong self-conscious emotions, but it is likely to make the 
process of post-reading self-examination more discerning. Learning more about the 
development of other people’s feelings enables me to weave finer threads into the cloth 
of my self-narrative. 
These three variants of self-reflection have one thing in common: they serve to 
give the reader a stable sense of self, supported by a believable story, which helps her to 
tackle her daily conflicts. 
Self-reflection after fiction reading does not, however, always behave in this 
ideal way. What can go wrong? I shall investigate the causes of non-functional self-
reflection in the next section. 
 
Self-reflection and bias 
 
It is a well-known truism that self-reflection can only be as good as the mirror we watch 
ourselves in. How does this translate to fiction reading? What makes self-reflection as a 
result of fiction-induced emotions realistic and useful, and under which circumstances is 
self-reflection uncritical and self-serving? 
I shall investigate two possible factors which can be responsible for a mirror 
distortion: the motivation of the reader when she chooses her fictional reading matter, 
and the quality of the reader’s self-narrative. 
Motivations for reading a work of fiction are similar for most readers, but differ 
in strength. Many readers choose a work of fiction in order to be entertained, to get out 
of their every-day drudgery into an unthreatening fictional world. Whereas some readers 
want to explore new worlds, others want the fictional world to be source of solace for 
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their own imperfect lives, providing them with dreams which are unlikely to come true 
in real life. If the need for the dream is too strong, the reader will not be able to 
assimilate the complete work of fiction, but only the parts of it that relate to the dream-
story. This is, for instance, illustrated by the number of romantic comedies that were 
made on the basis of Jane Austen’s sharp social novels; these films typically constitute 
visible versions of self-serving reading by extricating some sickly romance from the 
rich satire of Austen’s writing. 
Readers who engage with a work of fiction in order to fill a self-serving need 
tend to rewrite the other-narrative until it fits in with their expectations, if the text does 
not do comply with their wishes in a satisfactory way. The reader enters the story with a 
bias. 
Can such a form of affirmative reading lead to self-reflection at all? For more 
than 2000 years, writers and philosophers have been concerned about the question 
whether books can have a beneficial influence on the reader. For instance, Diodorus 
Siculus writes in his Library of History that the ‘sacred library’ of Thebes bears the 
inscription ‘Healing-place of the Soul’389 – we do not know, of course, how entertaining 
the books in this library were. The moral appreciation of fiction which was designed to 
please and entertain was a popular topic of discussion in the eighteenth century. Samuel 
Johnson professes lukewarm approval for books which aim at nothing but 
entertainment: ‘The author is not wholly useless, who provides innocent amusements 
for minds like these. There are, in the present state of things, so many more instigations 
to evil, than incitements to good, that he who keeps men in a neutral state, may be justly 
considered as a benefactor to life’.390 Other intellectuals of the age were intrigued by the 
possibility of ‘hiding’ valuable insights in entertaining works of fiction. As Clara Reeve 
says in the introduction to her Gothic novel The Old English Baron: ‘Romance displays 
only the amiable side of the picture; it shews the pleasing features, and throws a veil 
over the blemishes: Mankind are naturally pleased with what gratifies their vanity; and 
vanity, like all other passions of the human heart, may be rendered subservient to good 
and useful purposes’.391 
If I choose to read a work of fiction of which I am sure that it does not contain 
potentially troubling conflicts, which promises to be a ‘feel-good novel’, it is unlikely 
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(although still possible) that my empathy with one of its characters evokes strong self-
conscious emotions. For instance, reading John Steinbeck’s Sweet Thursday392 can lead 
me to empathize with Doc, but imagining his feeling of loneliness from inside only 
induces a slight and pleasant sentimentality in me. On the other hand, I enjoy the novel 
not only because the promised happy ending between Doc and Suzy comes to pass, but 
because the author’s sympathetic observations of eccentric society drop-outs gives me 
the feeling of slowing down, of paying attention to details that pass me by in my real-
life daily schedule. So even an intended affirmative reading can inadvertently lead to 
increased sensitivity, and thus to enrichment of the self-narrative, although it is unlikely 
to start a process of self-reflection. 
The second area where a reader may be biased is her own self-narrative. As 
discussed earlier, the narrative self is a practical self. It enables a person to interact with 
others, and to make decisions in small or big conflicts. If the self-narrative does not 
reflect the role a person plays in her real-life social environment, these interactions are 
bound to fail, leading to social clashes. For example, if I think I am a woman of 
stupendous beauty, expecting the people I meet to gaze at me admiringly, and ask for 
my autograph, they will be baffled or amused when they recognize my expectation, but 
they are not likely to meet it. To resolve the resulting conflict, the person acting outside 
her social role can undertake one of three possible actions: first, ignore these failures 
and classify them as unimportant; second, blame others for failing to perceive her 
admirable attributes; third, question her own self-assessment and behaviour. Assuming 
that a person is free in her choices and in full possession of her powers, selecting the 
third option could be termed the safest response because it spares her unnecessary fights 
in her social environment. Choosing options one and two (without having tried option 
three first) typically leads to a mismatch between the person’s self-narrative and her 
real-life self which needs to be bridged by fabrications. In this case, the person would be 
likely to follow what Peter Goldie calls ‘fictionalizing tendencies’, especially the 
tendency to impose genre on the self-narrative in a dangerous way.393 Regarding my 
assumed (but unacknowledged) beauty, I might imagine that I am a modern Cinderella, 
whose beauty can only be discovered by a modern Prince Charming who has yet to 
appear. 
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As another example, a recalcitrant ten-year-old girl might convince herself that 
her mother’s scolding and her schoolfellows’ jeering are not to be taken seriously 
because they just fail to see that she has been sadly neglected and misunderstood by her 
own family, and that she is entitled to eccentric behaviour and bad temper to make up 
for ill-treatment. In such a case of biased self-narrative, reading a book like Frances 
Hodgson Burnett’s The Secret Garden394 might strengthen the girl’s misconception of 
herself. She would empathize with Mary Lennox and look for similarities between Mary 
and herself, while tending to ignore the differences. As Michael S. Brady says, ‘subjects 
often seek for reasons that confirm, rather than disconfirm, their initial emotional 
construals’, making themselves ‘susceptible to a ‘confirmatory bias’.395 The reading 
process would probably evoke an enhanced self-conscious feeling of pride in the girl, a 
glorious feeling of being different and hence superior to others, and subsequent self-
reflection would increase the biased genre-like character of her self-narrative. 
A biased self-narrative will present an image of a unified self to the subject, but 
in contrast to a reality-based self-narrative, it is not only fragile, but also rigid. It cannot 
prove or disprove itself by social encounters. In such cases, the bias-driven version of 
self-reflection will not be likely to amend the real unity of the self, or to allow any 
additional discernment. 
As shown in this section, self-reflection is even possible – in a very limited way 
– if a reader chooses a work of fiction that is suitable for affirmative reading. If, 
however, the self-narrative of the reader is already biased and unrealistic, any self-
reflection after the reading process is likely to sharpen the problem instead of paving the 
way towards a stable sense of self-unity. 
In this chapter, I discussed two issues: first, the possibility that reading-induced 
emotions persist after the reading process, triggering self-reflection, and second, the 
question of whether self-reflection is always good for us. I arrived at the conclusion that 
fiction reading with empathy for a character(f) can invoke self-conscious emotions, and 
that self-conscious emotions are particularly likely to lead to self-reflection. Regarding 
the self-reflection process itself, I argued that this can only help us towards an improved 
unity of self if our self-narrative does not deviate too much from the role we play in our 
social nexus. 
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8 Filling out Ricoeur’s account of fiction reading 
 
In the previous two chapters, I developed my own account of how fiction reading and 
personal identity are interlaced through narrative: first, during the reading process, and 
second, as a consequence of the reading process. 
Here, I am going to highlight the lacunae in Ricoeur’s account of fiction 
reading in connection with narrative identity and explain how these are filled with my 
own account. As I explained earlier, the lacunae are located in these areas:  
1. during fiction reading, in the influence of imaginative variations on the reader’s self, 
in particular on the reader’s emotions; and  
2. after fiction reading, in the role of reflection during the refiguration of narrative 
identity.  
In the detailed discussion, I am also going to compare relevant parts of Ricoeur’s 
account with Walton’s account of engaging with a work of fiction. 
Before I start to investigate these points in detail, I would like to give an 
overview of Ricoeur’s main claims regarding the effects of fiction reading on the 
reader:396 
Reading fictional texts provides the reader with imaginative variations of her 
self to gain understanding and try out new perspectives on life. The reader who engages 
with a work of fiction enters the fictional world evoked by this work. Her reading 
process is accompanied by a dialectic with the inferred author397: her own expectations 
of how the text should be interpreted are continually challenged by the inferred author 
who wants to seduce the reader towards viewing the world in a specific way. The reader 
deals with this challenge by appropriating the fictional world in her own way: she 
merges her own experiential and cultural horizon with the horizon offered by the 
inferred author, thus experiencing imaginative variations of her self in a low risk 
environment. To be able to do this, she must first relinquish her self and then playfully 
adopt a new understanding of the world as offered by the text: ‘to understand is not to 
project oneself into the text; it is to receive an enlarged self from the apprehension of 
proposed worlds which are the genuine object of interpretation’.398 Ricoeur calls this 
                                                 
396 For the full account, see section 1.7 ‘Narrative and Mimesis’. 
397 Ricoeur uses the term ‘implied author’ but his arguments show that he means what I call the ‘inferred 
author’. 
398 Ricoeur 1991a, 87. 
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activity mimesis3.
399 During mimesis3, the reader experiences passive contemplation 
(aísthēsis). In connection with ‘the readers’ tendency to identify with the hero’400 this 
can lead to confrontation with unknown norms and, finally, to catharsis. ‘Aesthetism 
frees the reader from everyday concerns, catharsis sets the reader free for new 
evaluations of reality that will take shape in rereading’.401 Catharsis typically has three 
effects on the reader: purging of pent-up or hidden emotions, subsequent clarification of 
the conflicts in the fictional story, and learning from the newly gained insights. 
Learning leads to reflection on the reader’s own conflicts and to refiguration of the 
reader’s self-narrative. 
I am going to explore the overlappings and the differences between Ricoeur’s 
account and mine in the following areas: 
Reading process step No. Topic 
1 During the reading process: 
Engagement with a work of 
fiction with participation 
a 
What happens when I identify with a 
character(f) from within? 
b 
What happens when I follow a 
fictional story? 
c 
Do my imaginations belong to the 
fictional story? 
d 
How are my emotions evoked during 
fiction reading? 
e 
Do my reading-induced emotions 
persist? 
2 After the reading process: 
Reflection after the reading 
process 
a How is reflection triggered? 
b 
Does reflection move my self 
towards an improved unity of life? 
c 
Does reflection refigure my self-
narrative? 
Figure 4: Reading process Ricoeur 1 
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1a) What happens when I identify with a character(f) from within? 
 
Ricoeur’s concept of fiction reading is based on the view that a fiction reader actualizes 
the text by reading it. When this actualization is successful, it entails two main reader 
activities: first, tuning her own expectations into those which are raised by the text 
(which is represented by the inferred author), and second, entering the fictional world. 
The reader has to find a way of accepting the fictional text as conceivable, and if she is 
able to do this, she can appropriate the text. Appropriation means that the reader 
relinquishes her self and accepts the fictional world, ‘receiving, as in play, the self 
conferred by the work itself’.402 In other words, the reader lets go of all her current 
emotions and the preoccupations with her daily life before accepting and engaging with 
the fictional world proposed in the text. By appropriating the text in this way, the reader 
releases the revelatory power of the text: she allows herself to be carried off towards the 
reference of the text.403 
I agree with the gist of Ricoeur’s account here. However, I hold that he does 
not pay enough attention to the different degrees of appropriation which a fiction reader 
can attain. 
In his explanation, Ricoeur does not distinguish between the acceptance of the 
fictional world and the identification of the reader with a character(f) from within. For 
him, the identification with a character(f) is included in the general appropriation of the 
text by the reader. Appropriation of the text opens the way to aísthēsis (passive 
contemplation) and catharsis (the purging of emotions as a step towards learning). 
Ricoeur does not see the need to make further distinctions in his definition of 
appropriation. 
As I discussed in section 6.1, valuable additional insights can be gained by 
distinguishing three levels of reader participation: appreciation, sympathy and empathy. 
I hold that the level of reader participation is an important factor in the development of 
the reader’s emotions during and after the reading process. As we shall see later, 
Ricoeur does not explore the reader’s emotions after the reading process. I shall argue 
that in my view, this omission leads to a gap in Ricoeur’s account of how fiction 
reading can influence the reader’s narrative identity. 
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Let us examine an example: how would Ricoeur account for the reader’s 
attitude towards the important fictional characters in the first pages of the novel Stoner? 
As a start, we must determine who the significant characters(mf) and 
characters(f) in this Stoner chapter are. There are two obvious candidates: the inferred 
author, and Stoner himself. The inferred author, although outside the narrative, pushes 
himself into the foreground by describing the protagonist’s life in disparaging terms. He 
stresses that ‘few of Stoner’s students remembered him with any sharpness’ and draws 
attentions to the fact that Stoner’s colleagues ‘held him in no particular esteem when he 
was alive’.404 Everything the inferred author says about Stoner is calculated to rouse the 
reader’s fervid protest. We feel that the life of a human being should not be so cursorily 
dismissed by those around him. 
Ricoeur would say that this style of writing is an example of the seductive 
strategy of the real author who is trying to make the reader identify with the inferred 
author. For Ricoeur, the reading process is a dialectic between the author, who wants 
the reader to identify with the inferred author and his views, and the reader, who reacts 
with either willingness or suspicion.405 In Stoner, the inferred author belittles his 
protagonist on purpose, as if saying: ‘This is how the world sees Stoner, but I, the 
author, and you, the reader, are aware that there is more richness in a human being’. For 
most readers, the seduction would work: the reader goes along with the inferred 
author’s opinions. It is, of course, possible to imagine a different type of reader: a 
person with a strong prejudice against formal education might think that someone 
working at university was over-privileged in any case, and thus deserved to be spoken 
of badly. 
I agree that the ongoing struggle of the reader with the text is an important 
feature of fiction reading. As Ricoeur says, the inferred author ‘attempts to make the 
reader identical with himself’.406 However, Ricoeur describes this as nothing more than 
an intellectual and aesthetic exercise. For him, emotions do not play a major role in the 
dialectic between the author and the reader. I disagree with Ricoeur here on two counts: 
first, I hold that emotions play an important role in the reader’s acceptance of a text, and 
second, I think that the term ‘dialectic’ is not the best description of the interaction of 
the reader with the text. 
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In the Stoner example, the inferred author seduces me into rooting for Stoner 
by making me angry about the world’s disregard of Stoner’s life. I feel compassion 
towards an unknown protagonist, and I am happy to share the inferred author’s ethical 
position. Imagining the inferred author from within is only possible in a restricted area: 
the focus of his perception and, strongly connected with this, his ethical judgments. In 
most cases, I do not know enough about the inferred author and his life to imagine being 
like him. However, I can imagine sharing his judgments, seeing the world in the way 
that he does. If I imagine this, two things typically happen: I feel more confident about 
the fictional world he describes, and I feel more confident about my own tastes and 
moral standards because he shares them. Agreeing with the inferred author pleases me 
because my own judgements are backed up by an authority whom I classify as 
important. If, on the other hand, I cannot imagine sharing the inferred author’s 
judgements because I find them silly or objectionable, I feel disgusted with the inferred 
author and with the readers who liked or praised the book. For instance, when I read 
Marie Corelli’s description of the centre of the world407 in A Romance of Two Worlds, I 
feel sickened by her tawdry taste, and I despise Queen Victoria’s taste in literature. As 
these examples show, emotions are likely to be involved in the reader’s struggle with 
the inferred author. 
The struggle is, however, one-sided, and hence, I think that ‘dialectic’ is not 
the appropriate word for it. The reader works her way through the text, and during this 
journey she is repeatedly challenged by the inferred author. Does the inferred author 
represent the fictional world in a way that is conceivable to me, the reader? If he does 
not, can I imagine the missing links to make the story acceptable to me, or does the 
story remain alien to me even when I stretch my imagination? 
The real author designed his text, including the inferred author, with a view to 
making the reader react in a certain way, and he probably had an ideal reader in mind 
when he wrote the text. But there is no way the inferred author can react if the reader 
interpreted the text in a different way than the author designed. The inferred author is 
deaf and blind towards the reader; he cannot formulate honed arguments to set against 
the reader’s non-compliant conceptions. The text is fixed; only the reader’s reactions are 
flexible. As the process is one-sided, I hold that ‘rhetoric’ and ‘struggle’ are better 
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descriptions for this. The reader struggles with ways of processing the inferred author’s 
rhetorical devices, adjusting her own understanding of the story. Even if we take into 
consideration that the reader’s perception of the inferred author might change during the 
process, there would be no additional input from the text. The reader would argue with 
her own understanding of the text and its author, learning from the text, but the text 
cannot react to the reader’s changed understanding. 
So far, we have looked at the reading process in view of the reader’s 
identification with the inferred author. This is a special case of identifying with a 
character(mf). We usually know very little about the inferred author, and we cannot take 
part in his story because it is hidden from us. The situation is different when the reader 
identifies with a character(f). In this case, the reader knows enough about the 
character(f)’s life story, current situation and innermost thoughts to be able to imagine 
being in her place and feeling like her. 
Ricoeur says that identification with a character(f) guides the reader towards 
catharsis, the cleansing of her emotions. The reader revisits the conflicts of her own life 
through the actions and sufferings of the character(f). Reliving the emotions which are 
already known to her through another person frees the reader from pent-up and 
concealed emotions. Thus released from emotional baggage, the reader is able to see the 
relevant situation under new aspects, and to consider moral standards that were 
previously hidden from her. Catharsis opens the way towards clarification, examination 
and learning. For Ricoeur, this is the goal and the end of fiction reading, and no further 
reading-induced emotions from the reader’s side need to be investigated: ‘Aísthēsis 
frees the reader from everyday concerns, catharsis sets the reader free for new 
evaluations of reality that will take shape in rereading’.408 The vessel is emptied of 
emotional muddle and can be filled with instruction. As I shall explain in the course of 
this chapter, I see the development of emotions during fiction reading in a more 
differentiated way. Contrary to Ricoeur, I do not use the term ‘catharsis’ to describe 
what happens to our emotions during fiction reading. For me, identifying with a 
character(f), trying to feel like her, cannot be fully represented by a linear process like 
catharsis. Empathy with a character(f) triggers an ongoing development of emotions 
during the reading process. Among these emotions, reliving a conflict of the past can be 
one element of many, and the chain of emotions usually does not end there. Re-
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experiencing emotion-charged episodes of one’s own life during fiction reading triggers 
follow-up emotions which are usually self-reflective. Reading Stoner, for example, I 
enjoy reading about Edith’s brutal destruction of her dolls, feeling for her from the 
inside. Immediately afterwards I feel guilty about condoning unleashed hatred by 
identifying with a character(f) who indulges in it without restraint. Then, afterwards, I 
feel slightly silly about censoring my imagination, and the chain of emotions may even 
continue after that. The emotions I go through during this process are typically self-
conscious. 
There is no direct line from experiencing a strong emotion through fiction 
reading to learning from fiction reading. The reader does not just re-live emotions from 
her own life through the character(f). Identifying with a character(f) brings new 
memories and existing conflicts to the surface without resolving them during the 
reading process. This happens by association of situation patterns, below the level of 
consciousness, without any determined action on the reader’s part. Part of the resulting 
muddle may be cleared when the reader re-lives a conflict from her own life through 
fiction reading, but some remains, some is created during the new experience of the 
conflict itself. New messy emotions typically emerge during reading and the imaginings 
which accompany the reading process.  
Unlike Ricoeur, I have argued that the reading process is more complex than a 
simple struggle of the reader with the inferred author, and most importantly, that the 
reader’s identification with a character(f) from within is more than a simple road 
towards catharsis. As discussed in section 6.1, I claim that empathy with a character(f) 
generates a network of complex new emotions in the reader. Hence, my account 
provides a basis for explaining the persistence of different kinds of emotions, which is 
lacking in Ricoeur’s account. 
 
1b) What happens when I follow a fictional story? 
 
Ricoeur does not examine in detail what happens to the reader when she identifies with 
a character(f). He states that the reader undergoes imaginative variations of his ego by 
trying the role and the story of the character(f).409 Ricoeur calls the reader’s engagement 
with a work of fiction ‘appropriation’: the reader relinquishes her own self and receives 
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‘as in play, the self conferred by the work itself’.410 When a reader relinquishes her own 
self as part of the engagement with a work of fiction, Ricoeur claims, she is freed from 
her narcissistic ego and her real-world concerns. Appropriation thus reveals new modes 
of being to the reader, giving her fresh capacities for knowing herself. 
Ricoeur’s view that the reader plays a game with the text during fiction reading 
is similar to Walton’s view of fiction reading as a game of make-believe. Walton says 
that readers are reflexive props in games of make-believe who generate fictional truths 
about themselves,411 which is compatible with Ricoeur’s notion that ‘the reader is 
invited to undergo an imaginative variation of his ego’.412 When Ricoeur talks about the 
struggle between the inferred author and the reader, the strategy of seduction versus the 
strategy of suspicion, he implies that there are two worlds, the world suggested by the 
inferred author and the world imagined by the reader. This is compatible with Walton’s 
definition of the work world and the appreciator’s game world.413 Unlike Walton, 
however, Ricoeur does not distinguish between the different levels of imagining that 
take place within the reader’s world. He does not differentiate imaginations which are 
part of the game prescribed by the text from imaginations which occur outside the 
prescribed game. As I am going to explain, I hold this to be a very important distinction. 
The differentiation of various strands of imaginings forms the basis for my own 
account. 
I hold that Ricoeur’s focus on the reader’s activity of understanding a text, and 
applying it playfully to herself, does not shed full light on the reading experience. 
Identifying with a character from within often evokes emotions in the reader, and these 
emotions lead the reader to either take on the part of the character(f) as an extension of 
herself on a concordant and presumably predictable path (albeit with some new vistas), 
or to let herself be led astray by an uncannily familiar, but ethically dubious character(f) 
on a precarious journey on thin ice. These different paths are the self-in-other-narrative 
and the other-in-self-narrative.414 In the reader’s unconscious mind, an inner monitor, 
the doppelgänger-function, is always on the alert for indications of which path the 
reader should take. I take this doppelgänger function to be a socially developed 
mechanism that runs below the reader’s current level of consciousness. 415  
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Ricoeur’s account is much thinner regarding the reader’s imaginings. About 
my example, he would just say that the reader appropriates the fictional world of Stoner 
and identifies with a character(f). Joyfully identifying with Stoner when he is sanding a 
wooden board with quiet enjoyment on one extreme, and reluctantly / guiltily travelling 
with Edith in her angry revenge against her husband on the other, belong to the same 
kind of activity for him, and thus, he does not investigate them separately. For me, these 
are two different kinds of story: the first becomes a self-in-other-narrative during 
reading, whereas the second develops into an other-in-self-narrative.416 They provide 
different kinds of reading experience, and they typically generate different kinds of 
emotion in the reader. 
In contrast to Ricoeur, I say that during the reader’s own actualization of the 
fictional story, memory sequences of the reader’s own life become part of the reading 
experience. As discussed in section 6.2, these memory sequences can dominate the 
reader’s imagination of the story, or they can themselves be dominated by the influence 
of a character(f). These are the two extremes of the doppelgänger-function. 
Distinguishing between them enables me to examine whether these two paths lead to 
different possibilities of self-reflection after the reading process. I am going to say more 
about this under 2a). 
 
1c) Do my imaginations belong to the fictional story? 
 
Ricoeur says that it is constitutive for the self to be embodied, and thus anchored to the 
world. In his account of fiction reading, however, he claims that the reader leaves her 
self behind while appropriating the fictional world. This is a bold move, and it keeps 
him from investigating the connections between the reader’s embodiment and her 
engagement with a work of fiction. 
When Ricoeur talks about the reader’s self here, he means the ipse, the lived 
self, to be distinguished from the idem, the objectified personal identity which includes 
character(p). Ricoeur acknowledges that the reader is cognizant of the features of her 
idem during the reading process, and that this influences the way she reads and 
understands the text: ‘Insofar as the body as one’s own is a dimension of oneself, the 
imaginative variations around the corporeal condition are variations of the self and its 
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selfhood’.417 What Ricoeur underestimates is the connection between the lived self and 
the reading process. 
In my view, it is not accurate to say that the reader relinquishes her self when 
she enters a fictional world. I agree that she leaves her current concerns behind, but a 
basic self-awareness remains. A reader is still alert to phenomenological perceptions 
and able to react to them: if her leg becomes numb, she may change her position, and if 
she feels peckish, she may nibble a snack while continuing to read. In addition to that, 
she may be reminded of sensual experiences in her own past when she identifies with a 
character(f). When she enters the warm reception room together with Stoner, when the 
heat of the room almost pushes him back, she may recall how strange it can feel to enter 
a warm room coming in from the cold, and the context in which this happened to herself 
in the past. Ricoeur does not put enough emphasis on the sensory quality of experiential 
memories and the emotions which are linked to this. For him, the fiction-induced 
imaginative variations around the bodily condition merely serve to help the reader to 
identify with a character(f). 
A basic self-awareness also remains on the level of social behaviour. A reader 
who identifies with Stoner in the scenes where Stoner is treated unfairly by his 
colleagues will feel the injustice not only for Stoner, but for herself, in all the 
remembered instances when she was in a comparable situation. 
I hold that when a reader engages with a work of fiction, she does not leave her 
self, but rather her self-narrative behind. She enters the fictional narrative instead – but 
she retains access to her experiential memories which may be triggered by imagining a 
character(f) from within. These experiential memories form part of the reader’s idem; 
the reader can retrieve them because they are rooted in her embodiment. As soon as she 
has recalled them, they form part of her ipse, her lived self, because they become part of 
the reading experience. 
Unlike Ricoeur, I have explored in detail how the reader fills the gaps in the 
fictional story she engages with. Hence, I have been able to investigate the importance 
of experiential memories and the way they can influence the reading experience. 
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1d) How are my emotions evoked during fiction reading? 
 
For Ricoeur, identifying with a character(f) can lead a fiction reader towards catharsis. 
Catharsis purges the reader’s emotions, and it teaches the reader to look at the world 
from a new angle by setting familiar conflicts into a new context. In his view, the 
cleansing process of catharsis sufficiently describes the reader’s progress from reading 
to learning and, ultimately, self-reflection. 
On my account, this explanation is not satisfactory, for two reasons. First, the 
emotions triggered by fiction reading (recognizing and re-living one’s own troubles, or 
typically human troubles, in a character(f)) do not usually work in such a clear-cut way, 
and second, re-living a familiar conflict is not an end in itself: it triggers a chain of 
emotions in the reader. Identifying with a character(f), and recognizing similarities with 
emotion-charged occurrences in one’s own life, calls up experiential memories in the 
reader which have a narrative quality. They are narrative because they recall an action 
and a subsequent emotional reaction, even if the sequence is short and simple. Feeling 
for Pincher Martin, I remember my childhood adventure of almost drowning, and 
fearing for my life as a consequence. In this way, experiential memories bring their own 
mini-stories to the consciousness of the reader. When I feel like Stoner sanding his 
board, I focus not only on the text; I gather memories of similar experiences in my own 
life. I may recall being allowed to paint my grandfather’s garden fence as a child, how 
hot it was, and that my grandfather was collecting gooseberries for tea, and how the 
teacups were cracked and stained, how much my mother hated that and how strange and 
exciting it seemed to me, and how sorry I felt for my grandfather when she scolded him, 
and how guilty I felt about not defending him. All of these small details become part of 
my reading of Stoner, inextricably woven into the story, calling up new emotions 
directed towards my self. 
Contrary to Ricoeur, for whom emotions are spent and purged during the 
reading process, my account allows for chains of new emotions, which are directed 
towards the reader’s self, to be generated during the appropriation of a fictional story. 
As I shall show, this makes it more plausible that a reader is motivated to enter self-




1e) Do my reading-induced emotions persist? 
 
For Ricoeur, the long-term effect of fiction reading on the reader develops because the 
reader learns something new through fiction reading. After experiencing catharsis, the 
reader realises that the world can be understood, and lived in, in a way which was 
previously not known to her. Ricoeur says: ‘to understand is not to project oneself into 
the text; it is to receive an enlarged self from the apprehension of proposed worlds 
which are the genuine object of interpretation’, and ‘Reading releases an event of 
discourse’.418 For Ricoeur, emotions come into play at two stages of fiction reading: 
first, through empathy with a character(f), leading to (and ending with) catharsis; 
second, after learning something new by living in the fictional world, leading to feelings 
of puzzlement and wonder. 
I hold that the emotions experienced through empathy with a character(f) 
which involve re-living a previously experienced conflict usually persist and create new 
emotions. In his understanding of catharsis, Ricoeur says that fiction reading can cause 
the reader to re-live old conflicts with a new perspective. I agree with this, but I hold 
that this is only the beginning of the story. The very process of experiencing a conflict 
again spawns emotions which are based on this experience. Two factors influence the 
generation of new emotions during reading: reliving a conflict from the past, and 
recalling experiential memories during empathy with a character(f). These emotions are 
freshly created by engaging with a work of fiction. They tend to be emotionally 
charged, both by the aftermath of catharsis and by the mini-stories which are brought to 
consciousness together with the experiential memories called up by the text. Therefore, 
they can persist after the reading process has finished, and thus have a strong influence 
on the mode of discourse about the work of fiction. 
Hence – different from Ricoeur – I say that such newly created emotions are an 
important factor in explaining how fiction reading can lead us to self-reflection, and 
why the effects of fiction reading can haunt us in the way they often do. 
Summing up the comparison of my account with Ricoeur’s view of the reading 
process, I say that it is different in three important respects. First, contrary to Ricoeur’s 
view that analysis of the reader’s emotions is limited to catharsis, I hold that fiction-
invoked emotions often trigger a network of follow-up emotions. Second, I distinguish 
                                                 
418 Ricoeur 1991a, 87. 
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the reader’s imaginations which were mandated by the work of fiction from those which 
occur alongside the work of fiction. This is important because through the additional 
imaginations, the reader’s self begins to enter the narrative. Third, I investigate the 
different ways in which a reader can identify with a character(f), and am thus able to 
investigate the different kinds of emotions connected with these modes of identification. 
 
2a) How is reflection triggered? 
 
As we have seen, some reflection can already be motivated by the reading process itself, 
but the more interesting question is whether the reading experience can lead to 
subsequent and deeper reflection, and eventually a refiguration of the reader’s self-
narrative. Ricoeur says that provocation from fiction reading induces the reader to 
reflect on her self-narrative. By ‘provocation’ he means an unforeseen confrontation 
with new insights and moral viewpoints. In principle, I agree with him here. However, 
the provocation process is more complex than Ricoeur allows. A new insight is not 
itself sufficient to trigger self-reflection – if it were, newspaper-reading would throw us 
into spells of self-reflection every day. In my view, the emotions which were invoked 
during fiction reading typically lead to subsequent self-reflection. This a more than a 
prod. As shown under 1a), fiction reading – and, in particular, empathizing with a 
character(f) – can trigger a chain of strong emotions in the reader, many of which are 
self-conscious. Self-conscious emotions are especially potent in disturbing the reader’s 
peace of mind, making her reconsider the way she has been living. Emotions from 
fiction reading lead the reader towards reflection in a subtle way, on different levels: 
towards a situation-based moral decision, or towards a general moral lesson. 
Having identified with Edith’s revenge while reading Stoner, a reader would 
typically be torn between two emotions: empathy with Edith, her frustration and her 
rage about a life that has turned out to be completely empty and useless, on the one 
hand, and the ethical concern that what Edith does is deeply unfair and hurtful towards 
her husband, on the other hand. Identifying with Edith, one would slide into an 
emotional conflict that is not easy to resolve. Therefore, I hold that often, it is the 
gnawing sensation of one’s own inner conflict – brought about by identifying with a 
character from within, in the other-in-self-narrative – which induces reflection after the 
reading process. 
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On a higher level, my change of attitude towards Edith can make me aware 
how easy it is to make biased moral judgments. At the beginning of the novel, I see 
Edith as a shallow and malevolent person who torments her husband. When I am 
allowed to look into her deep conflicts later on in the novel, at the part where her father 
dies and her life is shattered, I begin to see her as a person, and I am able to feel for her 
from the inside. I can take this change of attitude towards a character(f) as a warning for 
my real life of how easy it is to cast someone in a certain (and usually negative) role just 
because one does not know enough about them. It also reveals to me how dangerous it 
can be to feel deep empathy for someone – my empathy for Stoner leads me to be 
prejudiced against any other character(f) in the novel who harmed him. Having 
unexpected insight into Edith’s sufferings put my judgement of her relationship with 
Stoner into a new perspective. 
These examples show that self-reflection typically develops from emotions. 
The emotions make us aware of how important the unexpected information from fiction 
reading is for us and our lives. In an environment which does not call for immediate 
action, we can reflect on this and think about refiguring our self-narrative. As discussed 
in section 7.1, I argue – contrary to Ricoeur – that self-reflection can be triggered in 
different ways by the reader’s complex emotions, and that a simple confrontation with 
new insight is not sufficient to explain the reader’s motivation to self-reflect. 
 
2b) Does reflection move my self towards an improved unity of life? 
 
In Ricoeur’s view, reflection can lead the reader to change her self and her self-
narrative. A prerequisite for this is that the reader has been able to engage with the work 
of fiction and identify with a character(f) from within. For reflection to take place, the 
reader needs to reach a moment of impetus ‘when reading becomes a provocation to be 
and act differently’, and, in addition to that, this impetus is transformed to action by the 
decision ‘Here I stand!’.419 Ricoeur says that reading-induced reflection – if it occurs 
successfully – leads the reader to make a decision about her ethical responsibility, and 
thus about changing her commitments (her self) and her plans and her self-assessment 
(her self-narrative). For him, this reflection naturally leads the reader to better insight, 
and puts her on the way towards a more realistic self-narrative. 
                                                 
419 Ricoeur 1985, 249. 
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In my view, the problem here lies in Ricoeur’s explanation of how the reader 
finds an appropriate way to identify, and reflect upon, the text’s suggestions to be and 
act differently. Ricoeur thinks that the only struggle the reader has is against the 
provocation of the text, deciding whether or not she will allow herself to be influenced 
by it. 
I hold that there are further factors which influence the reader’s ethical choices. 
These factors are not theoretical ethical considerations; they stem from the quality of 
reader’s current self-narrative. If the reader’s self-narrative complies with the facts of 
life as an external observer would perceive it in her social and physical environment, the 
reader will typically be able to identify with a character(f) in a way which is at least 
roughly similar to what the text prescribes. In this case, reflection is likely to lead the 
reader on the road to coping with her life even more successfully. If, on the other hand, 
the reader has delusions about herself and her life story, identifying with a character(f) 
may send her even deeper into her misconception about her life. Gustave Flaubert’s 
novel Madame Bovary420 is a literary example of this. The eponymous heroine likes to 
read romances about elegant and noble men who lay the world at the feet of the woman 
whom they love. Identifying with the ardently adored women in such novels encourages 
Madame Bovary in her delusion that she is destined to live a life of passion and 
romance. She acts according to this delusion (following her erroneous self-narrative), 
and this does not help her towards a better unity of life. Instead, it leads her to ruin and 
suicide. Thus – contrary to Ricoeur – I say that an existing bias towards the unrealistic 
in a reader’s self-narrative can have an influence on the success of her post-reading 
reflection. 
 
2c) Does reflection refigure my self-narrative? 
 
Ricoeur says that reflection, if successful, is usually followed by a decision to act and be 
differently, and thus to a refiguration of the reader’s self-narrative, and towards an 
improved unity of life. 421 
I agree with this, but I find it important to add that post-reading reflection is not 
always either successful or unsuccessful. As stated in the previous paragraph, reflection 
                                                 
420 Flaubert 2003. 
421 It is theoretically possible that my self-reflection leads to the conclusion that my life, and my self, are 
already as well-adjusted as they can be. But if this were the case, it does not seem plausible that I had 
fiction-induced emotions which led me to self-reflection. 
 185 
can also lead to harmful results if it sets out from a biased self-assessment. In such a 
case, it can harden existing erroneous convictions about the reader’s self and self-
narrative, which is likely to lead to additional clashes and conflicts in her daily life. 
So, contrary to Ricoeur, I hold that reflection can only refigure my self-
narrative if my self-narrative does not deviate too much from my role in real life as 
perceived within my social nexus. If my current self-narrative is delusional, reflection 
after fiction reading can force this unrealistic narrative even further from any narrative 
of myself that an objective observer might construct. In this case one could say that my 
self-narrative is not refigured, but hardened. 
 
In this chapter, I highlighted the differences between Ricoeur’s account of how a 
reader’s self-narrative can be influenced by fiction reading, and my own account. This 
is the summary of my investigations: 
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Figure 5: Reading process Ricoeur 2 
In particular, I pointed out that the emotions experienced during fiction reading, and the 
imaginings that occur alongside the ‘authorized’ game of make-believe, can have a 
strong influence on the emotional reactions of the reader, and that they may trigger a 
chain of new self-conscious emotions. This consideration is missing in Ricoeur’s 
account, and hence, he cannot give a convincing explanation of how and why the reader 
is motivated to reflect on her own life after fiction reading. For Ricoeur, catharsis and 
subsequent learning explain this motivation; for me, re-living conflicts of one’s past is 
just part of a complex web of self-directed emotions which emerge during the reading 
process. 
I also showed that reading-induced self-reflection can take three forms: it can be 
successful, unsuccessful, or harmful in developing the reader’s self and self-narrative. In 
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comparison to Ricoeur, who only distinguishes between successful and unsuccessful 
self-reflection, leaving the harmful self-reflection unexamined, I am able to give a more 
discerning account of self-reflection. 
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9 Filling out Walton’s account of fiction reading 
 
In Part III of this work, I referred to Walton’s account of fiction reading in two main 
contexts. First, I recalled his account of participation in a work of fiction when I laid out 
my own account of the mutual influences of fiction reading and narrative identity.422 
Second, I compared Ricoeur’s view of the reading process with Walton’s account of 
reading as a game of make-believe.423 
In this chapter, I am going to address three points in Walton’s account which 
appear to be open to questions. First, Walton’s view of the reader’s subsidiary 
imaginings does not address the role of the reader’s experiential memories; second – 
connected with the first point – the reader’s emotions should be investigated regarding 




step No. Topic 
1 During the 
reading process: 
Engagement 




What part do subsidiary imaginings play during 
fiction reading? 
b What are emotions during fiction reading like? 





a How does fiction reading contribute to our lives? 
Figure 6: Reading process Walton 1 
  
                                                 
422 See section 6.1. 
423 See chapter 8. 
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1a) What part do subsidiary imaginings play during fiction reading? 
 
Walton says that when a reader identifies with a character(f) from within, she engages 
in imaginings ‘that are not part of the authorized game but occur along with it’.424 He 
argues that this is necessary because the reader cannot be completely identical with a 
character(f), and thus has to use her imagination to fill some gaps in order to imagine 
being in the character(f)’s shoes. In Walton’s view, these imaginings are similar to those 
we undertake when we try to imagine a real person from within. 
I wholly agree with Walton’s general concept of subsidiary imaginings. 
However, I hold that there remains more to be said about their sources and their 
consequences to explain the nature of the reader’s emotions. Subsidiary imaginings do 
not just attach themselves to the fictional narrative out of the blue; they are usually 
based on emotionally charged memories of the reader. In order to imagine a character(f) 
from inside, to know what it feels like to be him, I need to resort to my own experiential 
memories. These memories bring my own unresolved emotions from the past with 
them. Imagining William Stoner at the point of his story where he inadvertently 
becomes a good teacher stimulates me to recall scenes from my own life when I realized 
that I was doing something well which I did badly before. I may remember, for 
instance, how I used to ignore my grandmother’s constant complaints about not being 
able to go out on account of the bad weather until one day I took her for a walk and 
realized that she just needed someone to go with her and did not want to say so. 
Suddenly, I felt I was acting as a caring relative should act. As a result, I felt remorse 
about not having been attentive enough in the past, and this remorse hits me again 
during the reading of Stoner. 
Usually, the memories we resort to in order to fill the gaps in fictional texts are 
charged with emotions; this is why they come back so easily to our consciousness. The 
memories we recall are embedded in their own stories, and these stories can evoke 
strong emotions in us when we live through them again during fiction reading. Hence, 
the subsidiary imaginings during fiction reading can have an influence on how emotions 
are generated in the reader, and whether they subsist after the reading process. 
                                                 
424 Walton 1990, 255. 
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This is an important point for my account because it explains how the reader 
typically develops a network of self-conscious emotions which can lead the way to self-
reflection, and refiguration of the self-narrative. 
 
1b) What are emotions during fiction reading like? 
 
As we saw in section 3.1, Walton makes a clear distinction between the emotions we 
experience in real life and the emotions we experience during fiction reading when we 
identify with a character(f). During fiction reading, he claims, it is only fictional that we 
have emotions about a character(f). The feeling we experience is real, but it is different 
from an emotion we would feel in a similar situation in real life. To make the distinction 
clear, he coins the term ‘quasi-emotion’425. A quasi-emotion contains all the elements of 
an emotion except the cognitive element and the motivational element.426 Walton says 
that we care about the experience of having quasi-emotions,427 but he does not pay 
attention to any other kind of real-life emotion that can be evoked from empathizing 
with a character(f). 
I claim that Walton underestimates the connection between the emotions which 
we fictionally have towards characters(f) and the emotions towards ourselves which we 
develop or recall when we identify with a character(f). ‘Caring’ about having quasi-
emotions does not fully explain the strong emotions which can evolve during fiction 
reading. For instance, when I read how Stoner is misunderstood and tormented by 
Lomax, I remember how I myself was treated unfairly by my stepmother but was unable 
to get my own back without dropping my moral standards. I fictionally feel for Stoner, 
and I care about feeling for Stoner, it makes me feel like a responsible person who 
reflects on ethical issues. So far, I agree with Walton. But my emotions do not stop 
there – as a consequence of my experiential memories of how unjustly my stepmother 
denounced me in front of the family, I also feel for myself, I re-experience my 
unresolved hurt from long ago. Walton does not account for this kind of re-lived self-
directed emotion in his theory of fiction reading. Although he holds that ‘virtually all of 
our imaginings are partly about ourselves’,428 he underestimates the impact of the self-
directed emotions which can develop from quasi-emotions. 
                                                 
425 For a more detailed discussion see section 3.1. 
426 Walton 1990, 196. 
427 Walton 1990, 271. 
428 Walton 1990, 28. 
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This gap in Walton’s account has been recognized by Jerrold Levinson. He 
says that we should supplement Walton’s account ‘in such a way as to be more adequate 
to our abiding sense that at least in some cases or interactions, something is really going 
on emotionally, i.e., there are some real, and not just quasi, or make-believe, emotions 
involved in the situation as a whole’.429 Although Levinson appears to equate the terms 
‘quasi’ and ‘make-believe’ here, which does not reflect Walton’s views, the point he 
makes is true: in addition to emotions that are based on imagining that something is the 
case, fiction reading can also trigger emotions are based on a belief that something is the 
case. When an emotion is based on a belief, a quasi-emotion and some motivations are 
generated. Levinson suggests that there is a leakage between two levels, ‘that of 
imaginative connection with the characters and that of half-remembered, dimly focussed 
recollections of stored life experiences’.430 The real-life emotions evoked by fiction 
reading are based on the beliefs about these stored life experiences, and they prompt a 
motivation to resolve a conflict which has become apparent during the reading process. 
Levinson’s distinction between two levels delves deeper into the details of the 
reading experience than Walton’s account does. It stresses the influence of the reader’s 
recalled memories on the quality of the reading experience. However, I hold that 
Levinson’s explanation does not go far enough. The emotions which come with our 
memories are embedded in their own mini-stories, and these stories get tangled up in the 
other-narrative the reader generates during the reading process, developing into either a 
self-in-other-narrative or into an other-in-self-narrative if the emotions are strong 
enough.431 Depending on the role the self plays in the ensuing narrative, different kinds 
of new emotions are likely to develop, most of them about the reader’s self. 
This is an aspect of fiction reading which is neglected by Walton. He 
acknowledges that we can have emotions when we engage with a work of fiction, but he 
does not investigate how this is influenced by our recalled memories, or what the target 
of these emotions is. In short: Walton says that during fiction reading, we can only have 
mental states that consist of quasi-emotions plus a make-belief, and that we care about 
these emotions because they enrich our lives. In my account, I claim that we can have 
both quasi-emotions towards characters(f) and strong real-life emotions towards 
ourselves when we engage with a work of fiction. These real-life emotions are not just 
                                                 
429 Levinson 1990, 79. 
430 Levinson 1990, 79. 
431 see section 6.2. 
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an appreciation of quasi-emotions, as Walton claims. Often, real-life emotions are 
caused by recalled experiential memories. They can be intense, and they can persist 
after fiction reading. Hence, the reader adds more emotional content to the reading 
process than Walton allows. 
 
2a) How does fiction reading contribute to our lives? 
 
Walton says that the connection between fiction reading and the reader’s real life, 
especially the benefit of participatory experiences, is something that still needs to be 
investigated in detail, in particular ‘the specific ways in which participatory experiences 
contribute to our lives’.432 In his search for the benefits of fiction reading he mentions 
the opportunities for trying out new roles, releasing unacceptable emotions, recognizing 
repressed feelings, facing disturbing aspects of ourselves, or gaining experience in 
dealing with specific situations. He wonders whether there is ‘an evolutionary 
explanation of why human beings find experiences that do in fact produce insight 
exciting or enjoyable’.433 
I concur with Walton’s idea that the desire of humans to learn is something that 
can be investigated further, especially in empirical studies by psychologists or 
neuroscientists. From the philosophical angle, however, I think that Ricoeur’s account 
of narrative identity provides the most interesting insight into the post-reading effects of 
fiction reading. I agree with Ricoeur that working out conflicts or trying out new roles 
are not isolated activities (as Walton represents them), but experiences that are closely 
woven together with the reader’s self. In my own account, I explore these activities 
more deeply by defining the doppelgänger-function that monitors the other-narrative, 
letting it swing towards the self-in-other-narrative or the other-in-self-narrative. These 
narratives represent different kinds of reading experience, evoking in their turn different 
kinds of emotion which often persist after the reading process. 
Thus, the reading experience can form the basis for extended self reflection and 
the long-term effects on the reader’s goals and self-understanding, including a 
refiguration of her self-narrative. As the self-narrative is a practical identity needed for 
the interaction of the embodied self with the world and her social environment,434 a 
                                                 
432 Walton 1990, 273. 
433 Walton 1990, 272. 
434 for details, see discussion in section 2.4. 
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fiction-reading induced refiguration of the self-narrative does indeed contribute to a 
person’s life. 
Ricoeur’s model of narrative identity has given us the framework for the 
integration of fiction reading into the reader’s lived self and her self-narrative. However, 
my account is an advance on Ricoeur’s in that I explore the details in more depth, 
distinguishing between different reader narratives and different kinds of emotions. This 
is at least a partial answer to Walton’s open question: I showed that fiction reading can 
contribute to our lives by changing our self-narrative, including our plans and 
commitments for the future. I do not attempt, however, to provide any answer to the 
question whether fiction reading can change the way we act; I leave these investigations 
to future empirical research by psychologists. 
 
This overview shows the results of my discussions on how my own account can fill the 
gaps in Walton’s account on the influence of fiction reading on the reader’s self: 
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process step No. Topic Kendall Walton My account 
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reading process: 
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Participatory experiences 
can alert us to conflicts and 
create emotions that prompt 
us to change our 
commitments, and thus, 
refigure our narrative 
identity. 
Figure 7: Reading process Walton 2 
These are the most important points of my discussion: I hold that fiction reading does 
not only involve quasi-emotions, but also real-life emotions directed towards the reader 
herself; and I argue that the concept of narrative identity shows how fiction reading can 




10 Summary of Part III: The Simulated Self 
 
In this main part of my work, I produced an account of the influence of fiction reading 
on the reader’s self, which draws but also advances on Ricoeur’s account of narrative 
identity. I investigated the effects of fiction reading both during and after the reading 
process. My theory covers two areas: the development of the emotional involvement of 
the fiction reader, and the process of self-reflection and self-refiguration after the 
reading process. I claim that Ricoeur’s account of fiction reading does not fully explain 
how and why the reader experiences emotions during and after the reading process. 
Ricoeur says that learning from fiction leads to self-reflection. This is not plausible: 
learning increases our knowledge, but it does not motivate us to re-think our lives. The 
important question is: what can spark the motivation for self-reflection? In my own 
account of fiction reading, I explore the different kinds of narrative a fiction reader 
weaves during the reading process, and the kinds of emotion that can be evoked by 
these narratives. 
I hold that emotions often have a complicated structure (which Ricoeur does not 
recognize), and that they frequently have a narrative quality. In chapter 5, I explained 
that my view is compatible with any theory which says that an emotion is intentional, 
complex, and structured. 
In chapter 6, I investigated how the reading process deepens into a reading 
experience when the fiction reader feels sympathy or empathy, caused by her 
engagement with a character(f). Starting from Ricoeur’s interpretation of fiction reading 
as an ‘imaginative variation of our ego’,435 I examined how emotions can be evoked 
during fiction reading, and what these emotions are about. I showed that the reading 
process has an experiential quality for the reader, and that this experience in itself can 
trigger a chain of new emotions in the reader, many of them self-directed. 
Regarding the development of self-directed emotions, I took encouragement 
from the empirical tests performed by psychologists who questioned readers on the 
emotions that they felt after reading examples from works of fiction. Their test results 
indicated that in almost all cases, the fiction reader experienced self-conscious emotions 
after the reading process. Taking up this idea, I suggested that the reader’s emotions are 
not created as a direct result of imagining something fictional, but as part of a 
                                                 
435 Ricoeur 2011, 437. 
 196 
subsequent chain of emotions which develops from the engagement of the reader with 
the fictional story. The full engagement with the story is possible only if the reader fills 
the gaps with her own experiential memories, which are linked to her personal history in 
which they originally occurred. Thus, both the experience of reading a work of fiction 
and the experience of re-living one’s own memories are woven into the reader’s 
engagement with the work of fiction. 
The thought that the act of reading is an experience in itself, interwoven with the 
narratives of the reader’s experiential memories, is under-represented in the fiction 
reading models of both Ricoeur and Walton. The addition allows for a deeper analysis 
of the reader’s experience and its time frame. Why are some reading-induced emotions 
longer-lasting, and more disturbing, than others? 
My claim is that identifying with a character(f) from within is a typical source 
for strong reading-induced emotions. Using examples from literary fiction, I 
investigated how, and under what circumstances, sympathy and empathy with a 
character(f) can promote the emergence of self-conscious emotions in the reader. 
How do the emotions enter the reading process? Ricoeur and Walton say that the 
reader creates her own narrative, her own interpretation of the text, and Walton 
acknowledges that the reader has imaginings that run alongside the mandated narrative 
of the text. I showed that this distinction is not detailed enough to explain the different 
chains of reading-induced emotions. In my view, the fiction reader creates three levels 
of narrative during the reading process: the other-narrative, the self-in-other-narrative, 
and the other-in-self-narrative. 
The first of these does not involve any variation of the reader’s ego: the other-
narrative consists of the story of a character(f) understood by the reader, based on the 
hints given by the work of fiction. To build the other-narrative, the reader applies her 
experience of the world and her knowledge of cultural customs to the fictional text, but 
she does not need to project herself into the story. She appreciates the story, and she 
may feel sympathy with characters(f). 
The self-in-other-narrative and the other-in-self-narrative develop from the 
other-narrative the reader creates for a character(f). They usually evolve when the 
fiction reader imagines a character from within. I showed that Ricoeur’s ‘imaginative 
variations of our ego’ can be explained in more depth by studying the web of stories the 
reader creates during the reading process. The reader enters the narrative during her 
empathy with the character(f), bolstering up her imaginings of this character(f) with her 
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own experiential memories. These memories bring their own mini-stories with them, 
which then become part of the reading experience. By imagining a character(f) from 
inside, the reader slides into the fictional world, entangled with her experiential 
memories, and develops emotions about her own self. During this process, it is possible 
that the reader is either envious or desirous of the character(f)’s actions, or disgusted by 
them. In the first case, the reader imagines new views and ways of living (which are 
compliant with her ethical values) through the character(f), and the other-narrative 
swings towards a self-in-other-narrative. In the second case, the character(f) leads the 
reader on to paths the reader would not have dared or wanted to tread in real life, thus 
turning the self-in-other-narrative into an other-in-self-narrative. As the reader can 
switch between these two self-involving narratives within the same reading experience, 
I call this process the ‘doppelgänger-function’. 
The doppelgänger function is constantly on the look-out for similarities between 
the reader and the character(f), thus influencing the direction of the reader’s 
imagination. I hold that my concept of the doppelgänger function is a fine-tuned tool to 
distinguish in which directions the imaginative variations of the fiction reader’s self 
may go. As shown with the example of John William’s Stoner, the self-in-other end of 
the doppelgänger function tends to cause emotions about situations in which we found 
ourselves in the past, whereas the other-in-self end typically leads to either a fleeting 
elation or a concern about a lesson newly learned, or shame about an unwelcome 
connection understood. So my distinction of the three types of narratives, monitored by 
the doppelgänger function, gives an explanation of how different kinds of self-
conscious emotion can evolve from fiction reading. 
As a next step, in chapter 7, I investigated the effects of fiction-induced 
emotions on the reader’s self-reflection. I showed that self-conscious emotions like 
shame, guilt, embarrassment or pride are often generated during the reading process 
with participation, in particular through sympathy or empathy with a character(f), for 
two main reasons: detachment from the reader’s current real-life concerns, and the 
possibility of risk-free imagination. I argued that these self-conscious emotions can 
result from the three different kinds of narrative discussed in chapter 6: the other-
narrative, the self-in-other-narrative, or the other-in-self-narrative. Reading-induced 
emotions have an important feature in common: they are – in the end – mainly about 
myself, the reader. 
 198 
Self-conscious emotions already contain a nucleus of self-scrutiny when they are 
invoked. This is why they have a high influence on a reader’s motivation to engage in 
subsequent self-reflection: they draw the reader’s attention towards unresolved conflicts 
in their self-narrative.  
In chapter 8, I discussed the differences between Ricoeur’s account of fiction 
reading and my own. Regarding the reading process itself, I argued that Ricoeur misses 
two important points: first, his view of catharsis is too simple to represent the complex 
chain of emotions which are triggered by fiction reading, and second, he does not attach 
sufficient importance to the impact of experiential memories which the reader recalls 
during fiction reading. Hence, he has no convincing explanation of how the reader 
comes to reflect on the fictional worlds she got to know. In my account, I filled these 
gaps. First, I showed how different kinds of emotions emerge during the three types of 
narrative the reader creates when engaging with a work of fiction. Second, I explained 
why many of these emotions are self-conscious, and hence possible starting points for 
self-doubts. 
Regarding the reader’s self-reflection after the reading process, I argued that 
Ricoeur’s account seems over-optimistic regarding the benefits of fiction reading. 
Ricoeur says that self-reflection will guide the dialectic between counterfactual actions 
and the story one has woven about one’s own life towards a revaluation of the self. His 
account seems to suggest that fiction reading is always beneficial to us, leading us in the 
direction of a unified life and better social integration. As I pointed out, this is the ideal 
path of self-reflection, but self-reflection can work in different ways. It can – as Ricoeur 
suggests – challenge our values, it can challenge our self-narrative, and it can make us 
more discerning in our social relationships. 
If, however, the reader’s self-narrative is severely distorted when she engages 
with a work of fiction, her subsequent self-reflection will be based on wrong premises. I 
showed that readers with a biased self-narrative are likely to react only to parts of the 
fictional work which support their erroneous conception of their own life. In such cases, 
the self-narrative will not have much chance of refiguration. I pointed out that Ricoeur’s 
account does not include this possibility. Ricoeur holds that self-reflection can only lead 
to an improved self-unity. In my own account, I showed that self-reflection can only do 
that if it is based on a realistic self-narrative. 
In chapter 9, I tackled two points in Walton’s account of fiction reading which 
are open to questions. First, I challenged Walton’s view of the reader’s emotions during 
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fiction reading. Walton says that during fiction reading, our emotions are only felt 
within the fiction. I showed that the reading experience and the recall of experiential 
memories can trigger a chain of real emotions in the reader. In my account, I explored 
how and when experiential memories can enter the reader’s narrative, transform it, and 
evoke a chain of self-conscious emotions which exist outside the reading experience. 
Second, I pointed out that the relationship between fiction-induced emotions and 
self-reflection can contribute to the reader’s life by influencing the way she refigures 
her self-narrative. Walton says that this point is still to be explored. I showed that self-
conscious emotions which evolve during the reading process can persist and start a 
process of reflection, during which the reader can rewrite her own story and, if it is 
realistic, gain a fuller unity of life. 
Overall, the main benefit of my account of fiction reading is that it accounts for 
the creation and the influence of self-conscious emotions which are generated during the 
reading process, and which can continue after reading. My account addresses a new 
topic: the interactive influence of fiction reading and the fiction reader’s narrative 





Attestation: in connection with personal identity: confirming one’s memories, one’s 
actions, and one’s body as one’s own. 
 
BCA: Bodily Continuity Account, claims that a person’s identity over time consists in 
the identity of her body. 
 
Character(f): a fictional person in a work of fiction. 
 
Character(mf): a meta-fictional person, who is not involved in the fictional narrative 
but with whom a reader engages when reading a work of fiction, usually the inferred 
author. 
 
Character(p): character as an aspect of personal identity: the set of lasting dispositions 
by which a person is recognized (durable, belonging to the idem). 
 
Conflict: a situation where there is a significant difference between what I believe to be 
the case and what I desire to be the case. 
 
Dialectic: a struggle between two positions, in the course of which each is becoming 
clearer, approaching a conclusion to end the conflict. 
 
Doppelgänger function: a general human capability that works as a monitor, 
constantly switched on, alerted to find relations between the reader and the character(f). 
 
Emotional disposition: tendency to react with certain emotions under certain 
conditions. 
 
Emotional episode: series of emotional reactions extended over time and organized 
around an underlying theme. 
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Emotional experience: combined phenomenological feeling (including bodily 
sensations as well as psychological feelings) caused by an emotional reaction or an 
emotional episode. 
 
Emotional reaction: short-term emotional response, which might last for a few seconds 
or a few minutes. 
 
Ethical subjectivity: a person’s ability to act according to her personal aims, 
preferences and values. This ability is shaped and developed in a person’s interaction 
with her social nexus and its prevailing value system. 
 
Event schema: the conceptualization of past experience. In memory, the events are 
structured into a recognizable script. 
 
Fiction: a story the content of which was not constrained by fidelity to reality. 
 
Idem: one of the two aspects of personal identity: the durable self, the answer to the 
question ‘what?’. 
 
Iff: philosophical term for ‘if and only if’. 
 
Inferred author: each reader’s own version of the implied author. 
 
Implied author: the author who is implied by the genre and style of the work of fiction, 
by the choices of theme, point of view, protagonist, story structure, vocabulary and 
general setting. 
 
Intentional content: content of an intentional state. Can be descriptive or directive, or a 
combination of both (appraisals). 
 
Intentional state: a mental state that is directed towards an object, or a state of affairs. 
 
Ipse: one of the two aspects of personal identity: the lived self, the answer to the 
question ‘who?’. 
 202 
Mimesis: Imitation of action. 
 
Mood: an affective state that is more ‘global’ or ‘diffuse’ than emotion. 
 
Narrative: a representation or specific manifestation of a story. 
 
NIA: Narrative Identity Account, claims that a person shapes her sense of herself by 
weaving the events of her life together in an ongoing autobiographical narrative. 
 
NIDA: Narrative Identity Descriptive Account, claims that every person weaves her 
autobiographical narrative without the need of a specific intention to do so. 
 
NINA: Narrative Identity Normative Account, claims that a person benefits from 
weaving her autobiographical narrative. 
 
Other-narrative: one of the narratives that can emerge during fiction reading: story 
that the reader weaves for a character(f). 
 
Other-in-self-narrative: one of the narratives that can emerge during fiction reading: 
the other (in this case the character(f)) influences the way the self views herself and her 
own values. 
 
PCA: Psychological Connectedness Account, claims that a person’s identity over time 
consists in connectedness or continuity of her psychological states. 
 
Self: short for “the lived self”, the conscious human being in interaction with the 
physical and social world. 
 
Self-narrative: the ongoing story of the self. The self-narrative provides the practical 
identity needed for the interaction of the embodied self with the world. 
 
Self-in-other-narrative: one of the narratives that can emerge during fiction reading: 
the self of the reader enters the story of the fictional ‘other’ by adopting her emotional 
experiences. 
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Story: an account of people and events, can be either fictional or non-fictional. 
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